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I show that maturity considerations affect the optimal conduct of monetary and fiscal policy during a period of government debt reduction. I consider a New Keynesian model and study a dynamic game of monetary and fiscal policy authorities without commitment, characterizing the incentives that drive the choice of interest rate. The presence of longterm bonds makes government budgets less sensitive to changes in interest rates. As a result, a reduction of government debt induced by a lack of policy commitment is associated with tight monetary policy. Furthermore, the long maturity of bonds slows down the speed of debt reduction up to the rate consistent with existing empirical evidence on the persistence of government debt. Finally, the long maturity of bonds brings down the welfare loss associated with debt reduction.

This paper studies optimal discretionary monetary and fiscal policy when the lower bound on nominal interest rates is occasionally binding in a model with nominal rigidities and long-term government debt. At the lower bound it is optimal for the government to temporarily reduce debt. This decline stimulates output, which is inefficiently low during liquidity traps, by lowering expected real interest rates following the lift-off of the nominal rate from the lower bound. Away from the lower bound, the long-run level of government debt increases with the risk of reaching the lower bound. The accumulation of debt pushes up inflation expectations so as to offset the opposite effect due to the lower bound risk.

Aquesta tesi contribueix a la literatura que analitza conjuntament la política fiscal i monetària. Des de l'inici de la crisi econòmica mundial al 2007-2008, moltes economies desenvolupades han experimentat notables fluctuacions econòmiques. La majoria de polítiques estabilitzadores en aquests països han consistit en grans estímuls fiscals que han endegat el debat sobre quines polítiques, particularment política monetària, caldrà implementar per tal de sostenir o ajustar el deute públic generat. El meu treball estudia el disseny de polítiques en un entorn dinàmic d'equilibri general on totes les forces descrites anteriorment hi tenen un paper. En el primer capítol, utilitzo un model New Keynesian per a estudiar la política monetària i fiscal òptima en un entorn on la barrera del tipus d'interès no negatiu condueix l'economia a la trampa de la liquiditat. L'efectivitat de les polítiques en aquest entorn està determinat per si el govern pot emetre deute públic o no. Quan el govern no pot generar deute, es veu obligat a utilitzar l'instrument de la despesa. En canvi, si el govern pot generar deute, és òptim utilitzar instruments recaptadors com els impostos sobre el treball ja que les distorsions d'aquest instrument poden ajustar els problemes generats pel deute quan s'entra en la trampa de la liquiditat. A més a més, demostro que el risc de caure en la trampa de la liquiditat condueix el govern a acumular deute de manera que el risc de arribar a la barrera del tipus d'interès no negatiu. En el segon capítol, estudio com la com la velocitat òptima del ajustament del deute públic, i el conjunt de polítiques necessàries per aconseguir-lo, depenen de l'estructura de pagaments del deute. Sota l'assumpció que el deute pren la forma de bons nominals a un període, per a nivells plausibles de deute, la sostenibilitat fiscal requereix un ràpid ajustament del deute mentre la política monetària s'encarrega d'acomodar les fluctuacions. Pagaments de deute més dissipats cap al futur alteren els incentius del govern per alterar ...

Abstract
How should independent central banks react if pressured by fiscal policymakers? We contrast the implications of two monetary frameworks: one, where the central bank follows a standard rule aiming exclusively at price stability against the other, where monetary policy additionally leans against fiscal influence. The latter rule improves economic outcomes by providing appropriate incentives to the fiscal authority. More importantly, the additional fiscal conditionality can enhance the credibility of the central bank to achieve price stability. We emphasise how the level and structure of government debt emerge as key factors affecting the credibility of monetary policy with fiscal conditionality.

How should independent central banks react if pressured by fiscal policymakers? We study an environment with strategic monetary-fiscal interactions where the central bank has a limited degree of commitment to follow policies over time and the fiscal authority has none. We contrast the implications of two monetary frameworks: one where the central bank follows a standard rule aiming exclusively at price stability against the other, where monetary policy additionally leans against fiscal influence. The latter rule improves economic outcomes by providing appropriate incentives to the fiscal authority. More importantly, the additional fiscal conditionality can enhance the credibility of the central bank to achieve price stability. We emphasize how the level and structure of government debt emerge as key factors affecting the credibility of monetary policy with fiscal conditionality.

Abstract
We illustrate how financial market data are informative about the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. Federal funds futures are private contracts that reflect investor's expectations about future monetary policy decisions. By relating price movements of these contracts with President Trump's tweets on monetary policy, we explore how financial market participants have perceived attempts by the President to influence monetary policy decisions. Our results indicate that market participants expected the Federal Reserve Bank to adjust monetary policy in the direction suggested by President Trump. (JEL codes: E44, E52, and E58)

This paper reviews and summarizes the literature on the complementary relationship between fiscal policy and monetary policy. We focus on four types of fiscal policy: (1) automatic stabilizers, (2) state-contingent non-discretionary fiscal policy, (3) discretionary fiscal stimulus and (4) government credit policies. The literature shows that automatic fiscal stabilizers can play a role in stabilizing business cycle fluctuation. But because they can have multiple policy objectives, their optimal design remains an open question. An alternative policy framework features state-contingent non-discretionary fiscal expenditures with a pre-committed fiscal spending formula triggered by objective macroeconomic conditions. Such a policy offers the advantage of being timely and easy to communicate; but at the same time, it poses challenges for identifying appropriate triggers and program expenditures with high short-run multipliers. The literature also shows that discretionary fiscal expenditures can support aggregate demand, and some expenditures have short-run multipliers close to, or above, 1. While these expenditures can focus on specific policy priorities that are relevant at the time, their discretionary nature may slow the policy response. When interest rates are close to the effective lower bound (ELB), fiscal stimulus can be particularly effective for complementing the stabilizing efforts of monetary policy. Finally, studies show that government credit policies can mitigate economic downturns that are accompanied by severe financial market distress. However, the effects of scaling up this channel are uncertain.