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Is the relationship between populist leaders and those in their parties always charismatic? Although many scholars of populism assume this, the attribution of 'charisma' is invariably based on how leaders present themselves rather than how purported followers within parties perceive them. In line with the literature on charisma, this article takes the latter approach, using interviews conducted between 2009 and 2011 with 111 elected representatives and grassroots members (i.e. 'the coterie') to examine how three European populist leaders regularly termed 'charismatic' – Silvio Berlusconi, Christoph Blocher and Umberto Bossi – were viewed within their parties. The article finds evidence of three different leadership types, with Bossi very clearly satisfying the conditions for coterie charisma, Berlusconi largely (but not entirely) fulfilling them, and Blocher only partially doing so. Finally, it presents new data showing the very damaging effects of Bossi's subsequent downfall on his party's organisation.

Despite the electoral success of Silvio Berlusconi's two political parties, little theoretical and empirical work has been done on Forza Italia (FI) and the Popolo Della Libertà (PDL – People of Freedom). This article aims to fill these gaps. Following a short overview of the history of FI and the PDL, it discusses how scholars have conceived of Forza Italia. Building on the criteria of Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner for the definition of a political party, a first operational definition is then offered of the term most used to classify FI and the PDL: the 'personal party'. On the basis of this, the article considers whether the PDL is another personal party akin to Forza Italia. This is done, first, by briefly considering the party statute and communications and, second, by examining the views expressed in interviews conducted across Italy with PDL elected representatives and ordinary party members.

Despite the electoral success of Silvio Berlusconi's two political parties, little theoretical and empirical work has been done on Forza Italia (FI) and the Popolo Della Liberta (PDL -- People of Freedom). This article aims to fill these gaps. Following a short overview of the history of FI and the PDL, it discusses how scholars have conceived of Forza Italia. Building on the criteria of Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner for the definition of a political party, a first operational definition is then offered of the term most used to classify FI and the PDL: the 'personal party'. On the basis of this, the article considers whether the PDL is another personal party akin to Forza Italia. This is done, first, by briefly considering the party statute and communications and, second, by examining the views expressed in interviews conducted across Italy with PDL elected representatives and ordinary party members. Adapted from the source document.

This article argues that the Lega Nord is best understood, first and foremost, as a regionalist populist party. Following a brief discussion of the importance of the territorial reference in explaining the Lega, the article examines its populist discourse using material from the party's newspaper La Padania over the three days in June 2005 around the annual Lega rally in Pontida.

Abstract
The party on the ground has traditionally enabled linkage with the party in office along with providing candidates, selectorates, and campaign volunteers. While this still occurs in cities, we do not know how party organisation changes have affected remote areas. To investigate, we examine two remote Australian electorates: the Barkly in the Northern Territory and the Kimberley in Western Australia. Based on interviews with grassroots members, representatives and officials, we conclude that, although parties still exert their traditional functions in some remote areas, in others they have disengaged, rendering membership less meaningful and weakening the chain of democratic legitimacy.

Political scientists have long asserted that populists use simpler language than their mainstream rivals to appeal to ordinary people and distance themselves from elites. However, there is little comparative evidence in support of that claim. In this study, we investigate the linguistic simplicity of four right-wing populists compared to their principal opponents in the United States, France, United Kingdom, and Italy. We do so by analysing a corpus of approximately one million words from leaders' speeches, using a series of linguistics measures for evaluating simplicity. Contrary to expectations, we find that Donald Trump was only slightly simpler than Hillary Clinton, while Nigel Farage in the UK and Marine Le Pen in France were more complex than their main rivals, and Italy's Matteo Salvini was simpler on some measures but not others. We conclude that the simple language claim is not borne out and that other aspects of the received wisdom about populism should be re-examined.