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The paper examines, with the analysis of the attached documents and letters, that the Austro-Hungarian head of military intelligence Alfred Redl was really a Russian agent just before the beginning of the First World War and what information he sent within the Russian intelligence community. According to the author's research, it can only be assumed with a reasonable probability that Agent no. 25 was Alfred Redl. ; U radu se propituje, uz analizu priloženih dokumenata i pisama, da li austro-ugarski šef vojne obavještajne službe Alfred Redl stvarno bio ruski agent neposredno pred početak Prvog svjetskog rata te koje je informacije slao unutar ruske obavještajne zajednice. Prema autorovim istraživanjima može se tek pretpostaviti s razumnom vjerojatnošću da je Agent br. 25 bio Alfred Redl.

On the basis of archival and printed sources, this article examines the role that Russian military intelligence played in miscalculating the Japanese threat before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. The treatment focuses on three general problem areas: assessments of Japanese military and naval strength and combat readiness; perceptions of war imminence and the related possibility of surprise; and Japanese intentions. Evidence indicates that the overall quality of intelligence was uneven, although reasonably accurate with regard to the Japanese navy. However, genuine situational and structural constraints clouded perceptions of the Japanese ground forces. Still other constraints obscured Russian perceptions of war imminence and Japanese intentions. The cumulative result was that Russia would enter far eastern conflict at a substantial disadvantage.