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In this article, I apply Alderson and Nielsen's (1999) holistic approach to the sociology of development by revisiting the consequences of private markets and foreign direct investment (FDI) for earnings inequality during postsocialist transition. I begin by arguing that FDI increases the pace of private market expansion and thereby affects inequality through an indirect causal pathway unrecognized in the literature. The total effect of FDI thus depends in part on how private markets drive distributional change. I then introduce a maturation thesis to reconcile debates over the distributional consequences of private markets, where private markets first reduce and then increase inequality. If FDI increases the pace of private market expansion and if the distributional consequences of private markets increase as they expand, then FDI's total effect on inequality should grow with the expansion of private markets. Evidence drawn from a time-series crosssection regression analysis of earnings inequality among 18 transition countries supports this intervention. FDI increases the pace of private market expansion, and the effect of private markets changes from negative to positive as private markets expand. Thus the total effect of FDI increases with the size of the private market. I conclude by implicating these findings in debates about postsocialist transition and the sociology of development more generally.

Interdisciplinary literature on global commodity chains (GCCs)/global value chains (GVCs) and global production networks (GPNs) contends that inter-firm power differentials within globally networked forms of economic organization have implications for the developmental trajectories of nation-states. In this article, I advance these literatures in three ways. First, I bridge the two approaches by elaborating an exchange-theoretic conceptualization of inter-firm power that is latent in the two literatures. This conceptualization focuses narrowly on the determinants of inter-firm power asymmetries and is useful for explaining why actual production networks vary in terms of the relative power of buyers and producers. Second, I develop an empirical framework to advance basic research on the link between globally networked forms of economic organization and national economic development. In particular, I derive cross-nationally and temporally comparable country-level measurements of the average bargaining power of a country's resident firms using industry-specific international exchange (trade) networks. I demonstrate the validity of these indices through a historical analysis of trade networks in the transport equipment and garment industries and by analysing cross-national variations in wages in the two industries. Finally, I conclude by charting a parallel path for GCC/GVC and GPN research that implicates global models of network organization in macro-comparative analyses of economic development. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractIn this article, I synthesize and extend the theoretical literature on global commodity chain (GCC) and global value chain (GVC) governance to generate a theory of the 'globalness' of value chains and the spatialization of value chain linkages. Drawing from the original GCC dichotomy of buyer/producer‐driven commodity chains, I emphasize the height of entry barriers to manufacturing and supplier capability differentials across the North–South divide as determinants of the amount and geographic extent of global offshoring behaviour. Using a novel empirical approach to the measurement of global offshoring behaviour at the global industry level, the article shows that the original GCC governance scheme successfully predicts the levels, rates and timing of global production fragmentation across three networked industries. Combining the original GCC governance scheme with the more recent GVC governance types, the theory leads to predictions about the specific types of GVC linkages that might occur given the drivenness of a chain and the geographical location of lead firms and their suppliers. I conclude by drawing out the theory's implications for our understanding of the link between value chain formation and economic development in the global South and suggesting areas for future research.

AbstractThe relationship between power, governance and value creation/capture is a central concern in global value chain (GVC) research. In the context of calls to develop a more expansive view of power in GVCs, we argue for retaining a focus on bargaining power, but shifting the conceptualization of bargaining power from the dyad to the network. We advance two arguments. First, we elaborate an exchange theoretic model in which skew of value capture is a function of the degree of power asymmetry inherent in the ratio of buyers to suppliers. Second, we explain how this model can be expanded to consider the role of external factors, such as the institutional and normative contexts in which exchange occurs. Rather than see these factors as contending forms of power, we treat them as forces that can affect value skew by either attenuating the bargaining power of lead firms or by moderating the distributional effects of power asymmetries between exchange partners. We conclude that an exchange theoretic approach to bargaining power in GVCs provides a parsimonious framework for explaining how inter‐firm governance shapes the distribution of value capture in global production.

