Search results

This paper analyzes and reports on the success, and characteristics of success, of the Candijay-Mabini Mangrove Rehabilitation and Coastal Resource Management Project (CMMRCRM), a co-management project implemented in the Philippines aimed towards re-establishing local-level management over coastal resources. Beginning in 1989, a co-management system was implemented to manage Cogtong Bay's mangroves. The national government passed enabling legislation, vesting responsibility of the day-to-day management of the coastal resources with local users. Individuals replanted pre-determined areas of mangrove forest in exchange for 25-year Certificate of Stewardship Contracts. Although much has been written on the benefits co-management, and much literature also exists promulgating the necessary conditions of successful co-management, very few case studies exist to offer tangible evidence. Recognizing this gap, the co-management experience in Cogtong Bay was researched (a) to determine if expected benefits were actually realized and, if so, (b) to identify characteristics of successful co-management. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Between 1787 and 1798, the agricultural writer and land agent William Marshall (1745–1818) published a number of works on the rural economies of England, covering Norfolk, his native Yorkshire, Gloucestershire, the Midlands and the South. This two-volume study appeared in 1796 and investigated the farming, geography, public works and produce of districts in Devon, Somerset, Dorset and Cornwall. Volume 1 looks in detail at West Devon, the eastern parts of Cornwall, and the South Hams. The coverage includes aspects of the laws surrounding land ownership, farming implements peculiar to the areas, woodland management, orchards and the production of fruit-based liquors. The result is a richly detailed survey of the area in the Georgian period and an important record of rural and agricultural life, so often overlooked by other contemporary chroniclers

Between 1787 and 1798, the agricultural writer and land agent William Marshall (1745–1818) published a number of works on the rural economies of England, covering Norfolk, his native Yorkshire, Gloucestershire, the Midlands and the South. This two-volume study appeared in 1796 and investigated the farming, geography, public works and produce of districts in Devon, Somerset, Dorset and Cornwall. Volume 2 looks in detail at the upland areas of Cornwall and Devon, at Dartmoor, North Devon, the vales of Exeter and Taunton, and West Dorset. The coverage includes aspects of the laws surrounding land ownership, the chemistry of the soil, notes on the dairy industry, and suggested improvements to farming practices. The result is a richly detailed survey of the area in the Georgian period and an important record of rural and agricultural life, so often overlooked by other contemporary chroniclers

Less Developed Countries (LDCs) provide enormous opportunities for companies involved in the development of infrastructure. LDCs couple significant need with often insufficient 'in country' capability or expertise, meaning that foreign companies willing to expand operations into LDCs can find interesting and profitable opportunities. International infrastructure development naturally brings with it the sovereign risks associated with contracting with the government of a LDC. During the last thirty years, governments of LDCs have actively sought the execution of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) with other nations in an attempt to mitigate the appearance of sovereign risk and encourage greater international investment. This has included encouraging foreign companies in the delivery of infrastructure projects.

In the last five years, however, worldwide political support for IIAs seems to be waning, as nationalism and populism threatens to replace globalism and multiculturalism as the dominant economic and political theories in the USA, Europe and Great Britain. In a global political landscape dominated by nationalistic rhetoric, we are unlikely to see continued popular support for the protection of foreign companies against national interests by way of IIAs. We are likely to see not only fewer new IIAs, but conceivably governments revoking their agreement to existing IIAs coupled with waning support for ICSID arbitrations. The author submits, however, that there will not necessarily be a marked increase in sovereign risk as a direct result, and that LDCs will continue to provide worthwhile markets and opportunities for infrastructure development.

The author submits that IIAs never in any event provided complete protection, and that protection against sovereign risk remains available through the underlying contract and in many cases, through political risk insurance. Further, international participants should look at projects with shorter timeframes to secure the return on investment, and avoiding taking sole risk on project by operating in joint ventures.

Conventional approaches to determining optimal abandonment of a project under uncertainty either assume risk‐neutrality or impose a mean‐variance criterion. Risk‐neutrality is unrealistic while the mean‐variance criterion precludes determination of the optimal strategy without consideration of covariances of returns among projects. Further, the use of variance of present value as a risk measure may result in the "optimality" of a time 0 strategy that involves maintaining a position at time t that will be "suboptimal" and would not be maintained. The use of the multiperiod capital asset pricing model (CAPM) as a decision criterion is consistent with contemporary theory of market behavior and remedies the deficiencies of the mean‐variance approach noted above. Computationally, the optimal strategy for abandonment, when the commitment must be made at time 0 (a lease, say), can be determined with little difficulty beyond that of mean‐variance models. When time of abandonment can remain unspecified, the value of the prospect that abandonment will occur at the optimal time can be determined, though the technique necessary is considerably more complicated. In both cases, the marginal costs of commitments that limit discretion over abandonment can be determined and attributed to those commitments.