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AbstractLearning about the relationship between distance to landmarks and events and phenomena of interest is a multi-faceted problem, as it may require taking into account multiple dimensions, including: spatial position of landmarks, timing of events taking place over time, and attributes of occurrences and locations. Here I show that tree-based methods are well suited for the study of these questions as they allow exploring the relationship between proximity metrics and outcomes of interest in a non-parametric and data-driven manner. I illustrate the usefulness of tree-based methods vis-à-vis conventional regression methods by examining the association between: (i) distance to border crossings along the US-Mexico border and support for immigration reform, and (ii) distance to mass shootings and support for gun control.

Does becoming a citizen represent a major step toward the inclusion of Latino immigrants in the American polity? I study this question by comparing the behavior of immigrants who have acquired citizenship with that of immigrants who are not willing or not eligible to become citizens, focusing on nonelectoral political activities such as contacting government officials and working to solve problems with others informally or through existing groups and organizations. The data analysis is based on recent survey data from the 2006 Latino National Survey. I use matching methods to control for the nonrandom selection of respondents into citizenship status, and perform a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of findings to hidden bias. Results suggest that granting citizenship to nonnaturalized immigrants is a measure that, by itself, is unlikely to achieve full inclusion of Latino immigrants in the broader democratic process.

In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions and periodic elections are sponsored by the authoritarian ruler, but voting outcomes are sometimes manipulated to prevent government turnover. In this paper, I investigate the conditions under which a unified opposition might decide to challenge the official election outcome, the conditions under which the authoritarian incumbent might find it profitable to manipulate the election outcome, as well as the conditions under which voters might decide to vote strategically for their least-preferred alternative in order to help avoid a costly post-electoral conflict. I find that the incumbent's decision about whether to commit fraud or acknowledge the true election outcome, as well as the opposition's decision about whether to contest or accept official election results, depends on the opposition's knowledge about the occurrence of fraud, as well as on the likelihood of successful collective action against the regime. Fears of post electoral violence may lead incumbent or opposition supporters to vote strategically for their least preferred alternative, and the probability that they do so depends on their expectations about the opposition's reaction to official election results.

Deliberative minipublics are small groups of citizens who deliberate together about a policy issue and convey their conclusions to decision makers. Theorists have argued that deliberative minipublics can give observers evidence about counterfactual, "enlightened" public opinion—what the people would think about an issue if they had the opportunity to deliberate with their fellow citizens. If the conclusions of a deliberative minipublic are received in this spirit and members of the public revise their opinions upon learning them, then deliberative minipublics could be a means of bringing actual public opinion into closer conformity with counterfactual, enlightened public opinion. We formalize a model of this theory and report the results of a survey experiment designed to test its predictions. The experiment produced evidence that learning the conclusions of a deliberative minipublic influenced respondents' policy opinions, bringing them into closer conformity with the opinions of the participants in the deliberative minipublic.

Invalid voting and absenteeism are alternative sources of abstention under compulsory voting. Previous research failed to systematically study the mechanisms behind each form of non-voting and the relationships between them. We develop an analytical framework and an empirical strategy to jointly examine invalid voting and absenteeism in Brazil, the world's largest democracy with mandatory voting. Using Bayesian inferential methods and analyzing both individual and district-level data, we show that less educated and politically knowledgeable citizens are less likely to vote and, when they do, they are typically unable to successfully complete their ballot. Unlike absenteeism, invalid voting also has a political dimension reflecting voters' disenchantment with elections and democratic performance. Both sources of abstention coexist and, together, undermine electoral participation.

During each electoral period, the strategic interaction between voters and political elites determines the number of viable candidates in a district. In this paper, we implement a hierarchical seemingly unrelated regression model to explain electoral coordination at the district level in Uruguay as a function of district magnitude, previous electoral outcomes and electoral regime. Elections in this country are particularly useful to test for institutional effects on the coordination process due to the large variations in district magnitude, to the simultaneity of presidential and legislative races held under different rules, and to the reforms implemented during the period under consideration. We find that district magnitude and electoral history heuristics have substantial effects on the number of competing and voted-for parties and lists. Our modeling approach uncovers important interaction-effects between the demand and supply side of the political market that were often overlooked in previous research. Adapted from the source document.

During each electoral period, the strategic interaction between voters and political elites determines the number of viable candidates in a district. In this paper, we implement a hierarchical seemingly unrelated regression model to explain electoral coordination at the district level in Uruguay as a function of district magnitude, previous electoral outcomes and electoral regime. Elections in this country are particularly useful to test for institutional effects on the coordination process due to the large variations in district magnitude, to the simultaneity of presidential and legislative races held under different rules, and to the reforms implemented during the period under consideration. We find that district magnitude and electoral history heuristics have substantial effects on the number of competing and voted-for parties and lists. Our modeling approach uncovers important interaction-effects between the demand and supply side of the political market that were often overlooked in previous research. (GIGA)

During each electoral period, the strategic interaction between voters and political elites determines the number of viable candidates in a district. In this paper, we implement a hierarchical seemingly unrelated regression model to explain electoral coordination at the district level in Uruguay as a function of district magnitude, previous electoral outcomes and electoral regime. Elections in this country are particularly useful to test for institutional effects on the coordination process due to the large variations in district magnitude, to the simultaneity of presidential and legislative races held under different rules, and to the reforms implemented during the period under consideration. We find that district magnitude and electoral history heuristics have substantial effects on the number of competing and voted-for parties and lists. Our modeling approach uncovers important interaction-effects between the demand and supply side of the political market that were often overlooked in previous research.