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In the absence of multiparty electoral competition, it is challenging to assess popular support for the Communist Party of China. Existing methods rely on unidimensional measures which are often reduced to a simple dichotomy of high or low support, therefore missing a measure for ambivalence. This study argues that party support in China has two dimensions. The specific dimension is trust in the Party, while the diffuse one is endorsement of one-party rule. The study therefore identifies three attitudes towards the Party—support, ambivalence and dissent— and concludes that popular support for the ruling party is weaker than the Party itself has claimed it to be. (China/GIGA)

Survey results inflate political trust in China if the observed trust in the central government is mistaken for the latent trust in the Centre. The target of trust in the country is the Centre, which is ultimately the top leader. The critical issue domain for assessing the Centre's trustworthiness is policy implementation rather than policymaking. The Centre's trustworthiness has two dimensions: commitment to good governance and the capacity to discipline local officials. Observed trust in the central government indicates trust in the Centre's commitment, while observed trust in the local government reflects confidence in the Centre's capacity. A machine learning analysis of a national survey reveals how much conventional reading overestimates political trust. At first glance, 85 per cent of the respondents trust the central government. Upon further inspection, 18 per cent have total trust in the Centre, 34 per cent have partial trust and 33 per cent are sceptical. (China Q/GIGA)

AbstractSurvey results inflate political trust in China if the observed trust in the central government is mistaken for the latent trust in the Centre. The target of trust in the country is the Centre, which is ultimately the top leader. The critical issue domain for assessing the Centre's trustworthiness is policy implementation rather than policymaking. The Centre's trustworthiness has two dimensions: commitment to good governance and the capacity to discipline local officials. Observed trust in the central government indicates trust in the Centre's commitment, while observed trust in the local government reflects confidence in the Centre's capacity. A machine learning analysis of a national survey reveals how much conventional reading overestimates political trust. At first glance, 85 per cent of the respondents trust the central government. Upon further inspection, 18 per cent have total trust in the Centre, 34 per cent have partial trust and 33 per cent are sceptical.

Given China's huge population and its growing importance in the world, any political reform that may affect its long-term stability and its possible transition to democracy deserves the scrutiny of political scientists. The introduction of direct election in Chinese villages is one of such reforms. As Dr. Schubert points out, Chinese leaders seem to expect that this limited democratic reform will help improve governance and enhance stability in rural China, where over 70 percent of 1.3 billion Chinese reside. In addition, some reform-minded senior leaders also seem to expect that grassroots democracy may provide democratic training to the vast peasant population. In reality, of course, no reform only produces intended consequences.

The article argues that distrust in government reflects a preference for regime change in authoritarian China. It shows that individuals who have stronger distrust in government also have a stronger preference for multiparty electoral competition which runs against the gist of one-party rule and would be a stepping stone toward representative democracy. The article suggests that the relationship between trust in government and system support in an established democracy is fundamentally different from its variant in an authoritarian state. The target of distrust shifts from an electorally accountable government to a self-appointed one, while the target of support shifts from a system that protects freedom and rights to one that restricts them. The article concludes that the buffer between distrust in government and preference for regime change is particularly thin and fragile in China, where the vices of authoritarianism are proven and the virtues of democracy look promising.

This article analyses distinctive features and contextual causes of the resignation en masse of Chinese government officials in the wake of the 18th Party Congress. Typically, officials who resigned were neither being "ceilinged" nor considered laggards. Instead, they were front runners with proven records, and had stronger achievement orientations and risk-taking personalities. However, three contextual changes triggered the exodus—the heightened risk of pursuing a political career attributed to the unexpectedly relentless momentum of the anti-corruption campaign; intensified work stress due to the reimposed orthodox ideological straightjacket and reinstated Maoist morals; and demoralisation and disillusionment as a result of aggravated nepotism and the condoned practice of anonymous informing. (China/GIGA)

AbstractThis paper argues that popular trust in the Chinese central government is significantly weaker than five national surveys suggest. The evidence comes from these surveys. First, the surveys show that between one- and two-thirds of respondents hold hierarchical trust, i.e. they have more trust in the central government than they do in local government. Second, all other things being equal, people who are less satisfied with political democracy in China tend to be less trusting of the central government. Finally, hierarchical trust holders tend to be less satisfied with political democracy in the country than those who express equal trust for central and local governments. Put together, the three findings show that hierarchical trust holders are less trusting of the central government than equal trust holders with regard to developing political democracy, although they sound equally confident. The fact that so many respondents hold hierarchical trust indicates that trust in the central government is significantly weaker than it looks.

This paper argues that popular trust in the Chinese central government is significantly weaker than five national surveys suggest. The evidence comes from these surveys. First, the surveys show that between one- and two-thirds of respondents hold hierarchical trust, i.e. they have more trust in the central government than they do in local government. Second, all other things being equal, people who are less satisfied with political democracy in China tend to be less trusting of the central government. Finally, hierarchical trust holders tend to be less satisfied with political democracy in the country than those who express equal trust for central and local governments. Put together, the three findings show that hierarchical trust holders are less trusting of the central government than equal trust holders with regard to developing political democracy, although they sound equally confident. The fact that so many respondents hold hierarchical trust indicates that trust in the central government is significantly weaker than it looks. (China Q/GIGA)

This paper examines the relationship between distrust in incumbent government leaders and demand for systemic changes in rural China. It finds that individuals who distrust government leaders' commitment to the public interest have both stronger demand for leadership change and stronger preference for popular elections. It argues that distrust in government leaders may have enhanced the demand for leadership change, which in turn may have reinforced the preference for elections. It further argues that distrust in incumbent leaders has in effect induced a demand for systemic changes, as introducing popular election of government leaders would require a major constitutional amendment. The paper suggests that two distinctive mechanisms may be at work in determining whether distrust in current government authorities induces preference for systemic changes. Whether citizens can engineer leadership change through existing channels influences the generation of idealistic wishes for a better political system. Perceived availability of better and viable alternatives affects whether idealistic wishes become a practical preference. Adapted from the source document.