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Over the past two decades, a growing number of 'outsider parties' have entered governing centre-left and centre-right coalitions across Western Europe. In this introduction, we first define outsider parties as those which — even when their vote-share would have enabled it — have gone through a period of not being 'coalitionable', whether of their own volition or that of other parties in the system. Based on the articles in this issue, we then discuss the problems which outsider parties encounter when entering government and suggest some reasons for the success and failure of these parties in office. Finally, we propose a number of avenues for further research, in particular that of examining differences between the first and subsequent experiences of office for such parties.

AbstractOne of the main supply‐side explanations for women's underrepresentation in politics is the gender gap in nascent political ambition. While this has been examined in terms of electoral ambition, the aspiration to pursue non‐electoral careers within parties has been overlooked. In our study, we therefore investigate whether both types of ambition – electoral and non‐electoral – vary among young women and men participating in a key entry point for political careers in Western democracies: party youth wings. To do so, we surveyed almost 2,000 members of six centre‐left and centre‐right youth wings in Australia, Italy and Spain. We find that while, as expected, women in youth wings display lower levels of electoral ambition, they are almost as likely as men to express non‐electoral ambition. Furthermore, and contrary to our expectations, we show that women in centre‐right youth wings are no less interested in pursuing electoral and non‐electoral political careers than women in centre‐left ones. Our study thus provides new insights into the gendered nature of political ambition, highlighting that women's lower interest in electoral office does not necessarily reflect reduced interest in a political career.

AbstractWhile India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has become recognized as a populist radical right (PRR) party under the leadership of Narendra Modi, we do not know whether this PRR supply is matched yet by PRR attitudes among its supporters. Using an original survey, we therefore investigate: Do BJP supporters display PRR attitudes? We find that those who feel close to the BJP have stronger populist and nativist attitudes than other Indian citizens. However, authoritarianism is not a distinguishing feature of BJP supporters. We argue that the similarities between the drivers of support for European PRR parties and for the BJP reinforce the idea that radical right populism is a coherent global phenomenon both in terms of supply and demand. Finally, we discuss how our study shows that party support in India is more ideologically rooted than has previously been thought.

Abstract
The Australian House of Representatives contains far fewer women than men. But is this because parties of left and right discriminate against women or because voters do? Using a new dataset comprising 7271 House candidates from 2001 to 2019, firstly, we find that the percentage of women candidates is increasing, but is consistently higher for parties of the left than the right. Secondly, women tend to be selected more by parties of both left and right in unsafe seats. Thirdly, all else being equal, voters reward women running for Labor with over 1400 votes more, are neutral towards those of the Liberals and Greens, but tend to penalise women standing for the Nationals. We conclude that, overall, it is parties, not voters, driving under-representation of women in Australia's lower house.

Sweden and Denmark have presented contrasting relationships between centre-right and populist radical right (PRR) parties. In Sweden, the centre-right has refused cooperation with the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) (SD), even when this cost the centre-right office. However, in Denmark, coalitions led by centre-right parties have cooperated with the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) (DF) on multiple occasions. Through a controlled comparison, we examine what explains these different outcomes. Using Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and public opinion data, we firstly look at the policy congruence between parties and the social acceptability of cooperation. We then examine interview material with representatives from centre-right and PRR parties in Sweden and Denmark to see their explanations of cooperation and non-cooperation. We conclude that, while the office goals of Danish centre-right parties, along with the policy focus and uncontroversial past of DF, explain that case, the reputation and past of SD has precluded a similar outcome.

AbstractConceptualizations and measurements of Euroscepticism tend to assume that, while parties may change positions from one period to another, they unequivocally espouse hard or soft euroscepticism at a given point in time. However, there are good theoretical reasons for some parties not to do so, in order to speak to different audiences and keep their decision‐making options open. Through an analysis of manifestos and leaders' speeches we show how two populist radical right parties, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party, espoused what we term 'equivocal euroscepticism' in the years around the 2014 European Parliament elections. Specifically, these parties articulated a distinct, albeit ambivalent, stance by combining elements of both soft and hard euroscepticism at the same time. We argue that 'equivocal euroscepticism' can give these parties strategic advantages, including the freedom to cooperate both with other radical right, hard eurosceptic, parties at European level and more moderate parties at the national one.

Since 1994, Italian politics has seen a number of coalitions including parties whose identity has been strongly based on their 'outsider' status as uncompromising opposition movements which would not previously consider government participation. This article examines the contrasting experiences in office of two such parties: the regionalist populist Lega Nord (LN) and the radical left Rifondazione Comunista (RC). While the Lega confounded expectations not only simply by remaining in the centre-right coalition from 2001 to 2006, but by influencing policy, increasing its vote-share and maintaining its 'outsider' identity, RC was unable to match its fellow outsider's success when it served in the centre-left government from 2006 to 2008. Looking at the experiences in office of the RC and the LN in terms of the three temporal divisions 'before', 'during' and 'after', this article seeks to analyse and explain the differing experiences and effects of government on both parties.

AbstractRight‐wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right‐wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right‐wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right‐wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right‐wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.