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Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Annex 1A agreements dealing with customs procedures -- 2. Antidumping -- 3. Subsidies -- 4. Safeguards -- 5. Technical barriers to trade -- 6. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures -- 7. Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) -- 8. Agreement on Agriculture -- 9. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing -- 10. Government procurement -- 11. The Civil Aviation Agreement -- 12. Transparency.

Regulation of football in Europe is, absent some piecemeal interventions (like sharing of TV rights) largely non-existent. This is the case, because the de facto regulator (UEFA, Union Européenne of Football Associations) has no mandate to comprehensively address on its own competitive balance, the focal point of football, and, in more general terms, sports regulation. Various aspects of competitive balance are part and parcel of antitrust law. European Union (EU) law thus, comes into the frame, since this is the body of law regulating antitrust in the European continent. The European Union, nevertheless, has no mandate to regulate football comprehensively, even though it has the power to issue (non-sports specific) law (including competition law), which affects football, and UEFA must observe it. As a result, UEFA wants to but cannot regulate the hard core of sports regulation, whereas the European Union as is, cannot do much, and it is at best doubtful that it wants to anyway. Under the circumstances, because of the legislative conundrum, the "regulatory stalemate" we observe is probably the equilibrium point.

The WTO Appellate Body (AB) has produced a volume-wise important body of case law, which is often difficult to penetrate, never mind classify. Howse (2016) has attempted a very lucid taxonomy of the case law using the standard of review as benchmark for it. His conclusion is that the AB is quite cautious when facing nondiscriminatory measures, especially measures relating to the protection of human life and health, while it has adopted a more intrusive (into national sovereignty) standard when dealing with trade measures (like antidumping), which are by definition discriminatory as they concern imports only. In my response, I share his basic conclusion with no buts and ifs. I simply add that this approach is not the outcome of a process that mandates this standard of review, but simply a political (e.g., nonlegal) reaction aimed at placating its clientele, the WTO membership.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has extended its institutional arsenal since the Kennedy round in the early 1960s. The current institutional design is the outcome of the Uruguay round and agreements reached in the ongoing Doha round (begun in 2001). One of the institutional outgrowths of GATT is the World Trade Organization (WT0), created in 1995. In this book, Petros Mavroidis offers a detailed examination of WTO agreements regulating trade in goods, discussing legal context, policy background, economic rationale, and case law. Each chapter examines a given legal norm and its subsequent practice. In particular, he discusses agreements dealing with customs clearance; "contingent protection" instruments, which allow WTO members unilaterally to add to the negotiated amount of protection when a certain contingency (for example, dumping) has occurred; TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade) and SPS (Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures) agreements, both of which deal with such domestic instruments as environmental, health policy, or consumer information; the agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIM); sector-specific agreements on agriculture and textiles; plurilateral agreements (binding a subset of WTO membership) on government procurement and civil aviation; and transparency in trade relations. This book's companion volume examines the GATT regime for international trade. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1129/thumbnail.jpg