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During the coronavirus disease pandemic rising in 2020, governments and nongovernmental organizations across the globe have taken great efforts to curb the infection rate by promoting or legally prescribing behavior that can reduce the spread of the virus. At the same time, this pandemic has given rise to speculations and conspiracy theories. Conspiracy worldviews have been connected to refusal to trust science, the biomedical model of disease, and legal means of political engagement in previous research. In three studies from the United States (N = 220; N = 288) and the UK (N = 298), we went beyond this focus on a general conspiracy worldview and tested the idea that different forms of conspiracy beliefs despite being positively correlated have distinct behavioral implications. Whereas conspiracy beliefs describing the pandemic as a hoax were more strongly associated with reduced containment-related behavior, conspiracy beliefs about sinister forces purposefully creating the virus related to an increase in self-centered prepping behavior.

Abstract. Only little is known about the underpinning psychological processes that determine medical choices. Across four studies, we establish that conspiracy mentality predicts a preference for alternative over biomedical therapies. Study 1a (N = 392) and 1b (N = 204) provide correlational support, Study 2 (N = 185) experimentally tested the role of power: People who endorsed a conspiracy mentality perceived a drug more positively if its approval was supported by a powerless (vs. powerful) agent. Study 3 (N = 239) again showed a moderating effect of power and conspiracy mentality on drug evaluation by comparing analytic versus holistic approaches. These findings point to the consequences of conspiracy mentality for health behavior and prevention programs.

Germany's past is marked not only by the atrocities of the Holocaust, but also by a history of collective attempts to come to terms with these crimes. The present paper focuses on the previously rarely explored consequences of perceived success in dealing with a perpetrator past for the moral ingroup-image and the demand for an end to the discussion of this chapter of history (i.e., demand for historical closure). In one correlational study (N = 982) and three experimental studies (N = 904), we found robust evidence for a positive association between perceived success in dealing with the Nazi past and perceived ingroup morality. The results on the assumed influence of success on claims for historical closure, mediated by morality, were only partly supportive and inconsistent, particularly when controlling for political orientation and collective narcissism. However, final single-paper meta-analyses revealed a significant association between perceived ingroup morality and demand for historical closure (K = 5), as well as a small but significant effect of success (vs. failure) on demand for historical closure (K = 4), even when accounting for political orientation. Implications for understanding ethical self-views in historical perpetrator groups and recurring debates about a 'Schlussstrich' on the German Nazi past are discussed.

Germany's past is marked not only by the atrocities of the Holocaust, but also by a history of collective attempts to come to terms with these crimes. The present paper focuses on the previously rarely explored consequences of perceived success in dealing with a perpetrator past for the moral ingroup-image and the demand for an end to the discussion of this chapter of history (i.e., demand for historical closure). In one correlational study (N = 982) and three experimental studies (N = 904), we found robust evidence for an association between perceived success in dealing with the Nazi past and perceived ingroup morality. Although the results on the assumed influence of success on claims for historical closure, mediated by morality, were only partly supportive and inconsistent, particularly when controlling for political orientation and collective narcissism, final single-paper meta-analyses revealed a significant association between morality and historical closure (K = 5), as well as a small effect of success (vs. failure) on historical closure (K = 4). Implications for understanding ethical self views in historical perpetrator groups and recurring debates about a Schlussstrich on the German Nazi past are discussed. ; reviewed ; acceptedVersion

Polarisierungen haben die Mitte der Gesellschaft erreicht und sie beeinflusst. In Teilen geht die herkömmliche Mitte verloren. Die Menschen wenden sich einer vermeintlich neuen, radikalen Mitte zu, die ihren Zusammenhalt aus der Abwertung von anderen schöpft. Das untersucht die aktuelle "Mitte-Studie" der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung anhand einer repräsentativen Bevölkerungsumfrage vom Herbst 2018. Die Autorinnen und Autoren analysieren die politischen und sozialen Einstellungen der Bundesbürgerinnen und -bürger und prüfen, wie fragil und gespalten die gesellschaftliche Mitte, die stets als Garant für Stabilität und feste Normen galt, heute ist. Rechtsextreme Gruppen treten öffentlichkeitswirksam an der Seite "normaler" Bürgerinnen und Bürger auf, rechtspopulistische Forderungen und Diskurse erhalten scheinbar immer mehr Raum in Politik und Debatte. Wie weit sind rechtsextreme, rechtspopulistische und menschenfeindliche Einstellungen in die Mitte der Gesellschaft eingedrungen? Haben Polarisierungen und Konflikte die Norm von der Gleichwertigkeit aller Gruppen verschoben? Ist die demokratische Mitte geschrumpft oder verloren? Antworten gibt die neue "Mitte-Studie", die seit 2002 antidemokratische Einstellungen in der deutschen Bevölkerung untersucht.

