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An expanding body of scholarly work posits that war, particularly intrastate war, disrupts established power arrangements and social institutions, providing avenues for women to enhance their political influence through reforms in political structures and participation in peace-building processes. Webster, Chen, and Beardsley (2019) systematically explore the nexus between war and women's political empowerment, demonstrating associations between both interstate and intrastate conflicts and advancements in women's political empowerment. Extending their analysis, this study investigates the influence of intrastate conflicts on women's representation in legislative bodies. However, nuanced findings emerge from this analysis. There is no supporting evidence that the occurrence of warfare leads to an increase in women's legislative representation. Ongoing internal conflicts exhibit a negative impact on the progression of women's political representation. Conversely, the termination of civil wars, particularly without their prompt resumption, correlates with a higher likelihood of adopting gender quotas, thereby enhancing women's legislative representation. Furthermore, the correlation between the termination of civil wars and women's legislative representation appears specific to the context of sub-Saharan Africa. No conclusive evidence supports this relationship as a global phenomenon.

Existing scholarship shows that a history of military rule increases the risk of democratic breakdown. However, scholars overlook the fact that military rule takes two distinct forms: collegial and personalist military rule. I argue that the two types of military rule provide different structural settings for post-authoritarian contexts. Collegial military rule hands over more cohesive and hierarchical militaries to their subsequent democracies than personalist military rule. These militaries remain organized, politicized, and powerful in emerging democracies, which increases the risk of military intervention and coups. I hypothesize that collegial military rule poses a greater threat to the survival of the ensuing democracies than personalist military rule. Empirical analysis reveals that democracies after collegial military rule are more likely to collapse than other democracies, including those emerging from personalist military rule. This shows that the previous finding on the detrimental effect of military rule is largely driven by collegial military rule.

Existing scholarship shows that a history of military rule increases the risk of democratic breakdown. However, scholars overlook the fact that military rule takes two distinct forms: collegial and personalist military rule. I argue that the two types of military rule provide different structural settings for post-authoritarian contexts. Collegial military rule hands over more cohesive and hierarchical militaries to their subsequent democracies than personalist military rule. These militaries remain organized, politicized, and powerful in emerging democracies, which increases the risk of military intervention and coups. I hypothesize that collegial military rule poses a greater threat to the survival of the ensuing democracies than personalist military rule. Empirical analysis reveals that democracies after collegial military rule are more likely to collapse than other democracies, including those emerging from personalist military rule. This shows that the previous finding on the detrimental effect of military rule is largely driven by collegial military rule.

Extant scholarship establishes that territorial issues are more likely than other types of issues to lead to militarized interstate disputes and war. One key premise is that a strong attachment to the material and symbolic values of the homeland makes people more willing to fight for their country in territorial disputes. However, there is no systematic evidence for this premise. Although recent studies investigate the effect of territorial conflict on individual attitudes and find that territorial issues are qualitatively different from other types of issues, researchers have not yet investigated how territorial threats influence people's willingness to fight. By combining data on territorial claims from the Issue Correlates of War project with individual-level data from the World Values Survey, this article tests the relationship between territorial claims and individuals' willingness to fight. My analysis reveals that respondents are more willing to fight for their country when their countries experience territorial claims. Building on the contentious issues approach, I further demonstrate the importance of issue salience and issue context in the relationship between territorial claims and willingness to fight. Last, I show that the relationship between territorial claims and willingness to fight depends on a country's level of economic development or regime type.

