The future of precision-strike warfare: strategic dynamics of mature military revolutions
In: Naval War College review, Volume 76, Issue 2, p. 13-37
ISSN: 0028-1484
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In: Naval War College review, Volume 76, Issue 2, p. 13-37
ISSN: 0028-1484
World Affairs Online
In: Research outreach: connecting science with society
ISSN: 2517-7028
The essential history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during the Nixon Administration How did Richard Nixon, a president so determined to compete for strategic nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, become one of the most successful arms controllers of the Cold War? Drawing on newly opened Cold War archives, John D. Maurer argues that a central purpose of arms control talks for American leaders was to channel nuclear competition toward areas of American advantage and not just international cooperation. While previous accounts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have emphasized American cooperative motives, Maurer highlights how Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shaped negotiations, balancing their own competitive interests with proponents of cooperation while still providing a coherent rationale to Congress. Within the arms control agreements, American leaders intended to continue deploying new weapons, and the arms control restrictions, as negotiated, allowed the United States to sustain its global power, contain communism, and ultimately prevail in the Cold War
How did Richard Nixon, a president so determined to compete for strategic nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, become one of the most successful arms controllers of the Cold War? Drawing on newly opened Cold War archives, John D. Maurer argues that a central purpose of arms control talks for American leaders was to channel nuclear competition toward areas of American advantage and not just international cooperation. While previous accounts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have emphasized American cooperative motives, Maurer highlights how Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shaped negotiations, balancing their own competitive interests with proponents of cooperation while still providing a coherent rationale to Congress. Within the arms control agreements, American leaders intended to continue deploying new weapons, and the arms control restrictions, as negotiated, allowed the United States to sustain its global power, contain communism, and ultimately prevail in the Cold War.
In: Diplomacy and statecraft, Volume 32, Issue 2, p. 310-329
ISSN: 1557-301X
In: Diplomacy and statecraft, Volume 30, Issue 2, p. 288-313
ISSN: 1557-301X
In: Orbis: FPRI's journal of world affairs, Volume 63, Issue 3, p. 305-320
ISSN: 0030-4387
In: Diplomatic history, Volume 43, Issue 2, p. 353-377
ISSN: 1467-7709
In: Orbis: FPRI's journal of world affairs, Volume 62, Issue 2, p. 184-203
ISSN: 0030-4387
In: Naval War College review, Volume 67, Issue 3, p. 24-42
ISSN: 0028-1484
In: Orbis: FPRI's journal of world affairs, Volume 58, Issue 4, p. 500-520
ISSN: 0030-4387
In: Orbis: FPRI's journal of world affairs, Volume 58, Issue 4, p. 500-520
ISSN: 0030-4387
In: The journal of strategic studies, Volume 35, Issue 6, p. 775-797
ISSN: 1743-937X