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This paper views tariff-cutting formulas as a potential solution to the free-rider problem that arises when market opening is negotiated bilaterally and extended on a most-favored-nation basis. The negotiators in the Doha Agenda chose formulas that are ideal from an economic efficiency viewpoint in that they most sharply reduce the highest and most economically-costly tariffs. When the political support that gave rise to the original tariffs is considered, however, this approach appears to generate very high political costs per unit of gain in economic efficiency. The political costs associated with the formulas appear to have led to strong pressure for many, complex exceptions, which both lowered and increased uncertainty about members' market access gains. Where tariff cuts focus on applied rates, it seems likely that a proportional cut rule would reduce the political costs of securing agreements. However, detailed examination of the Doha proposals with their product exceptions suggests that negotiators are likely to find cuts with exceptions politically attractive but economically costly when cuts are based on bound tariffs with different degrees of binding overhang.

In this paper, we focus on the use of food security as a justification for export taxation. During food crisis, governments of food-exporting countries are tempted to react to high food prices by restricting exports. This is to encourage local producers to sell food items domestically and to decrease local prices, which implies higher world food prices. This measure amplifies a food crisis and is typically a "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy. But in times of food crisis, food-importing countries also decrease import duties to decrease domestic food prices; this causes food demand on the world market to increase, further reinforcing the upwards pressure on world food prices. The combination of export taxes and reduced import duties increases the upward pressure on world prices when food prices are high. On the contrary, in times of low world agricultural prices, food-exporting countries may be tempted to decrease export taxes and food-importing countries to increase import duties. Trade policies make world markets structurally more volatile. We also focus on the institutional aspect and, in particular, why export taxes can be raised so easily. It appears that countries have a relatively large degree of freedom when implementing export taxes as the WTO does not prohibit export taxes and other forms of export restrictions.

International audience ; package could be the basis of an agreement. An evaluation of these various proposals shows how trade negotiations have been following countries' strategic interests. In eight years, the ambition of the formula in agricultural market access tariff reduction has increased, but additional flexibilities designed to accommodate domestic political constraints have offset delivered market access. The various scenarios imply losses for least-developed countries, reflecting eroded preferences and rising terms of trade for imported commodities, including food products. We study how this trade reform can be more development-friendly.

In 2001, the World Trade Organization launched a highly ambitious program of multilateral liberalization. Eight years later, concluding the negotiations is uncertain, though an opportunity still exists. Since 2001, many proposals on market access have been brought to the negotiating table by the European Union, the United States, and the G-20. Because it is politically and economically acceptable to many parties, the final December 2008 package could be the basis of an agreement. An evaluation of these various proposals shows how trade negotiations have been following countries' strategic interests. In eight years, the ambition of the formula to reduce agricultural market access tariffs has increased, but flexibilities added to accommodate domestic political constraints have offset delivered market access. The December 2008 package would reduce these average tariffs by 25 percent, a reduction very close to the one implied by the Harbinson and Girard proposals of 2003. This has to be compared with the 73 percent reduction in world agricultural protection of the very ambitious 2005 U.S. proposal. The 2005 G-20 and EU proposals were intermediate outcomes. The December 2008 package implies a reduction of agricultural protection by 6 percentage points in high-income countries and 0.5 percentage points in middle-income countries. If the U.S. proposal had been applied, these figures would have been 12.4 and 4.7, respectively. Different scenarios imply losses for developing countries, reflecting eroded preferences and rising terms of trade for imported commodities, including food products. We study how this trade reform can be more development-friendly.

In 2001, the World Trade Organization launched a highly ambitious program of multilateral liberalization. Eight years later, concluding the negotiations is uncertain, though an opportunity still exists. Since 2001, many proposals on market access have been brought to the negotiating table by the European Union, the United States, and the G-20. Because it is politically and economically acceptable to many parties, the final December 2008 package could be the basis of an agreement. An evaluation of these various proposals shows how trade negotiations have been following countries' strategic interests. In eight years, the ambition of the formula to reduce agricultural market access tariffs has increased, but flexibilities added to accommodate domestic political constraints have offset delivered market access. The December 2008 package would reduce these average tariffs by 25 percent, a reduction very close to the one implied by the Harbinson and Girard proposals of 2003. This has to be compared with the 73 percent reduction in world agricultural protection of the very ambitious 2005 U.S. proposal. The 2005 G-20 and EU proposals were intermediate outcomes. The December 2008 package implies a reduction of agricultural protection by 6 percentage points in high-income countries and 0.5 percentage points in middle-income countries. If the U.S. proposal had been applied, these figures would have been 12.4 and 4.7, respectively. Different scenarios imply losses for developing countries, reflecting eroded preferences and rising terms of trade for imported commodities, including food products. We study how this trade reform can be more development-friendly.

International audience ; package could be the basis of an agreement. An evaluation of these various proposals shows how trade negotiations have been following countries' strategic interests. In eight years, the ambition of the formula in agricultural market access tariff reduction has increased, but additional flexibilities designed to accommodate domestic political constraints have offset delivered market access. The various scenarios imply losses for least-developed countries, reflecting eroded preferences and rising terms of trade for imported commodities, including food products. We study how this trade reform can be more development-friendly.

International audience ; Dans un contexte marqué par le développement des audits de début de mandat, cette étude empirique s'intéresse à l'influence politique de ce moyen de contrôle et d'information, escomptée au moment de son engagement, sur la réélection du maire à la prochaine échéance municipale. Cet impact politique est analysé dans le cadre des théories des choix publics, de l'agence et du vote, où l'audit externe constitue une source d'information crédible et compréhensible destinée aux électeurs. Cette influence théorique sur la décision de vote des électeurs est appréciée sur la base des résultats aux dernières élections municipales de 2001 pour 141 villes de plus de 20 000 habitants. Les résultats mettent en évidence l'absence d'influence des politiques de communication financière et d'audit de début de mandat sur la réélection du maire et sur la continuité politique.

International audience ; Dans un contexte marqué par le développement des audits de début de mandat, cette étude empirique s'intéresse à l'influence politique de ce moyen de contrôle et d'information, escomptée au moment de son engagement, sur la réélection du maire à la prochaine échéance municipale. Cet impact politique est analysé dans le cadre des théories des choix publics, de l'agence et du vote, où l'audit externe constitue une source d'information crédible et compréhensible destinée aux électeurs. Cette influence théorique sur la décision de vote des électeurs est appréciée sur la base des résultats aux dernières élections municipales de 2001 pour 141 villes de plus de 20 000 habitants. Les résultats mettent en évidence l'absence d'influence des politiques de communication financière et d'audit de début de mandat sur la réélection du maire et sur la continuité politique.

In the event of large swings in world food prices, countries often intervene to dampen the impact of international food price spikes on domestic prices and to lessen the burden of adjustment on vulnerable population groups. While individual countries can succeed at insulating their domestic markets from short-term fluctuations in global food prices, the collective intervention of many countries may exacerbate the volatility of world prices. Insulating policies introduced during the 2010-11 food price spike may have accounted for 40 percent of the increase in the world price of wheat and one-quarter of the increase in the world price of maize. Combined with government policy responses, the 2010-11 food price spike tipped 8.3 million people (nearly 1 percent of the world's poor) into poverty.