Relative to other social scientists, political scientists seem disengaged from the political world outside the academy. In this article, I suggest that this is regrettable, arguing that such service is beneficial both for scholarship and for society at large. I examine two such forms of outside service: writing for a blog and working in a political party. I examine the potential pitfalls and benefits from such service. Adapted from the source document.
This article builds on Matthews and Stimsons (1975) study of legislative cue taking, analyzing the extent to which legislators sitting next to each other influence each others voting behavior. Data come from three decades of roll call votes in the California Assembly, a chamber in which each member is paired with a deskmate. By comparing deskmate pairs with nondeskmate pairs, I find that legislators vote identically to their deskmates on a sizeable subset of roll calls. This deskmate effect appears to remain strong even as a rival influence, legislative partisanship, increases in strength. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of Western Political Science Association, Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, Southern California Political Science Association, Northern California Political Science Association, Volume 65, Issue 1, p. 104-124
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy Section of the American Political Science Association, Volume 7, Issue 1, p. 20-38
Term limits advocates argued that their reform would make state legislative campaigns more competitive and less expensive, and limited early studies suggested that it may have achieved those goals. But now, with evidence from more than a decade of experience with reform, we re-examine the effects of terms limits on electoral competitiveness and campaign spending in California Assembly elections. We find that while term limits initially suppressed campaign spending, they did not check its growth for long. Today, California's state legislative elections are as expensive in real dollars as they have ever been. In terms of electoral competitiveness, state legislative incumbents are in no more danger of losing their seats today than they were in the pre-term limits days of the late 1980s. Furthermore, open-seat races are not any more competitive under term limits than before them; however, we do find a modest, but significant, decline in incumbents' average winning margin since the imposition of term limits. But since term limits have made fewer incumbents eligible to run for office, this incumbency advantage helps fewer people than it once did. Yet, for the most part, rather than being supplanted by citizen-legislators, career politicians have simply adapted to the constraints imposed by term limits. Adapted from the source document.
