Search results

AbstractIt will be politically difficult to liberalize international economic migration without some form of compensation for host-country workers. The paper explores the scope for managing migration using a government-regulated competitive market for work permits (WPs). We propose that host-county workers should be granted the legal option of renting out their WPs for a period of their choice, while foreigners can purchase taxable time-bound WPs. The proposed market is anonymous, with no need for personalized matchings of those on its two sides. The market can have either one price or be differentiated by occupation or region. There would probably be some losers, but potentially large gains, including through enhanced social protection in host countries. Using its power to tax WPs, the host country can achieve any desired floor to labour earnings. The market for WPs can also provide a new instrument for implementing industrial and regional development policies.

This paper reviews the literature that explores the drivers and effects of financial secrecy on emerging economies. It shows that most of the research on financial secrecy has been focused on issues of tax avoidance, neglecting the problems of institutional arbitrage that go beyond taxation issues. The paper discusses the limits of the institutionalist paradigm that treats businesses solely as rule-takers and calls for more attention to business agency and responsibility. Discussions about corporate social responsibility in emerging economies should incorporate thinking about the potential role that businesses, and especially big corporations, could play in promoting more effective institutions at home. Further research is needed to understand the political and institutional effects of global financial secrecy at the domestic level. The paper suggests some promising avenues for future research as well as new items to be included on the policy-making agenda in relation to financial secrecy.

AbstractThis paper uses data from the Russian Longitudinal Survey that span the two recent economic recessions of 1998 and 2008 to study the effect of declining incomes on household composition. We hypothesize that individuals face a trade‐off between taking advantage of economies of scale and specialization when living with others, and individual privacy. Consumption smoothing is achieved by forgoing privacy during the crisis and results in increases in household size. Our empirical results suggest that members of households that experienced negative income shocks are more likely to move in with others compared to individuals residing in households whose income remained the same or increased.