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The inauguration of Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te this week has spurred a new push for Washington to "get serious" about Taiwan by beefing up measures to discourage a Chinese invasion of the island.
A recent essay in Foreign Policy magazine by Raymond Kuo, Michael Hunzeker, and Mark Christopher is emblematic of how many in Washington approach Taiwan policy — with a deterrence-heavy strategy that actually risks bringing about the very Taiwan crisis they seek to prevent.
The authors rightly call for the U.S. to press Taiwan to do much more to provide for its own defense. Any effective deterrence of a Chinese use of force against Taiwan requires the island to acquire credible military capabilities, with U.S. assistance, something it is not doing at present. This indeed must change, as the authors argue.
Unfortunately, however, the authors entirely trip up when they go on to argue that deterrence should rest solely on Taiwan acquiring such military capabilities, augmented by much greater levels of U.S. and regional military support. Indeed, in doing so, they criticize a recent New York Times op-ed piece I co-authored with Mike Mochizuki that calls for the need to couple such military deterrence with far more credible levels of U.S. and allied diplomatic assurances to Beijing in support of the long-standing and highly successful One China policy.
The authors reject such a two-sided strategy by asserting, based on very shaky evidence, that such political assurances have become meaningless because Xi Jinping is supposedly committed to resolving the Taiwan issue on his watch, with force if necessary, and regardless of what the U.S. and others might say.
There is in fact no clear evidence that Xi has made such a dangerous decision. Indeed, although he needs to say so personally and publicly, his immediate subordinates have stated repeatedly that China has no timeline for resolving the Taiwan issue.
Make no mistake, Xi would certainly like to see progress toward a resolution while in office, but it is inconceivable that either he or other senior PRC leaders would ignore or downplay the obvious huge risks involved in resorting to force regarding Taiwan and launch an attack on the island without a clear provocation, and such a provocation has yet to occur. But it will occur if the U.S. and its allies were to eviscerate or discard their One China policies.
Numerous Western simulations, many no doubt known to Beijing, have shown that any Chinese attack on Taiwan would almost certainly produce disastrous consequences for all involved. Xi would not embark on such an enormous gambit unless he and those around him were to conclude that the alternative to a use of force would be China's acquiescence in clear moves by the U.S. and Taiwan to permanently separate the island from the mainland. Such a humiliating acquiescence would undoubtedly trigger a major nationalist response within China that would likely lead to the overthrow of those Chinese leaders in power at the time.
Such a fear would emerge in Beijing if the U.S. and its allies combined major increases in military deterrence of the sort advocated by the authors with a de facto gutting of the One China policy. Indeed, they seem to encourage the latter when they state that "Washington's long-standing attitude toward Taiwan is based upon a set of military and political foundations that no longer exist."
Instead of recognizing the obvious risks and uncertainties that Beijing continues to face in dealing with Taiwan, they simply reduce China's calculus to a function of Xi Jinping's supposed personality as a reckless, violent, genocidal, iron-fisted and un-assurable figure. This cartoonish characterization undermines any attempt to create a credible deterrence strategy based on both military and diplomatic elements.Yes, Washington definitely needs to get serious about Taiwan. But doing so requires not only a stronger Taiwanese military, but also far more credible assurances of America's continued commitment to the One China policy, along with more credible commitments by Beijing to its long-standing policy of peaceful unification.

