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AbstractFormer Prime Minister Koizumi's surprising victory within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2001 and his subsequent popularity as prime minister led to increased interest in the study of populism in Japan. In addition to Ōtake Hideo's prominent contributions, several others have also employed populism as a prism to study Japanese politics. Compared to the major debates on populism and particularly on the populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe over the last two decades, however, the study of Japanese populism seems to be at a less mature stage. Lessons may be learned from the European literature for the community studying Japanese populism. This paper first summarizes the studies on Japanese populism. Then, the main discussions and arguments presented in the academic literature on the PRR in Europe are discussed. Next, this study evaluates how arguments found in studies of European populism can be exploited in further research on populist politicians and parties in Japan. The author recommends further studies on conceptual definitions, on the classifications of politicians and parties, and on explaining the emergence and persistence of these parties and politicians. The findings in this paper encourage and support further research on populism in the Japanese political system.

Den fremvoksende supermakten og gigantøkonomien Kina har vist vilje og evne til å ta i bruk økonomiske virkemidler for å forme ikke bare egen region, men også for å skaffe global innflytelse. I dette bokessayet tar vi for oss fire bidrag om ulike sider ved Kinas økonomiske statshåndverk. Bøkene handler om graden av kontroll over kommersielle aktører i Kinas bruk av økonomisk statshåndverk (Norris, 2016), valutahåndverk og Kinas forsøk på å internasjonalisere sin valuta renminbi (Cohen, 2019), Kinas kollektive finanshåndverk gjennom BRICS-samarbeidet (Roberts et al., 2017) og Kinas gigantiske infrastrukturprosjekt (Clarke et al., 2020). Samlet viser bøkene spennet i økonomiske virkemidler Kina har til rådighet. Vi har en klar agenda med lesningen. Vi lurer først på hva som er de innovative aspektene ved bidragene. Dernest bruker vi bøkene til å svare på tre problemstillinger knyttet til Kinas fremvekst og dets økonomiske statshåndverk: (i) hva er Kinas ambisjoner?, (ii) hva gjør Kina? og (iii) leverer Kina på ambisjonene? Til slutt forsøker vi å løfte blikket og diskutere kort hvordan kunnskapstilstanden kan bedres fremover.
Abstract in English:China's Economic Statecraft: Ambitions, Behavior, and AchievementsThe rise of China as a superpower and economic giant has massive consequences for world politics. China has ambitions and capabilities to make use of its new economic muscles to not only shape its own region but also to increase its influence globally. In this book essay, we analyze four contributions to various facets of Chinese economic statecraft. The books concern the level of control of commercial actors in the Chinese leadership's economic statecraft (Norris, 2016), currency statecraft and China's attempts to internationalize its currency (Cohen, 2019), China's collective financial statecraft through the BRICS cooperation (Roberts et al., 2017), and China's enormous infrastructure project (Clarke et al., 2020). Taken together, the books show the extensive scope in the economic tools China has at its disposal. We have a clear agenda with our reading. We are predominantly interested in the innovative aspects of the contributions. We also use the books to answer three research questions concerning China's rise and its economic statecraft: (i) what are China's ambitions?, (ii) what is China's behavior?, and (iii) does China achieve its ambitions? Finally, we build on our reading of the contemporary literature on economic statecraft to outline some blind spots in the research field.

Japanese security policy has undergone significant changes lately. Japanese policymakers have recently argued over advancing Japan's Self-Defense Forces with new weapon systems. In particular, the Abe government has decided to pur- chase long-range cruise missiles for its new F-35A jetfighters, and to reconstruct a newly-built helicopter carrier into an aircraft carrier. While specific policy proposals continued di- viding policymakers and other stakeholders, the underlying story specifying Japan's place in East Asia, the rise of China, the threat of North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, the tight security relationship with the United States and the vulnerability of the Japanese archipelago has faced lit- tle core criticism. The lack of alternative national security narratives suggests the emergence of a Japanese security consensus in the mid-2010s. The strength of the narrative in deterring policymakers to refrain from critique, through the significant costs incurred by opposition, could also sug- gest a hegemonic narrative (but not necessarily a consensus). We find that the dominant narrative provided a necessary foundation for unorthodox policy proposals, which arguably enabled the Abe government to push through military in- strument expansions in the Self-Defense Forces, a move far from politically sustainable only a decade earlier. ; acceptedVersion

Japanese security policy has undergone significant changes lately. Japanese policymakers have recently argued over advancing Japan's Self-Defense Forces with new weapon systems. In particular, the Abe government has decided to purchase long-range cruise missiles for its new F-35A jetfighters, and to reconstruct a newly-built helicopter carrier into an aircraft carrier. While specific policy proposals continued dividing policymakers and other stakeholders, the underlying story specifying Japan's place in East Asia, the rise of China, the threat of North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, the tight security relationship with the United States and the vulnerability of the Japanese archipelago has faced little core criticism. The lack of alternative national security narratives suggests the emergence of a Japanese security consensus in the mid-2010s. The strength of the narrative in deterring policymakers to refrain from critique, through the significant costs incurred by opposition, could also suggest a hegemonic narrative (but not necessarily a consensus). We find that the dominant narrative provided a necessary foundation for unorthodox policy proposals, which arguably enabled the Abe government to push through military instrument expansions in the Self-Defense Forces, moves far from politically sustainable only a decade earlier. (Asian Perspect/GIGA)

Japanese security policy has undergone significant changes lately. Japanese policymakers have recently argued over advancing Japan's Self-Defense Forces with new weapon systems. In particular, the Abe government has decided to purchase long-range cruise missiles for its new F-35A jetfighters, and to reconstruct a newly-built helicopter carrier into an aircraft carrier. While specific policy proposals continued dividing policymakers and other stakeholders, the underlying story specifying Japan's place in East Asia, the rise of China, the threat of North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, the tight security relationship with the United States and the vulnerability of the Japanese archipelago has faced little core criticism. The lack of alternative national security narratives suggests the emergence of a Japanese security consensus in the mid-2010s. The strength of the narrative in deterring policymakers to refrain from critique, through the significant costs incurred by opposition, could also suggest a hegemonic narrative (but not necessarily a consensus). We find that the dominant narrative provided a necessary foundation for unorthodox policy proposals, which arguably enabled the Abe government to push through military instrument expansions in the Self-Defense Forces, moves far from politically sustainable only a decade earlier.

This article contributes to the relational IR literature on identity politics and Sino‐Japanese relations. Theoretically, we develop Rumelili's framework for studying modes of differentiation by incorporating the sectoral characteristics of key discourse signs. Empirically, we apply this framework to the construction of Self and Other in the official Japanese security discourse regarding the Senkaku Islands dispute from 2010–2014, a period of dispute climax that is meaningful for studying the (re)production of Japan's understanding of China. The inclusiveness of the discourse signs that Japan uses to construct China possibly opens up for a positive evolution of Sino‐Japanese relations, as there is space for progress if China's behavior—and Japan's interpretation of it—proves to be more peaceful, transparent, and law‐abiding. The findings also suggest, however, that the strong sense of superiority in Japan (and China) vis‐à‐vis a subordinate Other may not bode well for Sino‐Japanese relations.