An extensive body of research investigates the emergence and characterization of dishonesty by means of the die-under-cup paradigm. However, most of the previous studies do not take into account the negative externalities of unethical behavior, since lying to increase the liar`s payoff only decreases the experimental budget. In this chapter, we experimentally investigate the effect of imposing negative externalities on a charity organization when cheating. In a sample composed by 192 students, comparison between our Baseline treatment and our Charity treatment reveals no significant difference on subjects` reporting decision. Our analysis does not provide any statistical support to the hypothesis that dishonest behavior may be lower when negative externalities associated with unethical behavior are affecting a charity organization rather than the experimental budget.
We experimentally test for spillover effects of gender quotas on subsequent unrelated, unethical behavior. We find that introducing quotas has no systematic effect on unethical behavior for both genders. High performing, competitive females are more likely to display unethical behavior than their male counterparts.
We experimentally test for spillover effects of gender quotas on subsequent unrelated, unethical behavior. We find that introducing quotas has no systematic effect on unethical behavior for both genders. High performing, competitive females are more likely to display unethical behavior than their male counterparts.
While previous research has shown that social preferences develop in childhood, we study whether this development is accompanied by reduced use of deception when lies would harm others, and increased use of deception to benefit others. In a sample of children aged between 7 and 14, we find strong aversion to lying at all ages. Lying is driven mainly by selfish motives and envy. Children with stronger social preferences are less prone to deception, even when lying would benefit others at no monetary cost. Older children lie less than younger children and use self-justification to lie.
Whistleblowing is a powerful and rather inexpensive instrument to deter tax evasion. Despite the deterrent effects on tax evasion, whistleblowing can reduce trust and undermine agents' attitude to cooperate with group members. Yet, no study has investigated the potential spillover effects of whistleblowing on ingroup cooperation. This paper reports results of a laboratory experiment in which subjects participate in two consecutive phases in unchanging groups: a tax evasion game, followed by a generalized gift exchange game. Two dimensions are manipulated in our experiment: the inclusion of a whistleblowing stage in which, after observing others' declared incomes, subjects can signal other group members to the tax authority, and the provision of information about the content of the second phase before the tax evasion game is played. Our results show that whistleblowing is effective in both curbing tax evasion and improving the precision of tax auditing. Moreover, we detect no statistically significant spillover effects of whistleblowing on ingroup cooperation in the subsequent generalized gift exchange game, with this result being unaffected by the provision of information about the experimental task in the second phase. Finally, the provision of information does not significantly alter subjects' (tax and whistleblowing) choices in the tax evasion game: thus, knowledge about perspective ingroup cooperation did not alter attitude toward whistleblowing.
Women are less likely to enroll in selective or scientific courses, applying for promotions and are particularly underrepresented in both middle and top positions in the STEM field. Quota are often advocated as an instrument to reduce this gender gap, but it remains unclear at what step of the career ladder they more effectively foster women's reaching the top. Many factors may affect quota's success or failure, such as how they would in turn affect teamwork and trust between members within organizations or coordination in applying for promotions. In this paper, by means of a laboratory experiment implementing a two-stage tournament, we evaluate the impact of three different interventions in affecting individual decision to climb the career ladder, abstracting away from other possible confounding factors. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced in the initial stage of competition was ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top; quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or at both stages increased women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners. ; Women are less likely to enroll in selective or scientific courses, applying for promotions and are particularly underrepresented in both middle and top positions in the STEM field. Quota are often advocated as an instrument to reduce this gender gap, but it remains unclear at what step of the career ladder they more effectively foster women's reaching the top. Many factors may affect quota's success or failure, such as how they would in turn affect teamwork and trust between members within organizations or coordination in applying for promotions. In this paper, by means of a laboratory experiment implementing a two-stage tournament, we evaluate the impact of three different interventions in affecting individual decision to climb the career ladder, abstracting away from other possible confounding factors. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced in the initial stage of competition was ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top; quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or at both stages increased women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners.
We experimentally investigate the role of reciprocity in sustaining the emergence of implicit collusive agreements in hierarchical organizations. We show that when an agent hires, on behalf of the principal, one worker out of two candidates: i) low ability workers, being less entitled to be selected, are more likely to exert effort in a task that is exclusively beneficial to the agent; ii) as a consequence, agents distort the hiring process in favor of low ability workers and iii) sharing a small part of the organization's profits with the workers alleviates their effort distortion.
Women are underrepresented in leadership positions in business, politics, and in the academic and scientific community. Not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of talent and, consequently, a loss of economic growth potential. To design effective policy interventions that empower women to reach leadership positions, it is crucial to identify at which levels of the career ladder they should be introduced. In a laboratory experiment, we run a two-stage tournament to evaluate the impact of three different interventions on women's willingness to compete for top positions. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced at the initial stage is ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top, while quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or in both stages increase women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners.
Women are underrepresented in leadership positions in business, politics, and in the academic and scientific community. Not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of talent and, consequently, a loss of economic growth potential. To design effective policy interventions that empower women to reach leadership positions, it is crucial to identify at which levels of the career ladder they should be introduced. In a laboratory experiment, we run a two-stage tournament to evaluate the impact of three different interventions on women's willingness to compete for top positions. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced at the initial stage is ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top, while quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or in both stages increase women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners.
In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.