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AbstractIn 2013, British American Tobacco (BAT) returned to Myanmar a decade after it had left the country under pressure from civil society, international organizations, and the government of the United Kingdom. The company's involvement in a joint venture with an investment branch of the country's military government between 1999 and 2003 resulted in intense scrutiny and criticism based on the military's record of human rights abuses. BAT argued that corporations could not be held accountable for actions of governments in countries in which it operated, and that its presence in Myanmar contributed to economic and social development. It also maintained that its Myanmar subsidiary provided a model of responsible business conduct. The controversy that surrounded BAT's Myanmar subsidiary between 1999 and 2003 has increasing relevance to the current situation in Myanmar, and potential implications for foreign corporations operating in the country.

British American Tobacco Cambodia (BATC) has dominated the country's tobacco market since its launch in 1996. Aggressive marketing in a weak regulatory environment and strategies to influence tobacco control policy have contributed to an emerging tobacco-related public health crisis. Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, issues of BATC's in-house newsletter, civil society reports and media demonstrate that BATC officials have successfully sought to align the company with Cambodia's increasingly controversial political and business leadership that is centred around the Cambodian People's Party with the aim of gaining access to policy makers and influencing the policy process. Connections to the political elite have resulted in official recognition of the company's ostensible contribution to Cambodia's economic and social development and, more significantly, provided BATC with opportunities to petition policy makers and to dilute tobacco control regulation. Corporate promotion of its contribution to Cambodia's economic and social development is at odds with its determined efforts to thwart public health regulation and Cambodia's compliance with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

The enforced opening of Thailand's cigarette market to imports in 1990 has become a cause celebre in debates about the social and health impacts of trade agreements. At the instigation of leading US-based cigarette manufacturers, the US Trade Representative (USTR) threatened trade sanctions against Thailand to compel the government to liberalize its domestic cigarette market. Thailand's challenge to the USTR led to referral to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) arbitration. While GATT ruled in favour of the USTR on market access, it also found that Thailand could subsequently enact non-discriminatory tobacco control regulation without contravening the GATT agreement. This article contributes to existing literature via its analysis of tobacco industry documents that highlight not only USTR responsiveness to lobbying from tobacco corporations, raising concerns about the drivers of globalization and the limited protection afforded to public health concerns in trade agreements. Significantly, the documents also indicate that USTR support of the tobacco industry was not unconditional, being subject to wider pressures of global trade negotiations. Such qualification notwithstanding, however, ongoing governmental willingness to advance the international interests of tobacco corporations remains a concern from a public health perspective, particularly given the failure of the US to ratify the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

The enforced opening of Thailand's cigarette market to imports in 1990 has become a cause celebre in debates about the social and health impacts of trade agreements. At the instigation of leading US-based cigarette manufacturers, the US Trade Representative (USTR) threatened trade sanctions against Thailand to compel the government to liberalize its domestic cigarette market. Thailand's challenge to the USTR led to referral to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) arbitration. While GATT ruled in favour of the USTR on market access, it also found that Thailand could subsequently enact non-discriminatory tobacco control regulation without contravening the GATT agreement. This paper contributes to existing literature via its analysis of tobacco industry documents that highlight not only USTR responsiveness to lobbying from tobacco corporations, raising concerns about the drivers of globalization and the limited protection afforded to public health concerns in trade agreements. Significantly, the documents also indicate that USTR support of the tobacco industry was not unconditional, being subject to wider pressures of global trade negotiations. Such qualification notwithstanding, however,,ongoing governmental willingness to advance the international interests of tobacco corporations remains a concern from a public health perspective, particularly given the failure of the US to ratify the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

The Thailand Tobacco Monopoly (TTM) controlled the country's tobacco industry from its formation in the 1940s, until the government dropped restrictions on imported cigarettes in the late 1980s in response to pressure from the United States. The TTM has since competed with transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) in a semi-monopoly market in which TTCs have steadily increased their market share. Coupled with a decline in national smoking prevalence, the result of Thailand's stringent tobacco control agenda, the TTM now accounts for a diminishing share of a contracting market. In response, the monopoly has looked to regional trade liberalisation, and proximity to markets with some of the world's highest smoking rates to expand its operations. Expansion strategies have gone largely unrealised however, and the TTM effectively remains a domestic operation. Using TTM publications, market and trade reports, industry publications, tobacco industry documents and other resources, this paper analyses TTM expansion strategies, and the limited extent to which they have been achieved. This inability to expand its operations has left the monopoly potentially vulnerable to global strategies of its transnational competitors. This article is part of the special issue 'The Emergence of Asian Tobacco Companies: Implications for Global Health Governance'.

Japan Tobacco International (JTI) is the international division of Japan Tobacco Incorporated, and the world's third largest transnational tobacco company. Founded in 1999, JTI's rapid growth has been the result of a global business strategy that potentially serves as a model for other Asian tobacco companies. This paper analyses Japan Tobacco Incorporated's global expansion since the 1980s in response to market opening, foreign competition, and declining share of a contracting domestic market. Key features of its global strategy include the on-going central role and investment by the Japanese government, and an expansion agenda based on mergers and acquisitions. The paper also discusses the challenges this global business strategy poses for global tobacco control and public health. This paper is part of the special issue 'The Emergence of Asian Tobacco Companies: Implications for Global Health Governance'.

Tobacco industry public relations campaigns have played a key role in challenges to standardised cigarette packaging. This paper presents a comparative analysis of industry campaigns in Australia and the United Kingdom, which have implemented standardised packaging legislation; Canada, where policy has been adopted but not yet implemented; and the Netherlands, which has considered, but not enacted regulation. Campaigns were identified via Google searches, tobacco industry websites, media coverage, government submissions and previous research; analysis focused on issue framing and supporting evidence. Public relations campaigns in all case study countries drew on similar frames - the illicit trade in tobacco products, the encroaching 'nanny state', lack of evidence for the effectiveness of standardised packaging, a slippery slope of regulation, and inherent threats to intellectual property rights. These claims were supported by industry research, front groups and commissioned reports by accountancy firms, but were not with verifiable research. Independent evidence that contradicted industry positions was overlooked. Similarities in structure and content of public relations campaigns in countries that have enacted or considered regulation points to a strategic co-ordinated approach by cigarette manufacturers. Countries considering standardised packaging policy can expect powerful opposition from the tobacco industry. Tobacco control communities and policy makers can learn from previous experience, and share best practise in countering industry arguments.

Tobacco industry public relations campaigns have played a key role in challenges to standardised cigarette packaging. This paper presents a comparative analysis of industry campaigns in Australia and the United Kingdom, which have implemented standardised packaging legislation; Canada, where policy has been adopted but not yet implemented; and the Netherlands, which has considered, but not enacted regulation. Campaigns were identified via Google searches, tobacco industry websites, media coverage, government submissions and previous research; analysis focused on issue framing and supporting evidence. Public relations campaigns in all case study countries drew on similar frames - the illicit trade in tobacco products, the encroaching 'nanny state', lack of evidence for the effectiveness of standardised packaging, a slippery slope of regulation, and inherent threats to intellectual property rights. These claims were supported by industry research, front groups and commissioned reports by accountancy firms, but were not with verifiable research. Independent evidence that contradicted industry positions was overlooked. Similarities in structure and content of public relations campaigns in countries that have enacted or considered regulation points to a strategic co-ordinated approach by cigarette manufacturers. Countries considering standardised packaging policy can expect powerful opposition from the tobacco industry. Tobacco control communities and policy makers can learn from previous experience, and share best practise in countering industry arguments.