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This dissertation extends the understanding of asymmetric group behavior in the provision of public goods. Previous studies, using an asymmetric framework, have so far focused on situations where all players profit form the social optimum. The discussion in the first paper breaks with this tradition and the results show how strong inequalities may decrease group contributions, as the high endowment players only contributes a small share of their endowments. This is in contrast to experiments using a weaker asymmetry, which indicate that players tend to contribute a fair-share of their endow...

Der Ausgangspunkt dieser Dissertation ist der Gedanke, dass es in dem Interesse der Gesellschaft ist, prosoziales Verhalten zu fördern. Weitaus fraglicher ist, welche Strategien geeignet sind, um dieses Ziel zu erreichen. In dieser Arbeit betrachte ich drei Maßnahmen: Die Einführung von Reputationssystemen, die Möglichkeit Agenten direkt aufzufordern, sich prosozial zu verhalten, und ein Taking-Frame. Dafür habe ich Laborexperimente durchgeführt, die so gestaltet sind, dass sie das Verständnis für den Einfluss dieser drei Strategien vertiefen kann. In der ersten Studie, die in gemeinsamer A...

The dynamics of behavior observed in standard public-good experiments can be explained by imperfect conditional cooperation combined with social learning (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). But it is unclear what determines first-round contributions. We argue that first-round contributions depend on the difference between the actual marginal per capita return (MPCR) and the minimal MPCR necessary to create a social dilemma for the given group size. We use a novel connected-lab design that allows members of large groups to simultaneously interact under laboratory conditions. In total, 5,220 subjects participated in our experiment in groups of up to 100 subjects. The results confirm that first-round contributions increase with the MPCR distance. This effect carries over to contributions made in subsequent rounds. Our results demonstrate that small groups behave similar to large groups and that the salience of the di-lemma situation is of great importance for contributions made to the public good.