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The article investigates how exposure to gang-affiliated peers affects social behaviors and attitudes of early adolescents. Much of the literature finds that exposure to gangs contributes to adolescents' antisocial behaviors. According to other studies, however, gang exposure can also promote prosocial behaviors. The present article re-examines this contradictory evidence, exploring potential complementarity of both reactions to gangs. Using a survey of 1,782 adolescents aged ten to 13 from rural Colombia, I compare adolescents who are and are not in a school class with members of youth gangs. I exploit the fact that schools in rural Colombia are unsegregated. Moreover, the presence of youth gangs across these schools is linked to incidence of historic armed conflict rather than typical forms of social disadvantage. This comparative setting thus allows me to establish an unconfounded relationship between exposure to gang-affiliated classmates and social outcomes. The analysis reveals gender differences in the effect of youth gang exposure. I find that girls react to male gang classmate by increased involvement in prosocial organizations. Boys, by contrast, adjust to male gangs by expressing more antisocial attitudes. There are no gender differences in the effect of gang classmates on alcohol consumption (an indicator of antisocial behavior). The article shows that the well-documented antisocial adjustments to gangs are – population-wide – complemented by prosocial adjustments, with gender being a key moderator. I discuss the implications of these findings for theories of violence and social change after conflict.

Evidence on the consequences of war for community cohesion is mixed, pointing to both positive and negative effects of conflict. This study examines symmetry of force between warring actors as an explanation of heterogeneous conflict effects. Using survey data from 224 Colombian villages, I compare cohesion in communities exposed to asymmetric and symmetric conflicts, a guerrilla war between rebels and the state and a more conventional war between rebels and paramilitary groups, respectively. I find that symmetric war increases participation in community organizations, while asymmetric war decreases trust. Evidence suggests three mechanisms that explain these findings. Symmetric war increases cohesion (i) by spurring individuals to band together to cope with significant disruption of services and (ii) by strengthening group identities that map onto fairly clear wartime cleavages. Asymmetric war reduces cohesion (iii) by instilling fear and suspicion linked to wartime experiences of civilian collaboration and denunciations.

Evidence on the consequences of war for community cohesion is mixed, pointing to both positive and negative effects of conflict. This study examines symmetry of force between warring actors as an explanation of heterogeneous conflict effects. Using survey data from 224 Colombian villages, I compare cohesion in communities exposed to asymmetric and symmetric conflicts, a guerrilla war between rebels and the state and a more conventional war between rebels and paramilitary groups, respectively. I find that symmetric war increases participation in community organizations, while asymmetric war decreases trust. Evidence suggests three mechanisms that explain these findings. Symmetric war increases cohesion (i) by spurring individuals to band together to cope with significant disruption of services and (ii) by strengthening group identities that map onto fairly clear wartime cleavages. Asymmetric war reduces cohesion (iii) by instilling fear and suspicion linked to wartime experiences of civilian collaboration and denunciations.

The paper examines conditions under which communities threatened by armed groups amid the Colombian civil war are most likely to resist displacement. Using a game-theoretic framework and quantitative data, the paper shows that the threatened communities which expect rescue from an armed actor are more likely to resist displacement than those communities which expect no help. Community cohesion has a dual effect on displacement. The amount of peer support among community members reduces their chances to resist displacement, but the extent to which community members are involved in collective decision-making processes makes them less likely to displace. These findings reveal that both displaced communities and those that resisted displacement possess crucial social resources for their post-conflict recovery and development, such as cohesion and strong bonds of solidarity. The paper stresses the importance of local-level organisation coordinating collective decision-making to guarantee the most efficient use of these resources.

AbstractThis article addresses the puzzle of heterogeneous trends in paramilitary violence on the Colombian Pacific Coast since the beginning of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process in 2003. The usual explanations derived from political conflict theories are improved with insights from organized crime research. The article argues that the occasional escalation of post-DDR paramilitary violence at the subregional level cannot be explained by the weakness of the state argument. Instead, the article demonstrates the counterintuitive evidence that paramilitary violence correlates positively with the incidence of state repressive intervention against paramilitary groups. More specifically, paramilitaries challenged by the state use more violence, either to replace their nonviolent resources most affected by law enforcement activities or to respond to crackdown-related intensification of predatory tendencies within their respective organizations.