To understand recent anti-refugee protests in Europe, we examined how different levels of inclusiveness of group identities (national, European, and global) are related to intentions to protest among native Europeans. We focused on the mediating role of autochthony (a belief that the first inhabitants of a territory are more entitled) and the moderating role of threat. Survey data from 11 European countries (N=1909) showed that national identification was positively associated with autochthony, and therefore, with the intention to protest against refugees. In contrast, global identification was related to lower protest intentions via lower autochthony. These paths were found only among Europeans who perceived refugees as a threat. European identification was not related to the endorsement of autochthony or to collective action. These findings indicate why and when majority members are willing to participate in collective action against refugees, and underscore the importance of global identification in the acceptance of refugees.

To understand recent anti-refugee protests in Europe, we examined how different levels of inclusiveness of group identities (national, European, and global) are related to intentions to protest among native Europeans. We focused on the mediating role of autochthony (a belief that the first inhabitants of a territory are more entitled) and the moderating role of threat. Survey data from 11 European countries (N = 1,909) showed that national identification was positively associated with autochthony, and therefore, with the intention to protest against refugees. In contrast, global identification was related to lower protest intentions via lower autochthony. These paths were found only among Europeans who perceived refugees as a threat. European identification was not related to the endorsement of autochthony or to collective action. These findings indicate why and when majority members are willing to participate in collective action against refugees, and underscore the importance of global identification in the acceptance of refugees.

To understand recent anti‐refugee protests in Europe, we examined how different levels of inclusiveness of group identities (national, European, and global) are related to intentions to protest among native Europeans. We focused on the mediating role of autochthony (a belief that the first inhabitants of a territory are more entitled) and the moderating role of threat. Survey data from 11 European countries (N = 1,909) showed that national identification was positively associated with autochthony, and therefore, with the intention to protest against refugees. In contrast, global identification was related to lower protest intentions via lower autochthony. These paths were found only among Europeans who perceived refugees as a threat. European identification was not related to the endorsement of autochthony or to collective action. These findings indicate why and when majority members are willing to participate in collective action against refugees, and underscore the importance of global identification in the acceptance of refugees.

Selten war die gesellschaftliche Mitte so "gefordert" wie heute. Rechtsextremismus, Populismus, Rassismus setzen ihr zu. Alle zwei Jahre untersucht die Mitte-Studie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung rechtsextreme und demokratiegefährdende Einstellungen in der deutschen Gesellschaft. Die aktuelle repräsentative Umfrage von Dezember 2020 bis Frühjahr 2021 zeigt: Die "Mitte" ist gefordert, Haltung zu zeigen, Position zu beziehen und ihre Demokratie zu stärken! Dazu hat sie das Potenzial. Hasskampagnen, Gewalt, rechter Terror und neue rechte Gruppen haben die Mitte in den vergangenen Jahren getroffen. Nun kommt die Coronapandemie mit globalen Unsicherheiten und unkalkulierbaren Folgekrisen dazu. Was heißt das für die demokratische Orientierung der Gesellschaft? Die hier vorliegende Mitte-Studie 2020/21 erkennt sowohl Entwicklungen, die die Demokratie fördern, als auch solche, die sie gefährden. Die Mitte selbst schätzt den Rechtsextremismus als größte Bedrohung für die Demokratie ein, und hierin liegt die Chance, ihm zu begegnen

Selten war die gesellschaftliche Mitte so "gefordert" wie heute. Rechtsextremismus, Populismus, Rassismus setzen ihr zu. Alle zwei Jahre untersucht die Mitte-Studie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung rechtsextreme und demokratiegefährdende Einstellungen in der deutschen Gesellschaft. Die aktuelle repräsentative Umfrage von Dezember 2020 bis Frühjahr 2021 zeigt: Die "Mitte" ist gefordert, Haltung zu zeigen, Position zu beziehen und ihre Demokratie zu stärken! Dazu hat sie das Potenzial. Hasskampagnen, Gewalt, rechter Terror und neue rechte Gruppen haben die Mitte in den vergangenen Jahren getroffen. Nun kommt die Coronapandemie mit globalen Unsicherheiten und unkalkulierbaren Folgekrisen dazu. Was heißt das für die demokratische Orientierung der Gesellschaft? Die hier vorliegende Mitte-Studie 2020/21 erkennt sowohl Entwicklungen, die die Demokratie fördern, als auch solche, die sie gefährden. Die Mitte selbst schätzt den Rechtsextremismus als größte Bedrohung für die Demokratie ein, und hierin liegt die Chance, ihm zu begegnen

Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and is linked to other belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede's model of cultural values, three nation‐level analyses of data from 25, 19, and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 2b, N = 30,994) revealed positive associations between masculinity, collectivism, and CT beliefs. A cross‐sectional study among U.S. citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual‐level measures of Hofstede's values, replicated these findings. A meta‐analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive links between CT beliefs, collectivism, r = .31, 95% CI = [.15; .47], and masculinity, r = .39, 95% CI = [.18; .59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also play an important role in shaping CT beliefs.