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AbstractThis contribution finds that urban (but not rural) poverty fuels domestic and anti-U.S. terrorism in 43 developing countries. It argues that urban poverty aids non-state groups which use terrorism as a means to capture rents and consolidate popular support.

Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der potenziell komplexen Interaktion von Terrorismus und wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung. Sie diskutiert die bestehende Theorie und Evidenz und zeigt verschiedene Forschungslücken auf, die durch drei empirische Arbeiten geschlossen werden sollen. Zusammenfassend kommen diese Arbeiten zu dem Ergebnis, dass Terrorismus weder in Lateinamerika noch in Westeuropa einen statistisch erfassbaren, negativen Effekt auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung gehabt hat. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass die von Terrorismus betroffenen Volkswirtschaften in diesen Teilen der Welt eine ausreichende makroökonomische Robustheit aufweisen, um negativen ökonomischen Schocks durch Terrorismus zu widerstehen. Es wird argumentiert, dass diese Robustheit mit länderspezifischen Faktoren, insbesondere dem allgemeinen ökonomisch-institutionellen Entwicklungsstand (z.B. im Hinblick auf politisch-ökonomische Diversifikation und Dezentralisierung), in Verbindung steht. Zugleich zeigen die empirischen Arbeiten, dass es einen negativen kausalen Effekt von wirtschaftlichen Faktoren auf das Ausmaß der terroristischen Aktivität in diesen Ländern gegeben hat. Es wird argumentiert, dass eine Verbesserung der sozioökonomischen Situation eines Landes mit höheren Opportunitätskosten von Terrorismus einhergeht, welche Terrorismus weniger attraktiv machen. Dieser Zusammenhang ergibt sich aus dem Kalkül eines rational handelnden Terroristen (gemäß der Rational-Choice-Theorie). Wiederum scheinen länderspezifische Faktoren die Übertragung ökonomischer Entwicklungen auf das Kalkül von Terrorist zu steuern, indem sie z.B. über sozialstaatliche Maßnahmen die Verteilung ökonomischen Erfolgs und die Reduzierung sozioökonomischer Missstände gewährleisten. ; This dissertation examines the potentially complex interaction between terrorism and socio-economic development. It discusses the existing theory and evidence regarding this issue and identifies several research gaps. These gaps are to be closed through three empirical studies. In sum, these studies show that neither in Latin America nor in Western Europe terrorism has a statistically significant and negative effect on economic growth and development. These findings suggest that economies affected by terrorism in these parts of the world have been sufficiently resilient to possible adverse macroeconomic shocks from terrorism. This dissertation argues that this resiliency is governed by country-specific factors, particularly a countrys overall level of economic and institutional development (e.g., with respect to its level of politico-economic diversification and decentralization). At the same time, the three empirical studies show that there is a negative causal effect running from economic factors to the level of terrorist activity in Latin America and Western Europe. It is argued that an improvement of a countrys socio-economic situation results in higher opportunity costs of terrorism, making terrorism a less attractive option. This effect is due to the economic calculus of terrorists that are assumed to be rational actors (as it follows from rational-choice theory). Again, country-specific factors seem to govern the extent to which economic development influence the terrorists calculus. For instance, it is found that social welfare policies reduce terrorist activity by, e.g., improving the distribution of economic success and reducing socio-economic grievances. ; Tag der Verteidigung: 26.09.2012 ; Paderborn, Univ., Diss., 2012

We leverage plausibly exogenous variation in regional exposure to corruption to provide causal estimates of the impact of local political corruption on terrorist activity for a sample of 175 countries between 1970 and 2018. We find that higher levels of corruption lead to more terrorism. This result is robust to a variety of empirical modifications, including various ways in which we probe the validity of our instrumental variables approach. We also show that corruption adversely affects the provision of public goods and undermines counter-terrorism capacity. Thus, our empirical findings are consistent with predictions from a game-theoretical representation of terrorism, according to which corruption makes terrorism relatively more attractive compared to peaceful contestation, while also decreasing the costs of organizing and carrying out terrorist attacks.

We investigate the effect of Islamist terrorist activity on women's economic, political and legal position in society, using data for 168 countries between 1970 and 2016. We provide robust evidence that increased activity by Islamist terrorist groups is associated with lower levels of women's empowerment and rights. Various instrumental-variable approaches yield the same conclusion, suggesting that the adverse effect of Islamist terrorism on women' rights is causal. Further emphasizing the role of violent Islamist fundamentalism, we find no evidence that Islam per se (as indicated by a country's Muslim population share) affects the position of women in society. Finally, we show that left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism do not affect women's rights, which reinforces the notion that Islamist terrorism is singularly interested and effective in achieving weaker women's rights. We argue that our findings are consistent with predictions of a strategic model of terrorism, where (1) Islamist terrorists use violence to curb women's rights because they consider modern notions of gender equality to be corruptive and (2) governments make concessions that constrain the role of women in society because the costs of compliance are lower than the political and economic harm that would result from further Islamist terrorist attacks.

