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School vouchers might seem a natural feature of the liberal welfare model of the U.S. and American society generally. However, for social democratic welfare states in Scandinavia, school vouchers would seem to be a contradiction. Nevertheless, school vouchers have faced severe resistance in the USA, and the program has so far not been adopted as a national educational reform, although sporadic and limited state‐level developments can be observed. In Sweden, however, the social democratic welfare state adopted a national, universal public voucher scheme in the early 1990s. The goal of this article is to explain this counter‐theoretical empirical puzzle. It is argued that the varying output from political processes on school vouchers in the USA and Sweden is to be explained by the different ways in which political institutions affect political decision making in the two countries.

The idea that modern welfare states can be grouped into distinct regimes dominates contemporary studies of welfare state restructuring, and several studies have concluded welfare state reforms to be correlated with regime structures. These studies build, however, on analyses of only cash‐benefit programmes whereas social services are almost neglected in current welfare state research. Thus, the aim of this article is to test the explanatory capacity of the welfare state regime perspective in relation to reforms in the service dimension of advanced welfare states – normally termed 'public sector reforms'. For this purpose, the author has conducted a focused comparison of the degree to which archetypical examples of the liberal regime (United States), the social democratic regime (Sweden) and the conservative regime (Germany) have introduced vouchers and parental choice into their public primary schools. Schools and education have ranked high on the public sector reform agenda since the 1980s, while the school choice issue signifies core aspects of the rationale of the reform movement: re‐arranging public provision of services into quasi‐markets. The article identifies, however, a clear lack of correlation between adoption of the school‐choice policy and welfare state regimes. Instead, the reforms undertaken in all three countries seem closely related to the institutional rules of political decision making.

Comparative research emphasize Social Democratic parties as leading political forces when universal welfare states are reformed in accordance with market-oriented principles. Considering the traditional portrayal of universal welfare states as an institutional feature of Nordic political economics, which tends to favor the Social Democrats in the political power struggle, this is a highly surprising conclusion. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, that Social Democratic market reforms are caused by economic constraints, this article postulate reforms to be conducted for political & strategic purposes. The theoretical argument goes like this: Social Democrat governments decide upon reforms when the parry-elite perceive policy problems as potential threats to the legitimacy of the universal welfare state. Hence, market-oriented reforms are expected to re-invigorate the legitimacy of the universal welfare institutions. For political institutions to be efficient power resources they are requited to be deemed legitimate by a democratic constituency. Otherwise they can work counterproductive in the ongoing power-struggle. The theory is tested empirically in a structured comparison of Swedish & Danish school policy in the 1990s, & is confirmed with some slight modifications. References. Adapted from the source document.

How responsive are democratic governments to business demands for tax cuts? We research this question in comparative case studies of cuts in corporate taxes and inheritance taxes in Austria and Sweden. We find that governments, regardless of partisan composition, are responsive to business demands, but that fiscal and electoral goals attenuate responsiveness. In both countries, the limited revenues generated by inheritance taxation and greater alignment of business demands with middle-class voter interests resulted in governments heading business demands for an abolition of this tax. Goal conflict were larger for corporate tax cuts. In both countries, governments tried to minimize these goal conflict by adopting compensatory policy measures, specifically measures to broaden the tax base and simultaneous tax cuts for low-income groups. The findings suggest that the policy output of business-friendly tax cuts reflect a balancing of conflicting goals, rather than outright business dominance.

How responsive are democratic governments to business demands for tax cuts? We research this question in comparative case studies of cuts in corporate taxes and inheritance taxes in Austria and Sweden. We find that governments, regardless of partisan composition, are responsive to business demands, but that fiscal and electoral goals attenuate responsiveness. In both countries, the limited revenues generated by inheritance taxation and greater alignment of business demands with middle‐class voter interests resulted in governments heading business demands for an abolition of this tax. Goal conflict were larger for corporate tax cuts. In both countries, governments tried to minimize these goal conflict by adopting compensatory policy measures, specifically measures to broaden the tax base and simultaneous tax cuts for low‐income groups. The findings suggest that the policy output of business‐friendly tax cuts reflect a balancing of conflicting goals, rather than outright business dominance.

Do political outcomes respond more strongly to the preferences of the rich? In an age of rising inequality, this question has become increasingly salient. Yet, although an influential literature has emerged, no systematic account exists either of the severity of differentials in political responsiveness, the potential drivers of those differentials, or the variation across democracies. This article fills that gap. We analyze 1,163 estimates of responsiveness from 25 studies and find that, although this research collectively suggests that political outcomes better reflect the preferences of the rich, results vary considerably across models and studies. The divergence in results is partly driven by partisanship and the model specification, while we find no significant variation across either policy domains or general/specific measures of political outcomes. Finally, and against theoretical expectations, published research suggests that differentials in responsiveness are weaker in the United States compared to other developed democracies. The article contributes to our understanding of differential responsiveness by clarifying the main debates and findings in the literature, identifying issues and gaps, and pointing to fruitful avenues for future research.

Do political outcomes respond more strongly to the preferences of the rich? In an age of rising inequality, this question has become increasingly salient. Yet, although an influential literature has emerged, no systematic account exists either of the severity of differentials in political responsiveness, the potential drivers of those differentials, or the variation across democracies. This article fills that gap. We analyze 1,163 estimates of responsiveness from 25 studies and find that, although this research collectively suggests that political outcomes better reflect the preferences of the rich, results vary considerably across models and studies. The divergence in results is partly driven by partisanship and the model specification, while we find no significant variation across either policy domains or general/specific measures of political outcomes. Finally, and against theoretical expectations, published research suggests that differentials in responsiveness are weaker in the United States compared to other developed democracies. The article contributes to our understanding of differential responsiveness by clarifying the main debates and findings in the literature, identifying issues and gaps, and pointing to fruitful avenues for future research.

Koordinerede beslutningsprocesser og institutionaliseret samspil mellem stat og relevante interessegrupper skabte konsensus og stabilitet om politiske løsninger i den klassepolitiske æra. Det var en velegnet model i udviklingen af velfærdssamfundet, mens regeringer på den anden side af klassepolitikken har sværere ved at anvende korporativ konsensuspolitik i forbindelse med reformer, som påfører organiserede interesser koncentrerede tab. Vi argumenterer for, at det nye postklassepolitiske terræn til gengæld tilbyder reformregeringer øget fleksibilitet i alliancedannelserne med samfundets organiserede interesser, og øger de strategiske muligheder regeringer har for at maksimere eget aftryk på den førte politik. Men det er samtidig en fleksibilitet, der har en pris i form af reduceret konsensus og stabilitet omkring trufne beslutninger. Vi illustrerer relevansen af argumentet i casestudier af (dele af) kommunalreformen fra 2007, loven om lærernes tjenestetidsaftale fra 2013 samt nedsættelsen af familieejede virksomheders arveafgift i Danmark fra 2017. Skiftende danske regeringer gennemførte i alle tre tilfælde politiske reformer gennem strategiske alliancer med nogle organisationer mod andre, og der blev i alle tilfælde brudt med traditionelle allierede i det interessepolitiske terræn. I alle tilfælde fik reformregeringen også sin politik igennem. Men vi viser også, at de valgte løsninger vedvarende antastes af alternative politiske koalitioner.