We assess the degree to which the policy preferences of female legislators explain the widely observed negative association between women's political representation (known as "women in parliament," or WIP) and corruption. While a broad literature suggests that WIP reduces corruption, there is little consensus on how. Some suggest that the effect is driven by women's psychology—perhaps women are more prosocial or more risk-averse than men, and thus engage in less corruption. Others suggest that the effect is driven by policy preferences: because it serves the interest of their female constituents, women promote social spending, which in turn reduces corruption. We employ a mediation analysis that allows us to test the mediating effect of social spending, and to provide an upper bound for alternative explanations. Our results suggest that social spending explains as much as 69 percent of the effect of WIP on corruption, leaving as little as 31 percent for alternative explanations. These results are robust to concerns about spurious WIP effects, sample composition, and the potential for endogeneity in the link from either WIP or social spending to corruption. We conclude by implicating these findings in broader discussions about the beneficial effects of WIP for governance.

Existing sociological theories of international relations yield contrasting predictions for their structure that range from an increasingly dense and universally tied network to networks in which ties tend to concentrate within or between certain types of economically, politically or culturally defined blocs. We contribute to this growing body of empirical research by analyzing original data on the complete worldwide network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as it has evolved over the course of 50 years since its inception in 1959. We find that the number of BITs increases almost exponentially over time to include nearly all of the world's countries. However, the density of ties between advanced capitalist and others is stronger than for any other dyadic types. We also find patterns of regional homophily, but only in Asia, East Asia, Postsocialist Europe and Eurasia, and North Africa/Middle East. These findings suggest that existing explanations of globalization are more complementary than contending. Theorizing about any particular global outcome thus requires attention to the simultaneity of material and cultural forces and the interplay of transnational and local socio-historical developments. Our analysis of the structure of the BIT network also helps explain the weak link between foreign direct investment and BITs discovered in previous research.

Comparative sociologists have long considered occupations to be a key source of inequality. However, data constraints make comparative research on two of the more important contemporary drivers of occupational stratification - globalization and technological change - relatively scarce. This article introduces a new dataset on occupational "routine task intensity" (RTI) and "offshorability" (OFFS) for use with the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. To produce these data, we recoded 23 country-specific occupational schemes (74 LIS countryyears) to the two-digit ISCO-88 scheme. When combined with the handful of LIS countries already reporting their occupations in ISCO-88, we produce individual level RTI and OFFS scores for 38 LIS countries and 160 LIS country-years. To assess the validity of these recodes, we compare average labor-income ratios predicted by recoded ISCO-88 occupational categories to those predicted by reported ISCO-88 occupational categories within countries that transitioned from country-specific to ISCO-88 codes over time. To assess the utility of these RTI and OFFS scores and advance the literature on income polarization, we analyze their association with work hours and labor incomes in the global North and South. Both covariates correlate with work hours in ways that are consistent with previous research and additional theoretical considerations. Moreover, we show that both RTI and OFFS contribute to income polarization directly in the North, but not in the South. This article generates a public good data infrastructure that will be of use to a wide variety of social scientists, and brings new evidence to bear on the question of income polarization in rich democracies.

Comparative sociologists have long considered occupations to be a key source of inequality. However, data constraints make comparative research on two of the more important contemporary drivers of occupational stratification – globalization and technological change – relatively scarce. This article introduces a new dataset on occupational 'routine task intensity' (RTI) and 'offshorability' (OFFS) for use with the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). To produce these data, we recoded 23 country-specific occupational schemes (74 LIS country-years) to the two-digit ISCO-88 scheme. When combined with the handful of LIS countries already reporting their occupations in ISCO-88, we produce individual level RTI and OFFS scores for 38 LIS countries and 160 LIS country-years. To assess the validity of these recodes, we compare average labor-income ratios predicted by recoded ISCO-88 occupational categories to those predicted by reported ISCO-88 occupational categories within countries that transitioned from country-specific to ISCO-88 codes over time. To assess the utility of these RTI and OFFS scores and advance the literature on income polarization, we analyze their association with work hours and labor incomes in the global North and South. Both covariates correlate with work hours in ways that are consistent with previous research and additional theoretical considerations. Moreover, we show that both RTI and OFFS contribute to income polarization directly in the North, but not in the South. This article generates a public good data infrastructure that will be of use to a wide variety of social scientists, and brings new evidence to bear on the question of income polarization in rich democracies.