1. Election pledges, democratic representation and voting -- 2. How pledge performance affects voting -- 3. A threefold empirical investigation of RPV -- 4. RPV at the aggregate level: Evidence from observational data -- 5. RPV at the group level: Evidence from survey data -- 6. RPV at the micro level: Evidence from experimental data -- 7. New evidence on RPV -- 8. A good or bad sign for democracy?.
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AbstractDoes pledge fulfilment bear any electoral consequences for government parties? While previous research on retrospective voting has largely focused on electoral accountability with respect to the economy, the theoretical framework presented in this study links government parties' performance to their previous electoral pledges. It is argued that government parties are more likely to be rewarded by voters when they have fulfilled more pledges during the legislative term. Good pledge performance of a party is associated with the ability to maximise policy benefits (accomplishment) and to be a responsible actor that will stick to its promises in the future as well (competence). Analysing data from 69 elections in 14 countries shows that a government party's electoral outcome is affected by its previous pledge performance. A government party that fulfils a higher share of election pledges is more likely to prevent electoral losses. This finding indicates that voters react at the polls to party pledge fulfilment, which highlights the crucial role of promissory representation in democratic regimes. Surprisingly and in contrast with economic voting, there is no evidence that retrospective pledge voting is moderated by clarity of responsibility.
Does pledge fulfilment bear any electoral consequences for government parties? While previous research on retrospective voting has largely focused on electoral accountability with respect to the economy, the theoretical framework presented in this study links government parties' performance to their previous electoral pledges. It is argued that government parties are more likely to be rewarded by voters when they have fulfilled more pledges during the legislative term. Good pledge performance of a party is associated with the ability to maximise policy benefits (accomplishment) and to be a responsible actor that will stick to its promises in the future as well (competence). Analysing data from 69 elections in 14 countries shows that a government party's electoral outcome is affected by its previous pledge performance. A government party that fulfils a higher share of election pledges is more likely to prevent electoral losses. This finding indicates that voters react at the polls to party pledge fulfilment, which highlights the crucial role of promissory representation in democratic regimes. Surprisingly and in contrast with economic voting, there is no evidence that retrospective pledge voting is moderated by clarity of responsibility.
Does pledge fulfilment bear any electoral consequences for government parties? While previous research on retrospective voting has largely focused on electoral accountability with respect to the economy, the theoretical framework presented in this study links government parties' performance to their previous electoral pledges. It is argued that government parties are more likely to be rewarded by voters when they have fulfilled more pledges during the legislative term. Good pledge performance of a party is associated with the ability to maximise policy benefits (accomplishment) and to be a responsible actor that will stick to its promises in the future as well (competence). Analysing data from 69 elections in 14 countries shows that a government party's electoral outcome is affected by its previous pledge performance. A government party that fulfils a higher share of election pledges is more likely to prevent electoral losses. This finding indicates that voters react at the polls to party pledge fulfilment, which highlights the crucial role of promissory representation in democratic regimes. Surprisingly and in contrast with economic voting, there is no evidence that retrospective pledge voting is moderated by clarity of responsibility.
This study examines how a government's majority status affects coalition governance and performance. Two steps are investigated: the inclusion of government parties' electoral pledges into the coalition agreement, and the ability to translate pledges into legislative outputs. The main results of a comparative analysis of 183 pledges of a minority (without a formal support partner) and majority coalition in the German State North Rhine-Westphalia indicate that government parties with minority status include fewer pledges in the coalition agreement. But this does not mean that they also perform badly at pledge fulfilment. In fact, they show an equivalent performance in fulfilling election pledges, at least partially, when compared to majority government parties. However, there is tentative evidence that the prime minister's party shows a lower quality of pledge fulfilment, as measured by a higher share of partially enacted pledges.
This study examines how a government's majority status affects coalition governance and performance. Two steps are investigated: the inclusion of government parties' electoral pledges into the coalition agreement, and the ability to translate pledges into legislative outputs. The main results of a comparative analysis of 183 pledges of a minority (without a formal support partner) and majority coalition in the German State North Rhine-Westphalia indicate that government parties with minority status include fewer pledges in the coalition agreement. But this does not mean that they also perform badly at pledge fulfilment. In fact, they show an equivalent performance in fulfilling election pledges, at least partially, when compared to majority government parties. However, there is tentative evidence that the prime minister's party shows a lower quality of pledge fulfilment, as measured by a higher share of partially enacted pledges.
