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Although studies of the Cuban missile crisis abound, the story "from below" of those fateful days of October 1962 remains largely to be written. This is particularly true for the Soviet side. Little is known about the way the Soviet population, and particularly youth, the prime category for propaganda, perceived what is widely regarded as the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War. Youth were indeed the target of a massive mobilization campaign, but one that was ridden with many shortcomings, or, using the musical metaphor, dissonances. The propaganda machine (mainly the press but also radio and film) had been cultivating anti-Americanism and solidarity with the Cuban people for quite some time, but when the crisis suddenly arose, many "choir members" were unable to modulate their voice to the right key, if there ever was one. Secrecy and improvisation in the Communist Party's highest organs, coupled with the trauma of World War II, bore the fruits of inertia, formalism, pacifism, and above all, embarrassed silence, eventually contributing to an extreme and often ambivalent palette of reactions.

Although studies of the Cuban missile crisis abound, the story 'from below' of those fateful days of October 1962 remains largely to be written. This is particularly true for the Soviet side. Little is known about the way the Soviet population, and particularly youth, the prime category for propaganda, perceived what is widely regarded as the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War. Youth were indeed the target of a massive mobilization campaign, but one that was ridden with many shortcomings, or, using the musical metaphor, dissonances. The propaganda machine (mainly the press but also radio and film) had been cultivating anti-Americanism and solidarity with the Cuban people for quite some time, but when the crisis suddenly arose, many 'choir members' were unable to modulate their voice to the right key, if there ever was one. Secrecy and improvisation in the Communist Party's highest organs, coupled with the trauma of World War II, bore the fruits of inertia, formalism, pacifism, and above all, embarrassed silence, eventually contributing to an extreme and often ambivalent palette of reactions. Adapted from the source document.

After 1964, Soviet cultural diplomacy used the cinema industry more than ever to compete with its main enemy, Hollywood, in a Cold War battle across different continents. From the famous adaptation of Tolstoy's War and Peace (1965) to the now forgotten military saga Liberation (1971), the first part of the Brezhnev era witnessed an important effort by Moscow not only to recover cinematic territory from Hollywood, but also to counter the Western films whose vision of history contradicted the Soviet vision. Although these efforts seem disappointing, the analysis of co-productions shows that in reality the traditional model of interpretation (efficiency v inefficiency) needs to be reconsidered when studying Soviet cultural diplomacy. Adapted from the source document.

SUMMARY:
Соглашение в культурной сфере, подписанное 27 января 1957 г. между США и СССР, включало в себя договор о туристических обменах между странами. На сегодняшний день политическая и культурная история туристических обменов между СССР и США мало исследована. Документы организации ВЛКСМ "Спутник", которые хранятся в комсомольском архиве РГАСПИ в Москве, дошли до нас в очень неполном комплекте. Тем не менее они позволяют восстановить частицу этой забытой истории. В статье изучаются поездки делегаций "Спутника" в США в 1975–1985 гг., т.е. в период конца "разрядки" и так называемой "новой холодной войны". В этом непростом контексте тщательно отобранные для таких поездок молодые туристы играли разные роли: они должны были быть представителями "социалистического рая" и доносителями, а по ходу реализации программы становились потребителями. С другой стороны, эти туры предоставляли участникам не только редчайшую возможность сопоставить реальности почти "потустороннего мира" со стереотипами антиамериканской советской пропаганды – они также способствовали обогащению коллективной и личной идентичности. Автор приходит к заключению, что в результате этих поездок Америка теряла флер "потустороннего мира" в глазах молодых туристов, что делало ее привлекательной для нескольких поколений советских граждан. В этом состоит весь парадокс "закрытого общества": ограничивая путешествия в США, советская система способствовала распространению идеалов "воображаемого Запада" у молодежи, которая таким образом все более отдалялась от господствующей идеологической системы советского режима.