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It is a classical proposition that tax structure may influence public spending. Two such propositions concerning the visibility and the elasticity of the tax system are tested. Visibility is not important while highly elastic tax systems are correlated with big public spending in times of economic boom. In times of economic decline and recession, high spending countries turn to deficit financing. In both cases big spenders seem to rely more upon a dose of fiscal illusion than moderate spenders.

ABSTRACTThe median voter model of how public expenditures are determined is discussed, as are alternative models, which soft‐pedal the role of the electorate and elections in decision‐making on public spending. The median voter proposition is tested and rejected empirically. The empirical relationship between voter attitudes towards public spending and actual spending is then related to the alternative models of how public expenditures are decided upon. The empirical analysis shows inconsistencies between item‐by‐item spending preferences and aggregate spending preferences. Further, political activists have a higher propensity to spend than the average voter.

THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL OF HOW PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ARE DETERMINED IS DISCUSSED, AS ARE ALTERNATIVE MODELS, WHICH SOFT-PEDAL THE ROLE OF THE ELECTORATE AND EFFLECTIONS IN DECISION-MAKING ON PUBLIC SPENDING. THE MEDIAN VOTER PROPOSITION IS TESTED AND REJECTED EMPIRICALLY. THE EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VOTER ATTITUDES TOWARDS PUBLIC SPENDING AND ACTUAL SPENDING IS THEN RELATED TO THE ALTENATIVE MODELS OF HOW PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ARE DECIDED UPON.

ABSTRACTThis article tries to demonstrate that the logic of the political‐bureaucratic decision‐making process is biased in favour of public expenditure growth. The argument comprises two elements. Firstly: the decisive spending decisions relate to particular programs, they do not relate to the overall level of spending. The total spending is determined by the sum of a large number of spending decisions. Secondly: these atomized spending decisions are characterized by an asymmetrical decision‐making process the benefits of specific public programs are of a private nature to public employees and their clients, while the costs are of a collective nature. This implies that the "spenders" always tend to be stronger than the "cutters". This holds true whether the bureaucracy is on the offensive, i.e., trying to expand the public programs, or on the defensive, i.e., trying to resist cuts in their programs. The logic outlined implies that even if each single spending decision is "rational" or optimal, the total level of public spending may be "irrational" or suboptimal, in the sense that it is unwanted by a majority.

Danish politics in the 1970s is characterized by a remarkable increase in electoral fluidity. Increasing political mobility should be seen not as a product of passing and specific events, but as a product of basic societal change. The link between political mobility and some dimensions of social change is discussed theoretically and investigated empirically. The discussion focuses on the joint effects of socioeconomic change and political‐institutional change. Some reasons why these changes should lead to increased electoral mobility are stated. The empirical analysis is carried out at the level of municipalities. A positive relationship between various indicators of socio‐economic change and political mobility is demonstrated. The relationship is sustained when a control for the effects of social structure is introduced.