Search results

"This book contends that existing approaches leave out key aspects of the relationship between economic power and formal political power in multilateral economic institutions. Importantly, while existing works focus on either power or institutions as distinct realms, we must examine their intersection as well. Third, institutions mediate the importance of the inter-state distribution of economic power through institutional rules and conventions. Simply, institutional conventions denote well-established procedures and specific interpretations of rules for certain actions. Among the many conventions a single institution may embody, of interest here are those that concern formal political power, including the procedures for altering it. Reasonably, these existing rules and conventions determine the parameters, if not the content, of how members alter formal political power in the institution. Particularly, such rules may more often than not be a source for "incremental change" as opposed to more big-bang alterations (e.g., Pierson 2004; Thelen and Mahoney 2010). Given that the literature currently lacks an integrative theory"--

AbstractThe G20's renewal of faith in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the 2008 financial crisis appears to have reversed the IMF's declining relevance evident in the years preceding the crisis. This article examines this putative revival of the IMF, arguing that the G20's actions contained a paradox of delegation. On the one hand, the nature of the G20's replenishment of the IMF's resources during the crisis (mostly through credit lines available to the IMF) as well as the independence the major G20 economies can afford to have from the IMF (given that they are not beholden to its resources) has meant that the G20 countries faced low sovereignty costs in reviving the IMF. On the other hand, truly re‐establishing the IMF's relevance would impose higher sovereignty costs, specifically in the form of strengthened IMF surveillance over G20 economies. This paradox of delegation suggests that the G20's action toward the IMF does not inform properly whether the G20 states have contemplated the trade‐off between suffering sovereignty costs and achieving gains from delegation. In this regard, the proper role of the IMF in the governance of the global economy remains uncertain.Policy Implications
 The G20's resuscitation of the IMF cannot be simply interpreted as indicating certainty regarding the future of the institution.
 In order for the IMF to fulfill its key tasks, particularly surveillance of global economic conditions, as envisioned by key members of the G20, these states need to permit the IMF to play the role of a mediator and technical expert in close coordination of their policies.
 The G20 states should resist the temptation to forum shop, namely charge other institutions with tasks similar to those of the IMF with a view to dispersing/avoiding sovereignty costs.
 It is no longer viable to hold on to prior assumptions and frameworks regarding the distribution of influence among states vis‐à‐vis the IMF – scholarly and policy works need to recognize large emerging economies as key principals of the Fund.
 At the same time, the IMF needs to enhance the evenhandedness of its analysis and advice in order to increase key member states' perceptions of its effectiveness and fairness.