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The Crash That Stopped Britain, Ian Jack, Granta Press, London (2001), 94 pp.

The notions of "policy learning" and "policy transfer" have become increasingly influential in the public‐policy literature. By utilizing a comparative analysis of regulatory change in the railways in Britain and Germany, it is argued that an institutional approach adds to the understanding of "learning" and "transfer" processes, as well as explaining which institutions mattered as Britain and Germany adopted distinctively different regulatory regimes. The institutional approach points to the constraints involved in the selection of regulatory design ideas and, by assessing three institutional factors that structure relationships between the policy domain and its environments, suggests that in the case of railway privatization in Britain and Germany in the 1990s, it was the structure of the political‐administrative nexus that centrally shaped why particular policy options were selected while others were neglected.

The notions of "policy learning" & "policy transfer" have become increasingly influential in the public-policy literature. By utilizing a comparative analysis of regulatory change in the railways in GB & Germany, it is argued that an institutional approach adds to the understanding of "learning" & "transfer" processes, as well as explaining which institutions mattered as GB & Germany adopted distinctively different regulatory regimes. The institutional approach points to the constraints involved in the selection of regulatory design ideas &, by assessing three institutional factors that structure relationships between the policy domain & its environments, suggests that in the case of railway privatization in GB & Germany in the 1990s, it was the structure of the political-administrative nexus that centrally shaped why particular policy options were selected while others were neglected. 76 References. Adapted from the source document.

"Competition policy has been said to lie at the heart of the German social market economy and to have been a key influence on the EC competition regime. This chapter assesses the impact of Europeanization on the competition law policy domain in the light of earlier claims that suggest a marginalization of the Federal Cartel Office. The question is pursued through three case studies that involve three different Europeanization dynamics-those of domestic assimilation of EU policy provisions, of informing policy change at the EU level, and of 'collision' between national and Commission policy preferences. The cases cover three distinct policy issues-the Europeanization of domestic competition law, attempts to shape changes to the EC regime's Regulation 17/62 and efforts of the DG Competition to prohibit the fixed-book price agreement between Austria and Germany. While those cases leading to domestic policy change suggest a considerable degree of national 'resilience', the example of 'informing EC policy change' points to the declining influence of the German approach vis-à-vis other national competition law experiences, Commission preferences, and changing competition policy 'ideas'. Moreover, while earlier claims suggesting a marginalization of the Federal Cartel Office require some qualification, wider changes in the German political economy have challenged the previous predominance of competition policy in German economic policy." (author's abstract)

The notions of 'regulatory state' and 'Europeanisation' have become increasingly current in recent years. This article analyses the extent to which the national regulatory state has been Europeanised, focusing in particular on network industry regulation in four European Union (EU) member states, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany and Sweden. It does so in three steps. First, four dimensions of Europeanisation are discussed, pointing to: different institutional constellations in which Europeanisation takes place, different Europeanisation 'triggers'; institutional consequences of Europeanisation at the national level; and, finally, different dynamics of Europeanisation. Second, the article surveys regulatory reform in four EU member states, suggesting that national diversity remains prominent, whether in terms of organising network regulation, processes of reform or the utilisation of particular regulatory instruments to enhance transparency. Finally, the article considers the impact of the four dimensions of Europeanisation on the national regulatory state in network regulation. It suggests that, far from transforming national regulation, Europeanisation is associated with many different phenomena, allowing for continued national diversity and adding to existing policy cleavages.

Regulatory reform is often seen as a road paved by good intentions, but leading to 'policy hell'. The example of the railways seems to represent a prime example of regulatory failure, not only in Britain but also in Germany. This article analyses the notion of 'regulatory failure' in the railway domain by taking an analytical and a comparative perspective. First, it introduces a variety of explanations as to why regulation can go wrong. Second, it considers the design and the consequent evolution of the regulatory regimes for the railways in Britain and Germany since the early 1990s. Both countries offer similar life-cycles of regulatory reform, however differing in design, perceived failures and advocated solutions. Finally, it discusses how the literature on regulatory failure contributes to the understanding of British and German railway regulation and argues that any regulatory regime is not only characterised by a conflict of interests, but also by conflicts of standards of appropriateness that lead to inherent tension and potential causes for failure.

Analyzes and compares evolution of policy reform, and regulatory regimes with privatization of British and German railways since the early 1990s, the notion of "regulatory failure", and its design.