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Jacksonville/Duval County, Florida / Bert E. Swanson -- Columbus/Muscogee County, Georgia / Arnold Fleischmann and Jennifer Custer -- Tallahassee/Leon County, Florida / Linda S. Johnson -- Sacramento/Sacramento County, California / Glen W. Sparrow -- Athens/Clarke County, Georgia / Dan Durning, William L. Gillespie, and Richard W. Campbell -- Lafayette/Lafayette Parish, Louisiana / Hunter Bacot -- Branch/North Branch, Minnesota / Beth Walter Honadle -- Des Moines/Polk County, Iowa / Paul Coates and Alfred Ho -- Augusta/Richmond County, Georgia / Richard W. Campbell, William L. Gillespie, and Dan Durning -- Wilmington/New Hanover County, North Carolina / Gary Alan Johnson -- Knoxville/Knox County, Tennessee / Anthony Nownes and David J. Houston -- Kansas City/Wyandotte County, Kansas / Suzanne M. Leland -- Louisville/Jefferson County, Kentucky / H.V. Savitch and Ronald K. Vogel

Suzanne M. Leland is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Kurt Thurmaier is a professor and director of the Division of Public Administration at Northern Illinois University. --Book Jacket

ObjectivesTo determine if state governments utilize rainy day funds (RDFs) for political purposes in the aftermath of disasters rather than their intended purpose of combating state cyclical economic downturns.MethodsThis research draws from multiple state‐level data sources to construct a panel data set from 1992 to 2010.ResultsDisaster damage, relief funds, and politics all influence the usage of states' RDFs. We also find that the RDF balance is lower when disaster damages increase, when it is an election year, and the same party holds party control of the governor and legislature.ConclusionThe findings of this empirical research are consistent with the literature about the importance state‐level politics plays in the use of state stabilization funds intended for cyclical economic downturns as opposed to providing more politically expedient disaster relief.

This study uses 40 years of data from the U.S. Census of Governments to examine the impact of changes in local autonomy on the creation of the fastest growing form of local governments, special districts. Using fixed effects regression specified at the urban county and metropolitan statistical area level, we find that restrictions of fiscal autonomy of cities are associated with creation of new special districts. When the limits on fiscal autonomy interact with grants of functional autonomy, amplification occurs. We find no analogous effects for county governments. These two findings are consistent with the circumvention argument made in the local autonomy literature.

The following study looks at both qualitative and quantitative data collected from surveys of transit agency managers during and after the Great Recession to see if managers report changes in service provision arrangements in response to fiscal pressure. We investigate whether contracting out services is used as a method of cutback management. We find that the majority of agencies are unable to respond to current economic situation by changing service arrangements because of various and sometimes costly constraints such as state law, the level of competition in the bidding process, and length of contracts.

Contracting is often discussed as a cutback mechanism for public managers. The empirical evidence indicates that there are little savings in contracting out due to transaction costs. Public transit agencies exhibit path-dependent behavior; there are tangible conversion costs that may preclude changing the provision of services. As such, public managers should consider the provision of services very carefully as it may set an agency on a long-term trajectory that will be difficult to change due to both conversion and transaction costs.

The following study looks at both qualitative and quantitative data collected from surveys of transit agency managers during and after the Great Recession to see if managers report changes in service provision arrangements in response to fiscal pressure. We investigate whether contracting out services is used as a method of cutback management. We find that the majority of agencies are unable to respond to current economic situation by changing service arrangements because of various and sometimes costly constraints such as state law, the level of competition in the bidding process, and length of contracts. Adapted from the source document.