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Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Redistributive Politics -- Chapter 2. Who Are the Decision Makers and What Motivates Them? -- Chapter 3. Party Strength as a Determinant of Industry Tariffs -- Chapter 4. Restructuring and Redistribution in the Steel Industry -- Chapter 5. Redistributive Politics and Industry Stock Prices -- Chapter 6. A Theory and Direction for Future Research -- Notes -- References -- Index

Cross-sectional time-series data from fourteen stock markets, from 1973 to 1996, are used to study how political institutions compare in affecting party governments' incentives to enrich one group of industries at the expense of another. Using measures of cross-sectoral variance of price changes within stock markets as a proxy for change in redistributive policy, I show that political change is important in both proportional representation (PR) and majoritarian systems. As parties shift in and out of government, trade and industrial policy is redistributed to favour the parties' industrial supporters. Such changes in policy increase the cross-sectoral dispersion in price changes, with newly advantaged industries seeing their stock increase, while the price of those losing favourable policy declines. The temporal impact of redistribution differs across electoral systems, with the impact of political change being more immediate in majoritarian systems and the effect being more diffuse in PR systems. Majoritarian systems are also more responsive to economic shocks, while changes in economic conditions have few discernable effects on the dispersion of stock prices in PR countries. PR systems, however, experience overall higher levels of dispersion. I contrast these results with the dominant extant arguments of radical policy shifts in majoritarian systems and policy stability in PR systems.

Cross-sectional time-series data from fourteen stock markets, from 1973 to 1996, are used to study how political institutions compare in affecting party governments' incentives to enrich one group of industries at the expense of another. Using measures of cross-sectoral variance of price changes within stock markets as a proxy for change in redistributive policy, I show that political change is important in both proportional representation (PR) and majoritarian systems. As parties shift in and out of government, trade and industrial policy is redistributed to favour the parties' industrial supporters. Such changes in policy increase the cross-sectoral dispersion in price changes, with newly advantaged industries seeing their stock increase, while the price of those losing favourable policy declines. The temporal impact of redistribution differs across electoral systems, with the impact of political change being more immediate in majoritarian systems and the effect being more diffuse in PR systems. Majoritarian systems are also more responsive to economic shocks, while changes in economic conditions have few discernable effects on the dispersion of stock prices in PR countries. PR systems, however, experience overall higher levels of dispersion. I contrast these results with the dominant extant arguments of radical policy shifts in majoritarian systems and policy stability in PR systems. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Chapter 1: We Have No Quarrel with the People -- Leader Specific Punishments and Interstate Relations -- Proper Nouns in International Relations -- International Cooperation -- Chapter 2: A Theory of Leader Specific Punishments -- A Stochastic Prisoners' Dilemma with Leader Mortality -- A Continuous Choice Prisoners' Dilemma -- Appendix -- Chapter 3: Political Institutions, Policy Variability, and the Survival of Leaders -- Leader Survival -- Selectorate Politics -- Selectorate Institutions, Policy Choice, and Leader Survival -- Policy Variability and the Turnover of Leaders -- Chapter 4: Leader Specific Strategies in Human Subject Experiments -- Human Subject Experiments -- Results -- Conclusions -- Chapter 5: International Trade, Institutions, and Leader Change -- Data -- Setup of Econometric Tests and Model Specification -- Results -- Conclusions -- Chapter 6: Putting the Sovereign Back into Sovereign Debt -- Institutions, Credibility, and Explanations of Debt -- Modeling the Debt Repayment -- Data -- Debt, Repayment, and Leader Replacement -- Conclusions -- Chapter 7: Conflictual Interactions -- International Crises -- Economic Sanctions -- Chapter 8: Positive Political Theory and Policy -- Building Trust and Cooperation -- Positive Political Theory or Policy Advice? -- Conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index

In the context of a noisy, continuous-choice prisoner's dilemma, the authors examine how leadership turnover and domestic institutions affect the depth and reliability of cooperative agreement that can be enforced between states through the use of leader-specific punishment strategies. If foreign nations target punishments against leaders observed to cheat on cooperative arrangements (i.e., they refuse any future cooperation as long as the responsible incumbent remains in office), then citizens remove leaders caught cheating, providing the cost of doing so is less than the value of the cooperation foregone. For leaders whoare easily replaced, being caught cheating cost them their job. Since cheating jeopardizes their tenure, such leaders can credibly commit to deeper and more reliable cooperation. The authors derive hypotheses about the patterns of cooperation and leadership turnover predicted under different institutional arrangements.