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Now more than ever, communities across the world are integrated into a complex, global information ecosystem that shapes the nature of social, political, and economic life. The ripple effects of actors trying to manipulate or disrupt this information ecosystem are far more severe than the primary effects that are merely being felt in the information space. In fact, the weaponization of narratives has already shown its potential to transform the character of conflict in the twenty-first century. Subversion examines how malicious state and nonstate actors take advantage of the information space to sow political chaos. Andreas Krieg reveals how the coordinated use of weaponized narratives can achieve strategic-level effects through a six-stage process. Preying on vulnerable states and communities to find the fault lines within societies, these campaigns begin in the information space with an ultimate goal of producing tangible results (such as changes to policy or voting behavior, or spurring political violence). Krieg closely examines recent subversion campaigns by two states in particular, focusing on Russia's interference in Western public discourse and the United Arab Emirates's demonization of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

Introduction -- Chapter I: Perceptions and Divisions in Security and Defence Structures in Arab Gulf States -- Chapter II: Tribe and Tribalism: The Trojan Horse of GCC States? -- Chapter III: Bitter Brethren: Freud's Narcissism of Minor Differences and the Gulf Divide -- Chapter IV: The UAE, Qatar and the Question of Political Islam -- Chapter V: The Weaponization of Narratives amid the Gulf Crisis -- Chapter VI: The Saudi Dimension: Understanding the Kingdom's position in the Gulf Crisis -- Chapter VII: The 'Trump Factor' in the Gulf Divide -- Chapter VIII: The Political Economy of the Gulf Divide -- Chapter IX: The Future of the GCC amid the Gulf Divide -- Chapter X: The Libyan Revolution Undone - The conversation will not be televised -- Chapter XI: The Evolution of Turkey- Qatar Relations amid a growing Gulf Divide -- Chapter XII: Iran & Qatar: A Forced Rapprochement -- Chapter XIII: Qatar's Response to the Crisis: Public Diplomacy as a means of Crisis Management -- Chapter XIV: Making Sense of Europe's Response to the Gulf Crisis -- Conclusion

Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Redefining the Concept of Security -- Why This Book? -- The Book's Outline -- Notes -- Chapter 2: A New Approach to Conceptualizing Security in the Arab World -- The Social Contract: Providing Security as a Public Good -- Defining the Public Sphere -- Conceptualizing Patron-Protégé Relations in Islamic Political Thought -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter 3: Patron-Protégé Relations Under the Old Regime -- Patron-Protégé Relations in the Arab World -- Egypt -- Syria -- Libya -- Tunisia -- Bahrain -- Yemen -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter 4: Traditional Civil-Security Sector Relations in the Arab World -- Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Public, Patron and Security Sector -- Means of Privatizing the Statutory Security Sector -- Structural Means of Privatization of the Security Sector -- Diversification of the Security Sector -- Centralization of Command Structures -- Constant Rotation of Stakeholders -- Coercive Means of Privatizing the Security Sector -- Commissarism -- Accommodative Means of Privatizing the Security Sector -- Favouritism -- Types of Security Sectors -- Personalized Security Sectors -- Sectarian Security Sectors -- Profiteering Security Sectors -- Praetorian Security Sectors -- Fractured Security Sectors -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter 5: The Arab Public Sphere: Challenging the Old Regime -- Civil Society and the Regime -- New Media and the Rise of the Arab Public Sphere -- The Arab Public Sphere and the Arab Spring -- The Mobilization of the Masses -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter 6: Public Dissidence, the Security Sector and Regime Resilience -- Dissidence, Repression and Its Impact on Regime Resilience -- The Escalatory Spiral of Dissidence, Response and Regime Resilience Since 2011 -- The Initial Spark -- Protest and Repression

This book examines the connection between socio-politics and security in the Arab World. In an effort to understand the social and political developments that have been on-going in the Arab World since the 1990s, culminating in the Arab Spring, Krieg moves beyond liberal deterministic assumptions - most notably that the promotion of liberal values and democracy are the panacea for the structural problems of the region. Instead, this text advances the case that grievances related to individual security needs are at the heart of regional insecurity and instability. Looking towards the future, the author asserts that regimes can only be resilient if they are able to provide for individual security inclusively. When regimes fail to cater for public security, they might be replaced by alternative non-state security providers.