This study examines how a government's majority status affects coalition governance and performance. Two steps are investigated: the inclusion of government parties' electoral pledges into the coalition agreement, and the ability to translate pledges into legislative outputs. The main results of a comparative analysis of 183 pledges of a minority (without a formal support partner) and majority coalition in the German State North Rhine-Westphalia indicate that government parties with minority status include fewer pledges in the coalition agreement. But this does not mean that they also perform badly at pledge fulfilment. In fact, they show an equivalent performance in fulfilling election pledges, at least partially, when compared to majority government parties. However, there is tentative evidence that the prime minister's party shows a lower quality of pledge fulfilment, as measured by a higher share of partially enacted pledges.
Nach der Bundestagswahl 2021 kam es in Deutschland zum ersten Mal seit den 1950er-Jahren zu einer Drei-Parteien-Koalition. Was bedeutet das für die politische Repräsentation der Wähler*innen? Und wie wurden die Wahlversprechen in das Regierungsprogramm übersetzt? Die Autor*innen gehen diesen Fragen sowohl allgemein als auch für vier zentrale Politikfelder (Verkehrswende, Bildungsgerechtigkeit, Familie und Beruf, Digitalisierung in der Gesundheitspolitik) nach. Sie untersuchen, was vor den Wahlen versprochen wurde, wie dies Eingang in die Sondierungsgespräche fand und unter welchen Reibungsverlusten es schließlich im Koalitionsvertrag steht.
Nach der Bundestagswahl 2021 kam es in Deutschland zum ersten Mal seit den 1950er-Jahren zu einer Drei-Parteien-Koalition. Was bedeutet das für die politische Repräsentation der Wähler*innen? Und wie wurden die Wahlversprechen in das Regierungsprogramm übersetzt? Die Autor*innen gehen diesen Fragen sowohl allgemein als auch für vier zentrale Politikfelder (Verkehrswende, Bildungsgerechtigkeit, Familie und Beruf, Digitalisierung in der Gesundheitspolitik) nach. Sie untersuchen, was vor den Wahlen versprochen wurde, wie dies Eingang in die Sondierungsgespräche fand und unter welchen Reibungsverlusten es schließlich im Koalitionsvertrag steht.
Nach der Bundestagswahl 2021 kam es in Deutschland zum ersten Mal seit den 1950er-Jahren zu einer Drei-Parteien-Koalition. Was bedeutet das für die politische Repräsentation der Wähler*innen? Und wie wurden die Wahlversprechen in das Regierungsprogramm übersetzt? Die Autor*innen gehen diesen Fragen sowohl allgemein als auch für vier zentrale Politikfelder (Verkehrswende, Bildungsgerechtigkeit, Familie und Beruf, Digitalisierung in der Gesundheitspolitik) nach. Sie untersuchen, was vor den Wahlen versprochen wurde, wie dies Eingang in die Sondierungsgespräche fand und unter welchen Reibungsverlusten es schließlich im Koalitionsvertrag steht. ; Die freie Verfügbarkeit der E-Book-Ausgabe dieser Publikation wurde ermöglicht durch POLLUX – Informationsdienst Politikwissenschaft und die Open Library Community Politik 2022 – einem Netzwerk wissenschaftlicher Bibliotheken zur Förderung von Open Access in den Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften. Für die finanzielle Unterstützung der Publikation der Druckversion dieses Bandes danken die Autor:innen dem Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).
The Manifesto Project Dataset provides the scientific community with parties' policy positions derived from a content analysis of parties' electoral manifestos. It covers over 1.000 parties from 1945 until today in over 50 countries on five continents. The content analysis aims to discover party and presidential stances by quantifying their statements and messages to their electorate. A unified classification scheme with an accompanying set of rules was developed to make such statements comparable. Analysing manifestos allows for measurement of party and presidents' policy positions across countries and elections within a common framework. Manifestos are understood to be parties' only and presidential candidates' main authoritative policy statements and, therefore, as indicators of the parties' policy preferences at a given point in time. The Manifesto Project Data Collection was originally created by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) in the late 1970s and the 1980s. The work was continued under the name Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center in the 1990s and 2000s. Since 2009 the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) project updates and extends the dataset. It is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and is still located at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
