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Sarah is sixteen. After the death of her parents, on the ship coming to Australia, she finds herself alone in a strange but fascinating new land, left to care for her baby brother, Tommy. River Child is an intensely moving story of adventure, love, tragedy and courage

ABSTRACTThe long-standing debate about the proper role for Africa's traditional leaders in contemporary politics has intensified in the last two decades, as efforts to foster democratisation and decentralisation have brought competing claims to power and legitimacy to the fore, especially at the local level. Questions persist as to whether traditional authority and democratic governance are ultimately compatible or contradictory. Can the two be blended into viable and effective hybrid systems? Or do the potentially anti-democratic features of traditional systems present insurmountable obstacles to an acceptable model of integration? Survey data collected by the Afrobarometer indicate that Africans who live under these dual systems of authority do not draw as sharp a distinction between hereditary chiefs and elected local government officials as most analysts would expect. In fact, popular evaluations of selected and elected leaders are strongly andpositivelylinked. They appear to be consistently shaped by each individual's 'leadership affect', and by an understanding of chiefs and elected officials as common players in a single, integrated political system, rather than as opponents in a sharply bifurcated one. Moreover, there is no evident conflict between supporting traditional leadership and being a committed and active democrat. Rather than finding themselves trapped between two competing spheres of political authority, Africans appear to have adapted to the hybridisation of their political institutions more seamlessly than many have anticipated or assumed.

How media coverage and government leadership can influence public opinion.

Competitive elections are becoming institutionalized in Africa. But elections have proven an uncertain mechanism for guaranteeing the accountability of political leaders. One reason is that political accountability has numerous attitudinal, behavioral and institutional requirements, of which popular participation in open elections is only one. Instead, we propose a framework of four elements that together comprise a holistic system of political accountability: (a) demand for vertical accountability; (b) supply of vertical accountability; (c) demand for horizontal accountability; and (d) supply of horizontal accountability.The article measures each of these elements using data from Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011–13). On one hand, we find that the weakest link in the chain of accountability remains the vertical one between largely passive electors and evasive legislative agents. On the other hand, we find that the African citizens surveyed think that elections strengthen the institutional autonomy of parliament, thus enabling a greater measure of horizontal accountability. But this pattern of accountability begs several lingering concerns. We wonder whether citizens have sufficient information to accurately monitor the relationship between president and parliament under a democratic constitution, and we find that the quality of elections, along with the partisan predispositions of electoral winners, condition the effect of elections on popular perceptions of accountability.

Can democracy consolidate in electoral systems without power alternations? Using public attitude data collected by the Afrobarometer in 16 sub-Saharan African countries (2005-2006), as well as country-level variables, this study examines how alternations in power that result from electoral contests affect mass perceptions of democratic durability. By examining durability, we shift the focus from individuals' own preferences and attitudes regarding democracy to their perceptions about the degree of societal commitment to a democratic regime. Multilevel analysis finds that a lack of alternation among power holders undermines popular confidence that democracy, weak as it may be, will endure. Moreover, the gap in perceptions of democratic durability between the political majority and the minority narrows considerably in systems where one or more alternations have occurred. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Can democracy consolidate in electoral systems without power alternations? Using public attitude data collected by the Afrobarometer in 16 sub-Saharan African countries (2005-2006), as well as country-level variables, this study examines how alternations in power that result from electoral contests affect mass perceptions of democratic durability. By examining durability, we shift the focus from individuals' own preferences and attitudes regarding democracy to their perceptions about the degree of societal commitment to a democratic regime. Multilevel analysis finds that a lack of alternation among power holders undermines popular confidence that democracy, weak as it may be, will endure. Moreover, the gap in perceptions of democratic durability between the political majority and the minority narrows considerably in systems where one or more alternations have occurred.

The emerging literature on the "quality of democracy" promises to advance our knowledge of democratization in several ways. First of all, it takes us beyond the narrow assessment of stability and endurance of democratic political regimes to ask about the quality of democracy those regimes supply. We move from asking "how stable?" to "how well?" Second, the concept of quality promises to provide us with greater nuance and precision, and thus greater ability to distinguish amongst widely disparate countries -- such as Cape Verde and Ghana on one hand, and Canada and Greece on the other -- that are usually lumped together as free, or as liberal democracies by the relatively blunt measures provided by Freedom House or Polity. Finally, and related to this, it enables us to move beyond "whole system" (Diamond 2002) measures and brings into focus differing dimensions of democracy, allowing us to appreciate that some countries can do better on some dimensions but worse on others. This also opens up the possibility that we may be able to measure democratic qualities in countries that do not qualify as electoral or liberal democracies (Elkins 2000).

ABSTRACTIn February 2011, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni resoundingly won re-election. In the aftermath of the vote, which many had predicted would be competitive, analysts and opposition supporters ascribed Museveni's victory to massive pre-election spending on public goods, creation of new administrative districts, and vote buying. While the opposition could not compete with Museveni and his National Resistance Movement in access to resources, our analyses of survey data, from two pre-election surveys conducted by Afrobarometer in November/December 2010 and January 2011, and a pre- and post-election panel study, find little evidence that Museveni benefited significantly from public goods outlays, district creation, and vote buying. Additionally, we find little evidence that fear and intimidation were responsible for the results. Instead, the data suggest that Museveni's re-election was driven by an uninspiring opposition slate, widespread satisfaction with macro-economic growth, and an improved security situation, particularly in the Northern Region.