This Brief sheds light on the motivation of humanitarian intervention from a theoretical and empirical point of view. An in-depth analysis of the theoretical arguments surrounding the issue of a legitimate motivation for humanitarian intervention demonstrate to what extent either altruism or national/self-interests are considered a righteous stimulus. The question about what constitutes a just intervention has been at the core of debates in Just War Theory for centuries. In particular in regards to humanitarian intervention it is oftentimes difficult to define the criteria for a righteous intervention. More than in conventional military interventions, the motivation and intention behind humanitarian intervention is a crucial factor. Whether the humanitarian intervention cases of the post-Cold War era were driven by altruistic or by self-interested considerations is a question is covered within and enables a comprehensive and holistic evaluation of the question of what motivates Western democracies to intervene or to abstain from intervention in humanitarian crises.

The contractor has become a potent commercial surrogate for the state to conduct expeditionary operations across a global battlespace, defined here as the environment, factors and conditions which need to be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect a force or complete a mission. Private military and security companies (PMSCs) act as force multipliers that enhance the state's ability to fight wars remotely. Contractors allow states to achieve military objectives overseas with enhanced discretion, plausible deniability and consequently lower political costs. In the past two decades, Western states have developed an over-reliance on the market in certain areas such as logistics and the maintenance of high-tech weapons systems or IT infrastructure. Although contractors working for Western states only rarely provide armed services and do not provide combat or combat support services, they nonetheless offer essential military support functions without which Western states could not successfully execute military operations. Consequently, the market has established itself as a critical provider for Western militaries that have widely lost institutional knowledge and in-house capacity to commercial providers. Therefore, the industry has developed from a mere agent of the state to a partner that determines state capacity and capability. In the non-Western world the industry has created security partnerships between the state and the PMSC market, which complement the state's ability to provide public security. Here, PMSCs provide a range of armed services including combat and combat support services. The market enables these states to buy-in capability and capacity that they cannot domestically generate. With insufficient skilled capacity to conduct counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operations, non-Western states have externalized core military functions to commercial providers. In light of the increased role of the market in shaping global security agendas, the adequate regulation of the market for force has become an ever more important issue. Although both Western and non-Western states are heavily dependent on contractors to effectively execute military operations overseas, the contractor remains able to evade effectively home, host or contracting state regulation and monitoring.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring the Middle East has plunged into a state of instability. The United States has responded to these rising insecurities in a region of strategic importance with hesitation or half-hearted commitments. The Obama administration, plagued by the increasingly difficult decision of defining America's role in an apolar world while managing the political and economic legacy of the Bush administration, has relied on a policy of delegation. Obama neither refrained from military options nor showed any willingness to commit American ground troops to one of the strategically and operationally most complex environments of the world. Instead, Obama's preferred way of war is one relying on surrogates-both human and technological-that allow the United States to externalize, partially or wholly, the strategic, operational and tactical burden of warfare. Unlike any other previous US administration surrogate warfare has become the principal means of protecting US interests in the Middle East that are perceived to be all but vital. The need for deniability and legitimacy, cost-benefit considerations as well as the lack of capability have made warfare by surrogate a preferred option in the Middle East. The consequences for US policy in the region are profound, as the lack of control and oversight have empowered surrogates whose long-term interests are not compatible with those of the United States. More severely, the US might have jeopardized its standing as the traditional guarantor of security in the Middle East- something that partners and adversaries alike have exploited. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring the Middle East has plunged into a state of instability. The United States has responded to these rising insecurities in a region of strategic importance with hesitation or half-hearted commitments. The Obama administration, plagued by the increasingly difficult decision of defining America's role in an apolar world while managing the political and economic legacy of the Bush administration, has relied on a policy of delegation. Obama neither refrained from military options nor showed any willingness to commit American ground troops to one of the strategically and operationally most complex environments of the world. Instead, Obama's preferred way of war is one relying on surrogates— both human and technological—that allow the United States to externalize, partially or wholly, the strategic, operational and tactical burden of warfare. Unlike any other previous US administration surrogate warfare has become the principal means of protecting US interests in the Middle East that are perceived to be all but vital. The need for deniability and legitimacy, cost–benefit considerations as well as the lack of capability have made warfare by surrogate a preferred option in the Middle East. The consequences for US policy in the region are profound, as the lack of control and oversight have empowered surrogates whose long-term interests are not compatible with those of the United States. More severely, the US might have jeopardized its standing as the traditional guarantor of security in the Middle East— something that partners and adversaries alike have exploited.