This thesis addresses the puzzle of heterogeneous trends in paramilitary violence in the two Colombian regions since the beginning of DDR process in 2003. The usual explanations derived from political conflict theories are improved with insights from organized crime research. The author argues that the occasional escalation of post DDR paramilitary violence at sub-regional level cannot be explained with the weakness of the state argument. In order to support this claim, the paper demonstrates the counter intuitive evidence that paramilitary violence correlates positively with the incidence of the state repressive intervention against paramilitary groups. More specifically, the paper finds that the paramilitaries challenged by the state use more violence either as a way of substituting their non-violent resources most affected by law enforcement activities, or in response to crackdown-related intensification of predatory tendencies within their respective organizations. Implications for future conflict resolution of Colombian Civil War are considered.

Abstract
Why do some people resolve disputes through the state, while others use religious or customary justice? We address this question by conducting a vignette experiment in Kosovo. We design hypothetical situations in which fictitious characters are involved in disputes regarding inheritance, debt, domestic violence, and murder. We vary information concerning (i) vignette characters' resources, (ii) their beliefs about the efficiency of state justice, and (iii) dispute settlement customs in the characters' communities. Survey respondents assess whether a vignette character is likely to seek informal justice, given the described circumstances. We find that respondents associate informal justice with characters who believe that the state would resolve their disputes very slowly, and whose other community members would not use state justice. These findings generalize to respondents' own justice preferences and patterns of actual informal dispute settlement in Kosovo and beyond. Our article highlights efficiency concerns and local conventions as explanations of informal justice.

Does physical surveillance hinder or foster antiregime resistance? A common view holds that surveillance prevents resistance by providing regimes with high-quality intelligence on dissident networks and by instilling fear in citizens. We contrast this view using formerly classified data from Communist Poland. We find that communities exposed to secret police officers were more likely to organize protests but also engaged in less sabotage. To ensure that the relationship is causal, we use an instrumental variable strategy, which exploits the exogenous assignment of Catholic "spy priests" to local communities. To trace the underlying mechanisms, we draw on qualitative interviews and archival sources. We document that Poland's comprehensive use of surveillance created widespread anger as well as an incentive for citizens to reveal their true loyalties, thus facilitating antiregime collective action. Once on the streets, protesters refrained from sabotage to signal their political motivation to bystanders and authorities alike.

Do ethnic riots affect prosocial behavior? A common view among scholars of ethnic violence is that riots increase cooperation within the warring groups, while cooperation across groups is reduced. We revisit this hypothesis by studying the aftermath of the 2010 Osh riot in Kyrgyzstan, which saw Kyrgyz from outside the city kill over 400 Uzbeks. We implement a representative survey, which includes unobtrusive experimental measures of prosocial behavior. Our causal identification strategy exploits variation in the distance of neighborhoods to armored military vehicles, which were instrumental in orchestrating the riot. We find that victimized neighborhoods show substantially lower levels of prosocial behavior. Importantly, we demonstrate that the reduction is similarly stark both within and across groups. Using qualitative interviews, we parse out two mechanisms that help explain the surprising reduction in ingroup prosociality: Victimized Uzbeks felt abandoned by their coethnics, and variation in victimization created a feeling of suspicion.

Do ethnic riots affect prosocial behavior? A common view among scholars of ethnic violence is that riots increase cooperation within the warring groups, while cooperation across groups is reduced. We revisit this hypothesis by studying the aftermath of the 2010 Osh riot in Kyrgyzstan, which saw Kyrgyz from outside the city kill over 400 Uzbeks. We implement a representative survey, which includes unobtrusive experimental measures of prosocial behavior. Our causal identification strategy exploits variation in the distance of neighborhoods to armored military vehicles, which were instrumental in orchestrating the riot. We find that victimized neighborhoods show substantially lower levels of prosocial behavior. Importantly, we demonstrate that the reduction is similarly stark both within and across groups. Using qualitative interviews, we parse out two mechanisms that help explain the surprising reduction in ingroup prosociality: Victimized Uzbeks felt abandoned by their coethnics, and variation in victimization created a feeling of suspicion.

It is commonly viewed that violence against politicians increases support for the victim's party. We revisit this conjecture drawing on evidence from an assassination of an opposition politician in Poland. First, we analyze engagement with Twitter content posted by opposition and government politicians using a difference-in-differences framework. Second, we use a public opinion survey collected in the days around the attack and compare party preferences of respondents interviewed just before and respondents interviewed just after the attack. Our results reveal decreased support for the victim's (opposition) party relative to support for the government. To explain this finding, we show that the opposition antagonized the public by engaging in negative campaigning against the government over their politician's assassination. Content analysis of tweets and news media confirms that citizens punished the opposition for their negative campaigning after the violence. Tentative evidence suggests that these effects could have had long-run political consequences.