Extant scholarship establishes that territorial issues are more likely than other types of issues to lead to militarized interstate disputes and war. One key premise is that a strong attachment to the material and symbolic values of the homeland makes people more willing to fight for their country in territorial disputes. However, there is no systematic evidence for this premise. Although recent studies investigate the effect of territorial conflict on individual attitudes and find that territorial issues are qualitatively different from other types of issues, researchers have not yet investigated how territorial threats influence people's willingness to fight. By combining data on territorial claims from the Issue Correlates of War project with individual-level data from the World Values Survey, this article tests the relationship between territorial claims and individuals' willingness to fight. My analysis reveals that respondents are more willing to fight for their country when their countries experience territorial claims. Building on the contentious issues approach, I further demonstrate the importance of issue salience and issue context in the relationship between territorial claims and willingness to fight. Last, I show that the relationship between territorial claims and willingness to fight depends on a country's level of economic development or regime type.

Do elections improve a country's prospects for democratization? The theory of democratization by elections proposes that reiterated multiparty elections foster gradual institutional changes leading to progress toward democracy. Edgell et al. provide the most systematic evidence for this theory, but substantial disagreements remain among scholars studying the effects of authoritarian elections on democratization. In this study, I reassess the relationship between elections and democratization. In doing so, I account for the temporal structure of democratic qualities that are highly persistent. When I control for the dynamics of democratic qualities by adding a lag (or lags) of the dependent variable, the democratizing effects of repeated elections disappear; indeed, most evidence indicates a negative relationship between elections and democratization. This finding calls into question the causal role of elections in the process of democratization and demonstrates the importance of modeling the persistent nature of democracy in exploring the effect of a variable on democratization.

This study argues that sustained threats to homeland territory create an environment conducive to the presence of military regimes. Territorial threats lead to increased levels of militarization and make the military internally unified and cohesive. These developments enhance the military's capacity for intervening in politics where a strong and autonomous military serves as an institutionalized veto player. Accordingly, collegial military regimes, characterized by a group of high-ranking officers and distinct from military strongman rule in which power is concentrated in the hands of a single military leader, are likely to exist in environments rife with territorial threats. Supporting my argument, I find that a country is more likely to experience collegial military rule when it engages in rivalries or claims over territorial issues.

AbstractThe role transparency plays in the prevention of currency crises is widely acknowledged. Nevertheless, the relationship between transparency and currency crises has rarely been subjected to systematic cross‐national scrutiny. This paper attempts to explore the effect of transparency on currency crises by focusing on a specific dimension of transparency: the public dissemination of aggregate economic data by governments. My analysis provides strong evidence that greater transparency is associated with a lower likelihood of currency crises, regardless of economic conditions. When I add economic and political determinants of currency crises, the estimate of transparency remains unaltered in magnitude or statistical significance.

This article argues that revolutionary leaders are more willing to commit mass killing than nonrevolutionary leaders. Revolutionary leaders are more ideologically committed to transforming society, more risk tolerant, and more likely to view the use of violence as appropriate and effective. Furthermore, such leaders tend to command highly disciplined and loyal organizations, built in the course of revolutionary struggles, that can perpetrate mass killing. This study uses time series cross-sectional data from 1955 to 2004 to demonstrate that revolutionary leaders are more likely to initiate genocide or politicide than nonrevolutionary leaders. The violent behaviors of revolutionary leaders are not limited to the immediate postrevolutionary years but also occur later in their tenure. This demonstrates that the association of revolutionary leaders and mass killing is not simply indicative of postrevolutionary instability. This article also provides evidence for the importance of exclusionary ideologies in motivating revolutionary leaders to inflict massive violence.

Does military rule make a state more belligerent internationally? Several studies have recently established that military autocracies are more likely than civilian autocracies to deploy and use military force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. I argue that military regimes are more likely to resort to military force because they are located in more hostile security environments, and not because they are inherently aggressive. First, I show that rule by military institution is more likely to emerge and exist in states facing external territorial threats. Second, by examining the relationship between military autocracies and conflict initiation, I find that once I control for states' territorial threats, the statistical association between military regimes and conflict initiation disappears. Additionally, more evidence suggests that civilian dictatorships are more conflict-prone than their military counterparts when I account for unobserved dyad heterogeneity. The results are consistent across different measures of international conflict and authoritarian regimes.