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Incentives and political economy
In: Clarendon lectures in economics
Regulation and development
In: Federico Caffè lectures
The principal agent model: the economic theory of incentives
In: The international library of critical writings in economics 162
In: An Elgar reference collection
Competition in telecommunications
In: Munich lectures in economics
Theoretical models based on the assumption that telecommunications is a natural monopoly no longer reflect reality. As a result, policymakers often lack the guidance of economic theorists. Competition in Telecommunications is written in a style accessible to managers, consultants, government officials, and others. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole analyse regulatory reform and the emergence of competition in network industries using the state-of-the-art theoretical tools of industrial organisation, political economy, and the economics of incentives. The book opens with background information for the reader who is unfamiliar with current issues in the telecommunications industry. The following sections focus on four central aspects of the recent deregulatory movement: the introduction of incentive regulation; one-way access (access given by a local network to the providers of complementary segments, such as long-distance or information services); the special nature of competition in an industry requiring two-way access (whereby competing networks depend on the mutual termination of calls); and universal service, in particular the two leading contenders for the competitively neutral provision of universal service: the use of engineering models to compute subsidies and the design of universal service auctions. The book concludes with a discussion of the Internet and regulatory institutions.
[Barcelona 1990]
In: Advances in economic theory 6,1
In: Econometric Society monographs 20
Collusion and group lending with adverse selection
In: Journal of development economics, Volume 70, Issue 2, p. 329-348
ISSN: 0304-3878
Privatisation et incitations
In: Revue économique, Volume 47, Issue 6, p. 1239-1251
ISSN: 1950-6694
Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat
In: Revue économique, Volume 38, Issue 1, p. 5-24
ISSN: 1950-6694
Toward a Normative Theory of Incentive Contracts Between Government and Private Firms
In: The Economic Journal, Volume 97, p. 17
Information imparfaite et rationalité collective
In: Revue économique, Volume 35, Issue 1, p. 163-176
ISSN: 1950-6694