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The aim of this article is to study political representatives in a multilevel government system and their level of political trust in relation to institutions in their own and other tiers of government. The results show that two factors are essential for understanding variations in their trust: Representatives tend to trust institutions in other tiers less than those in their own tier (the tier‐association effect), and they trust institutions more where their own party is in a governing position (the home‐team effect). Of the two, the home‐team effect is by far the most dominant factor. Multiple mandates serve to increase inter‐level trust, but divided loyalties possibly make representatives with multiple mandates less trusting towards political institutions in their own tiers than more partisan single mandate representatives. The study builds on data from surveys conducted among all elected representatives in Sweden in 2012 (local and regional councillors) and 2014 (national MPs).

Two central mechanisms of representative democracy are A) the identification of the people's will by elections and B) the process wherein elected representatives enforce pol- icies preferred by the voters. This article demonstrates that municipal size is of vital importance for how these two mechanisms function in Swedish local democracy. A prerequisite for mechanism A is that voters are provided with a variety of political alternatives to choose from. If the political alternatives are limited, voters will have trouble deciding which parties or candidates reflect their political opinions. To interpret election results as a manifestation of the people's will in such situations is highly problematic. The study shows that the manifestation of political alternatives in local politics increases significant- ly with the size of the municipality. The results also show that the political knowledge and influence (in relation to national and local bureaucracies) of local political leaders correlate positively with municipal size. The conclusion is that the success of local political leaders in their endeavour to identify and enforce the will of the people depends on the size of the municipality they govern.

Two central mechanisms of representative democracy are A) the identification of the people's will by elections and B) the process wherein elected representatives enforce policies preferred by the voters. This article demonstrates that municipal size is of vital importance for how these two mechanisms function in Swedish local democracy. A prerequisite for mechanism A is that voters are provided with a variety of political alternatives to choose from. If the political alternatives are limited, voters will have trouble deciding which parties or candidates reflect their political opinions. To interpret election results as a manifestation of the people's will in such situations is highly problematic. The study shows that the manifestation of political alternatives in local politics increases significantly with the size of the municipality. The results also show that the political knowledge and influence (in relation to national and local bureaucracies) of local political leaders correlate positively with municipal size. The conclusion is that the success of local political leaders in their endeavour to identify and enforce the will of the people depends on the size of the municipality they govern.

Summary

AbstractBehavioral public administration research has provided empirical evidence of several perception biases when individuals process information. Building on these findings, we seek to advance the literature by analyzing politicians' financial perceptions of their own government. Drawing on the theory of motivated reasoning, we examine the context of Swedish municipalities and find financial perception gaps associated with politicians' party affiliation (establishment or anti‐establishment), parliamentary position (opposition or governing party), and formal hierarchical rank. Specifically, politicians representing anti‐establishment and opposition parties, as well as those occupying lower positions in the political hierarchy—and thus having less influence over and less responsibility for municipal affairs—tend to perceive the financial situation more negatively. These findings suggest the presence of a motivationally driven bias in politicians' perceptions of financial conditions; moreover, they illustrate that these perceptions are influenced by factors beyond the traditional financial, socioeconomic, and demographic ones examined in previous research.

This article shows how two forms of party conflict (political dissent and antagonistic behaviour) are related but explained by different factors. It is therefore of utmost importance to distinguish between the two forms of conflict. Political dissent is mainly explained by the size of demos while social fragmentation, fiscal stress and party contestation increase antagonistic behaviour. The presence of a local protest party inflates both forms of conflict. Surprisingly, party contestation has less impact on conflict levels than earlier studies have suggested. The study builds on data from a unique survey conducted among all councillors in the 290 municipalities in Sweden.

There is a cost-of-ruling effect for parties who are part of ruling coalitions I local multi-party elections. Results from the case of Sweden (based on 8,892 election results of parties in local elections 1998-2010) indicate that a party on average loses almost a quarter of its share of the votes after an election period in government. The results also indicate that this cost-of-ruling effect varies depending on the party's prominence and its political company within the ruling coalition. The voters punish anti-establishment parties who enter into ruling coalitions especially hard.

The relation between institutions and political leadership has been the central theme of the research project "Local political leadership in a time of constitutional transition" at the School of Public Administration, University of Gothenburg. The project, which started in 2006 was funded by the Swedish Research Council and led by Professor Henry Bäck. Results from the project have contributed with new knowledge in the field of local political leadership in a number of aspects. This special issue of Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration marks the end of this project. Each of the three included articles represents essential aspects of how political institutions affect local political leadership. The first article has been written within the project, while the two others are written by internationally renowned local government scholars and provide comparative perspectives on the importance of institutions for political leadership.