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Excise taxes are popular as regulatory policy. This popularity stems in part from their simple disincentive mechanism: higher prices mean less consumption of the regulated item. The size of the disincentive, however, may not be the whole story since governments rarely regulate without sending signals about why the regulation is necessary. This paper integrates signaling into a model designed to test the effectiveness of regulatory policies. By focusing on how signaling can be used in conjunction with more traditional policy analysis models, we offer a more complete understanding of regulation. 1 Table, 43 References. Adapted from the source document.

Machine generated contents note: Preface -- Chapter 1 Introduction: The Possibilities of Theory -- Why Do We Need Theory in Public Administration? -- The Uses of Theory -- Is a Useful and Reliable Public Administration Theory Possible? -- Some Contemporary Theories of Public Administration -- Notes -- Chapter 2 Theories of Political Control of Bureaucracy -- Introduction: What Are Theories of Control of Bureaucracy? -- The Difference Between Politics and Administration -- Are Bureaucracies Out of Control? -- Agency Theory -- Conclusions -- Summary -- Chapter 3 Theories of Bureaucratic Politics -- Introduction: What Are Theories of Bureaucratic Politics? -- Administrative Theory as Political Theory -- Allison's Paradigm of Bureaucratic Politics -- Politics, Power, and Organization -- Networks and Bureaucratic Politics -- Representative Bureaucracy -- Conclusions -- Summary -- Chapter 4 Public Institutional Theory -- Institutional Theory -- The Basic Idea -- From Organizations to Institutions -- Hierarchy -- Alternatives to Hierarchy -- Comparing Institutional Forms -- High-Reliability Systems -- Low-Reliability Systems and Their Improvement -- System Fragmentation -- Garbage Cans and Rent Seeking -- The Diffusion of Innovation -- Conclusions -- Summary -- Chapter 5 Theories of Public Management -- Introduction: Developments in Public Management Theory -- Traditional Management Theory Thrust Forward -- Leadership as Public Management -- Managing by Contract -- Governance -- Conclusions -- Summary -- Chapter 6 Postmodern Theory -- Organizational Humanism and Postpositivism -- Postmodern Perspectives in Public Administration -- Looking for Postmodern Public Administration Theory -- Conclusions: Fading Away or Still Useful as a Theory? -- Summary -- Notes -- Chapter 7 Decision Theory -- Introduction -- The Evolution of Decision Theory -- Revisiting the Logic of Consequences -- Bounded Decision Rationality and the Logic of Appropriateness -- Conclusions -- Summary -- Chapter 8 Rational Choice Theory and Irrational Behavior -- Introduction: What Is Rational Choice Theory? -- The Rational, Self-Maximizing Bureaucrat -- Trust and the Irrational Bureaucrat -- The Self-Maximizing Citizen and the Tiebout Hypothesis -- Rational Choice as the New Orthodoxy -- Conclusions -- Summary -- Notes -- Chapter 9 Theories of Governance -- Introduction: Public Administration's Need for a Theory of Governance -- A New Model of Governance > -- Governance as the New Public Management -- Governance as a Unifying Framework for Public Administration? -- Collaborative Governance Theory -- Conclusions -- Summary -- Chapter 10 Conclusion: A Bright Future for Theory? -- Theories of Political Control of Bureaucracy -- Theories of Bureaucratic Politics -- Public Institutional Theory -- Theories of Public Management -- Postmodern Theory -- Decision Theory -- Rational Choice Theory and Irrational Behavior -- Theories of Governance -- Theory in Public Administration -- References -- Index.