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AbstractNegative partisanship is one of the most popular explanations for current levels of dysfunction in American politics. Yet, the term is used inconsistently in both academic research and the popular press. It is sometimes referred to as negative affect towards the out-party that is a more important predictor of political behavior than positive affect towards the in-party. It is also sometimes referred to as a negational identity, wherein identification with one party is founded upon not being identified with the other party. In this essay, I first review the two definitions of negative partisanship and their preponderance in the mass public. Counter some reports, disdain is not more prevalent than warmth. Next, I discuss new evidence which shows that partisan disdain and negational partisanship are mutually exclusive concepts. Finally, in a reanalysis of published work, I reexamine the evidence that purportedly shows that negative partisanship is a better explanation for political behavior than positive partisanship.

AbstractAt least two theories have been offered that explain the rise of affective polarization. Some scholars, relying on social identity theory, argue that as the relevance of party identification increased, Americans became more likely to see their in-party in positive terms and the out-party in negative terms. Other scholars argue that affective polarization is a reaction to increasingly extreme political actors. This study seeks to arbitrate between these two theories of affective polarization through a survey experiment which asks respondents to rate candidates whose party (or lack thereof) and ideology (or lack thereof) is randomly assigned. In line with the policy-oriented view of affective polarization, respondents reacted far more strongly to ideology than party, especially if it was the ideology of the member of the out-party.

American partisans are far more hostile towards out-party members than they were 40 years ago. While this phenomenon, often called affective polarization, is well-documented, political scientists disagree on its cause. One group of scholars believes that affective polarization is driven by processes related to social identity theory. In particular, cross-cutting identities have declined in America, and toxic political communication continuously primes partisan identities and resentment. Recently, several scholars have pointed to another phenomenon as the root cause of affective polarization: partisan sorting, i.e. the alignment of partisan identities with ideologically consistent issue positions. I review evidence in favor of each claim, and provide additional evidence that affective polarization has increased about as much among those who are not sorted as among those who are sorted. Furthermore, while sorting is only related to affective polarization among the most politically knowledgeable, affective polarization has increased across all levels of political knowledge. Finally, affective polarization may also increase sorting, further complicating any clear cut causal relationship.

AbstractFamilies are not only the first institution ever created, they are also, for most people, the first institution ever encountered. The preindustrial family structure, which was a function of local ecology and cooperation needs, instilled family members with different values, such as trust in strangers and respect for elders. These values passed through generations and, as we show in three studies, impact today's political attitudes and policies. First, using surveys of second-generation immigrants representing roughly 180 ethnicities living in 32 European countries, we show that the tighter kinship structure of a person's ancestors predicts right-wing cultural attitudes. Among those who are less engaged in politics, tighter ancestral kinship structure also predicts left-wing economic attitudes. In a second study, we control for country-level differences by comparing ethnic groups within countries and find that ancestral kinship strength predicts right-wing cultural attitudes but not left-wing economic attitudes. Finally, in a third study, we examine the policy implications of ancestral kinship. We show that stronger country-level ancestral kinship strength also increases anti-LGBT policies and welfare spending. Finally, we examine whether value systems link preindustrial kinship with modern political attitudes. In total, this work indicates that our political beliefs are rooted in the value systems and familial institutions created by our forebears.

AbstractDemocrats and Republicans clearly dislike one another. Yet, scholars debate whether policy disagreement or partisan identity, per se, drives interparty animus. Past studies suggest the relationship between partisanship and interpersonal affect is spurious, driven by inferred policy preferences. We argue, instead, that policy preferences signal partisan identity when the parties' stances on an issue are well‐known. Using a nationally representative survey and four preregistered experiments, we disentangle the effects of policy disagreement and partisan identity on interpersonal affect. Our findings suggest that partisan identity is the principal mechanism of affective polarization, and that policy preferences factor into affective polarization largely by signaling partisan identity. However, our results also affirm that policy disagreement in itself drives interpersonal affect. This provides evidence that partisanship reflects an emotional attachment to a political party, not merely a running tally of rational considerations.

"Don't Expose Yourself: Discretionary Exposure to Political Information" published on by Oxford University Press.

Acquiescence response bias, or the tendency to agree with questions regardless of content, is a prominent concern in survey design. An often proposed solution, and one that was recently implemented in the American National Election Study, is to rewrite response options so that they tap directly into the dimensions of the construct of interest. However, there is little evidence that this solution improves data quality. We present a study in which we employ two waves of the 2012 American National Election Study in order to compare the reliability and concurrent validity of political efficacy questions in both the agree–disagree and construct-specific formats. Construct-specific questions were not only as reliable and valid as agree–disagree questions generally, they were also as valid among respondents that were most likely to acquiesce. This suggests two possible outcomes: Either agree–disagree questions do not negatively impact data quality or that construct-specific questions are not a panacea for acquiescence response bias.

AbstractWe evaluate the empirical evidence interrogating the question of whether social media erodes social cohesion. We look at how networks, information exchange, and norms operate on these platforms. We also evaluate the conditions under which social media can be conducive to forming social capital and encouraging prosocial behavior. We discuss the psychological mechanisms that operate at the individual level and assess whether social media can create the environment and incentives to sustain cooperation and constructive exchange. Our discussion of the literature centers on how attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs are formed during the type of online interactions encouraged by platforms, their design, and affordances. We consider the policy implications of existing research, focusing on how empirical studies may inform regulatory efforts and platform interventions.