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ABSTRACTPolitical polarization is a systemic-level and multifaceted process that severs cross-cutting ties and shifts perceptions of politics to a zero-sum game. When it turns pernicious, political actors and supporters view opponents as an existential threat and the capacity of democratic institutions to process political conflict breaks down. The article identifies four common fault lines of polarization globally – who belongs, democracy, inequality and social contract. It argues that while Latin American countries experience, to varying degrees, all four of the fault lines, it is the deep-seated, persistent social hierarchies oriented around class, race, and place that stand out relative to other countries. Reaching consensus on reforms that may renew or reformulate agreements on the terms of the social contract, boundaries of community membership, and redressing social inequality is a tall task. Yet the region's sustained consensus on the democratic rules of the game can provide the mechanisms for addressing this task if new majority coalitions can be formed.

O artigo enfoca o referendo revogatório realizado na Venezuela em agosto de 2004, que confirmou a permanência de Hugo Chávez na Presidência do país até o fim de seu mandato. Apontam-se o contexto político que nele culminou, no qual o governo Chávez foi alvo de intensas contestações por parte de seus opositores, e seus conturbados desdobramentos, com acusações de fraude e de atuação imparcial da autoridade eleitoral. A autora destaca a rígida polarização que permeou o processo, dividindo a sociedade venezuelana e impondo ao governo e à própria oposição o desafio de reconstituir o consenso nacional em torno dos interesses coletivos.

Abstract: Venezuelans voted on August 15, 2004 to keep President Hugo Chávez in office. Coming two years after the short-lived coup, the recall took place in an extremely divided society. Although endorsed by international observers, the opposition charged fraud. The government swept subsequent elections for governor and mayors. The government now controls all of the major institutions in the country, while facing a weakened opposition. It can therefore govern without the distraction (or excuse) of continued challenges, but also must avoid the temptation to abuse its dominant position. The opposition has the opportunity to move to a longer-term effort to mobilize and organize its supporters and its message.

This article examines contemporary sources of democratic crisis and the international responses to these crises from 1990 to 2011. The analysis is based on an original dataset of five domestic sources of democratic crisis: classic military coup or coup attempt, incumbent leaders, intragovernmental clashes between branches of government, armed non‐state actors, and unarmed nonstate actors including societal mass protests and blockades. Several trends are identified. The newest sources of democratic crises include nonstate actors and intragovernmental disputes resulting in constitutional crises; threats from incumbents are persistent over the entire time period; despite a decline in classic military coups since 1990, the Inter‐American Democratic Charter does not appear to have made a difference in preventing coups; the participation of rebellious military or police units in challenging civilian leaders presents a continued challenge from the armed forces in new guises; and many contemporary democratic crises include multiple actors and behaviors. This article offers explanations for the weak capacity of the international community to prevent democratic tensions from erupting into full‐blown crises or the undermining of democratic obligations by government, despite strong commitments in the form of international charters and protocols, and offers policy suggestions to strengthen that capacity.

We are currently witnessing a demand to expand citizenship to civil and social realms in Latin America, the region of the world with the most unequal income distribution. This may be seen as a new stage of democratization within the Third Wave begun in 1978, one that inherently creates conflict over the redistribution of power and resources. During the initial years of the Third Wave, Latin American societies adopted formal procedures of democracy and created a broad consensus on macroeconomic liberalization. In the second stage, citizens-particularly the urban poor and indigenous groups-are striving to move beyond the broadly established political rights of electoral competition in order to also enjoy civil rights (freedoms and access to justice) that are incompletely and inconsistently applied, and social rights (providing the basic capabilities to citizens to make free choices) that are woefully underprovided. Middle class groups are insisting that their governments perform better, deliver promised services, and represent broader societal interests. With existing political institutions failing to adequately include these groups in political and socioeconomic terms, they are finding their voice through street politics and the ballot box. Nearly a dozen presidents have been forced out of office prematurely in the last decade as a result, at least in part, of citizen mobilization and street protests. One interpretation sees this as a threatening sign of mob rule or even "civil society coups." Another interpretation views the active participation of citizens voicing their demands as a welcome sign of more truly democratic societies. This article seeks to make sense of the current attempts at democratic transformation in Latin America. Adapted from the source document.