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The article examines the new U. S. Arctic strategy adopted by Joseph Biden's administration in October 2022. The new strategy develops the policies of both Barack Obama and Donald Trump. This continuity is particularly relevant to such issues as the promotion of the United States' national interests in the Arctic, strengthening cooperation with NATO allies, increasing the U.S. military presence in the region, promoting the concept of Alaska's sustainable development, developing dialogue and cooperation with the indigenous population of Alaska. However, the document also has a number of significant differences from previous strategies. The Strategy‑2022 pays much more attention to the problem of climate change. Under Obama, the development of climate action strategies was still in its initial stage, under Trump it was almost completely ignored, but for the Biden administration it has become a priority again. The Strategy‑2022 differs greatly from the Strategy‑2013 in its confrontational spirit, and, continuing the traditions of the Trump administration, it sees the Arctic as a region of likely conflicts, not peace and cooperation. Moreover, it has strengthened Trump's policy of confrontation with Russia and China in this region. Washington's military construction plans, the intensification of exercises in the areas adjacent to the Russian Federation, the launch of the process of including Sweden and Finland in NATO creates prerequisites for a smooth inclusion of the Arctic in the NATO area of responsibility. This significantly increases Russia's military vulnerability in the northern and northwestern strategic directions. The Strategy‑2022 has a certain inconsistency. On the one hand, the document declares the U.S. commitment to international cooperation in the Arctic. On the other hand, it obviously contains hegemonic aspirations in the region. Washington's position on the resumption of cooperation with Russia in international institutions, including the Arctic Council, remains uncertain. In fact, the Arctic becomes one of new fronts of the long-term competition between the United States and Russia. Such a turn creates concerns not only for Russia, but also for other nations who would like to see the Arctic peaceful, safe and prosperous.

The growing interest in exploitation of the Arctic is present on the part of many countries. According to the existing legal rules, only five countries directly bordering on the Arctic are eligible to develop its shelf: Canada, Denmark, Norway, the USA and Russia. Japan and China would like to participate if the Extreme North exploitation regime changes. The authors analyze the unfolding battle between different countries for the control over the Arctic. For many countries, their interests in the region and concepts of the shelf borders are the area of disagreement. Therefore, both multipartite and bipartite coalitions at the political level are possible in the future.

This article examines the implications of the deployment of the US ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in the Baltic and Nordic regions. These implications are to be considered to ensure Russia's military security. Using the structural-functional method, the authors analyse the internal structure of the US BMD in Europe, stages of its implementation, and its influence on the military equilibrium in the region. Being similar to other regional missile defence systems of the Pentagon, BMD in Europe increases the offensive capabilities of the US armed forces and its allies and in doing so, it stops performing a purely defensive mission declared by Washington. It is stressed that the deployment of mobile sea- and land-based BMD elements in the Baltic Sea region and Nordic countries will inevitably destabilize the strategic situation and may lead to a new round of arms race in the region. The efficacy of BMD in Europe is evaluated from the perspective of military technology. The system's potential threats to Russia's military security and its armed forces are assessed. The article considers measures to enhance national security that could be taken by Russia provided the US plans to deploy BMD in Europe are fully implemented.

Defence cooperation between Poland and the United States significantly affects the security agenda of Russia, the Baltic region, and Europe as a whole. On the one hand, Poland intends to become a key partner of the US in ensuring European security. On the other hand, it has ambitions to take the leading position in the security area among the Baltic States. The Polish leadership sees an additional advantage in expanding military cooperation with the United States, regarding it as a jumping board to accelerating its economic and technological development. This article examines a mechanism underlying defence cooperation between the US and Poland, i.e. lobbying Poland's interests in another state. This allows Warsaw to actively promote its interests in the US. The research methodology employed includes the periodisation of Polish lobbying activities in the US and an empirical study of lobbying based on analysis of original documents, many of which have been analysed for the first time. It is shown that, under the existing party system, Poland will not abandon strategic partnership with the United States, primarily in security and defence. Over the study period, Poland quickly gained experience in promoting its interests in the US through direct lobbying, showing flexibility in negotiations, relying on the two-party support in the US Congress, successfully coordinating the activities of its governing bodies and various corporations which are submitted to tight state control.