AbstractThis article provides an overview of the literature on the relationship between terrorism and migration. It discusses whether and how (1) migration may be a cause of terrorism, (2) terrorism may influence natives' attitudes towards immigration and their electoral preferences and (3) terrorism may lead to more restrictive migration policies and how these in turn may serve as effective counter-terrorism tools. A review of the empirical literature on the migration–terrorism nexus indicates that (1) there is little evidence that more migration unconditionally leads to more terrorist activity, especially in Western countries, (2) terrorism has electoral and political (but sometimes short-lived) ramifications, for example, as terrorism promotes anti-immigrant resentment and (3) the effectiveness of stricter migration policies in deterring terrorism is rather limited, while terrorist attacks lead to more restrictive migration policies.

We examine the effect of population size on government size for a panel of 130 countries for the period between 1970 and 2014. We show that previous analyses of the nexus between population size and government size are incorrectly specified and fail to consider the influence of cross-sectional dependence, non-stationarity and cointegration. Using a panel time-series approach that adequately accounts for these issues, we find that population size has a positive long-run effect on government size. This finding suggests that effects of population size that increase government size (primarily due to the costs of heterogeneity, congestion, crime and conflict) dominate effects that reduce government size (primarily due to scale economies).

After the 9/11 attacks in particular, there has been a controversial discussion in the academic and public arena on whether the United States' close relationship with Israel has made it a likelier target of transnational terrorism. Indeed, foreign terrorist organizations with various ideological profiles have repeatedly justified attacks against U.S. interests as punishment for the (purported) special relationship between the United States and Israel. We analyze the effect of various measures of U.S. support for Israel (e.g. U.S. military assistance to Israel) on anti-American terrorism for the period 1970–2014. Using both time-series and panel approaches, we do not find that more U.S. support for Israel systematically translates into more anti-American terrorism. Rather, other systemic (e.g. U.S. dominance in the international system) and local conditions (e.g. local state failure) are found to predict the patterns of anti-American terrorism. However, as a qualification to these general findings, we also provide some (preliminary) evidence that for terrorism originating from the Middle East and Northern Africa a favorable U.S. policy stance towards Israel may indeed contribute to more anti-American terrorism.

We investigate the relationship between transnational terrorism and the restrictiveness of immigration policies. We argue that transnational terrorism may create incentives for governments to implement more restrictive migration policies. First, more restrictive policies may make terrorism a more costly endeavor, discouraging future terrorist activity. Second, voters may hold the government accountable for the increased insecurity and economic instability terrorism produces; more restrictive migration policies may signal political resolve and meet public demand for security-providing policies, consequently reducing the government's chances of electoral defeat. We provide an empirical analysis of the effect of transnational terrorism on migration policy restrictiveness for a sample of 30 OECD countries between 1980 and 2010. We find that a greater exposure to transnational terrorism is associated with stricter migration controls, but not stricter migration regulations regarding eligibility criteria and conditions. This finding is robust to different model specifications, estimation methods, operationalizations of terrorism, and instrumental-variable approaches. It points to the securitization of immigration, providing partial support for the notion that transnational terrorism incentivizes migration policy change towards greater restrictiveness. However, the policy response appears to be surgical (affecting only migration controls) rather than sweeping (and thus not influencing broader migration regulations) for the countries in our sample.

We investigate the relationship between transnational terrorism and the restrictiveness of immigration policies. We argue that transnational terrorism may create incentives for governments to implement more restrictive migration policies. First, more restrictive policies may make terrorism a more costly endeavor, discouraging future terrorist activity. Second, voters may hold the government accountable for the increased insecurity and economic instability terrorism produces; more restrictive migration policies may signal political resolve and meet public demand for security-providing policies, consequently reducing the government's chances of electoral defeat. We provide an empirical analysis of the effect of transnational terrorism on migration policy restrictiveness for a sample of 30 OECD countries between 1980 and 2010. We find that a greater exposure to transnational terrorism is associated with stricter migration controls, but not stricter migration regulations regarding eligibility criteria and conditions. This finding is robust to different model specifications, estimation methods, operationalizations of terrorism, and instrumental-variable approaches. It points to the securitization of immigration, providing partial support for the notion that transnational terrorism incentivizes migration policy change towards greater restrictiveness. However, the policy response appears to be surgical (affecting only migration controls) rather than sweeping (and thus not influencing broader migration regulations) for the countries in our sample.

This article provides an overview of the literature on the relationship between terrorism and migration. It discusses whether and how (1) migration may be a cause of terrorism, (2) terrorism may influence natives' attitudes towards immigration and their electoral preferences and (3) terrorism may lead to more restrictive migration policies and how these in turn may serve as effective counter-terrorism tools. A review of the empirical literature on the migration–terrorism nexus indicates that (1) there is little evidence that more migration unconditionally leads to more terrorist activity, especially in Western countries, (2) terrorism has electoral and political (but sometimes short-lived) ramifications, for example, as terrorism promotes anti-immigrant resentment and (3) the effectiveness of stricter migration policies in deterring terrorism is rather limited, while terrorist attacks lead to more restrictive migration policies.