U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping had a phone conversation on Tuesday, the first time the two leaders have spoken since their in-person meeting in November. As has happened following previous conversations, there is a considerable difference between the Chinese and U.S. readouts of the conversation. While both sides stressed the importance of maintaining open lines of communication, the official White House readout as usual placed a high stress on cautioning China against a variety of actions while saying virtually nothing about the clear need to undertake constructive actions to address common problems, such as those regarding climate change and pandemics. Equally important, as in past such readouts on conversations held between U.S. and Chinese officials, Beijing listed a set of assurances that Biden has supposedly made several times to Xi regarding Taiwan, U.S. alliances, and other critical security issues. And yet the U.S. side, as in the past, again failed to mention such assurances in its official readout of the conversation. Why is it that Washington will not confirm, clearly and unambiguously, that Biden either has or has not made all such assurances to the Chinese side? Various lower-level officials have at times made some of these assurances. But to my knowledge no U.S. official has made all of them. And Biden has not personally confirmed that he has made all such assurances.The failure to clear up this apparent disparity in messaging on these crucial issues could eventually produce Chinese expectations and perhaps even pressure on the U.S. that Washington pushes back against, thus creating a crisis in relations. Washington needs to do more to build constructive relations with Beijing on both sides' vital interests, and clarify its stance regarding Biden's supposed assurances. This is particularly necessary with regard to the administration's policies regarding Taiwan. See my recent brief on what the White House needs to say and what Beijing needs to do on that critical issue.

The much-ballyhooed summit meeting between Xi Jinping and Joe Biden, occurring yesterday on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in San Francisco, was viewed by many observers as a critical opportunity for the two nations to establish a degree of enduring stability in their tumultuous relationship.
Although some limited agreements and understandings were apparently reached and some encouraging remarks uttered, the meeting fell far short of providing an enduring basis for much of anything beyond a willingness to keep talking and avoid conflict.
On the positive side, of greatest note is the fact that the two presidents agreed on steps to reduce the influx into the United States from China of items fueling the fentanyl crisis in this country and affirmed a general desire to strengthen dialogue on various military-to-military topics and reaffirm the openness of direct lines of communication between military leaders responsible for Asia-Pacific security. Additionally, according to the Chinese readout of the summit, President Biden reiterated the so-called five-point commitment he made regarding Taiwan at the Bali summit last year– that the United States does not seek to start a new Cold War, change China's political system, mobilize alliances against China, or support Taiwan independence, and has no intention of engaging in conflict with China.
While certainly helpful, such developments and repetitions of past statements do not appreciably stabilize the overall relationship in an enduring manner, nor, in the absence of such stability, create serious momentum for the creation of a substantive crisis communication dialogue between the two sides. Particularly worrisome is the fact that no progress whatsoever was evident in creating an agreed-upon vision and framework for the relationship that could provide genuine stability over time. Indeed, nothing that occurred at the summit has altered the fundamentally adversarial nature of relations, nor appreciably lessened the deep levels of mutual suspicion and uncertainty that plague it.
For its part, Washington has made it very clear, in comments made before and after the summit by President Biden and senior officials, that it intends to remain primarily focused on improving its competitive capacities at home, pulling countries into greater alignment with the United States in countering China, and competing intensely with Beijing in a largely zero-sum struggle between democratic and authoritarian values, norms, and international structures.
In this effort, achieving genuine, substantive cooperation in reaching a middle ground or compromise on key issues like the climate challenge, high-tech innovation, and developing more broad-based, inclusive economic and trade structures, is either dismissed by U.S. officials as unrealizable or having been tried and failed in the past. And no effort is being made to define what a stable relationship should look like over the long term. In short, the primary focus of U.S. policymakers remains on keeping talking and avoiding the worst case, not the creation of a durable basis for productive, mutually beneficial relations.
For its part, Beijing has shown no evidence that it has altered its view that the problems in the relationship are due solely to U.S. actions. It continues to insist that China only wants "win-win," productive outcomes and that it has no intention nor desire to displace the U.S. position in the world nor undertake policies designed to weaken or constrain the United States. But this belies a determined Chinese effort to reduce international support for U.S. alliances, create alternative economic, security, and political structures to those led by the United States, and increase its military or quasi-military pressure on U.S. allies and partners. Such soothing Chinese words also run counter to internal statements made on several occasions by Xi Jinping and Chinese officials to the effect that China must develop far greater economic and military capabilities in order to counter a United States that is fundamentally committed to weakening China and ending communist party rule.
Whether precipitated by supposedly threatening U.S. actions or rooted primarily in preexisting ideological views (or both), such Chinese behavior and attitudes will continue to validate, in the minds of many U.S. observers, the disingenuous nature of Chinese statements and the fundamentally threatening nature of the Chinese regime and thereby continue to justify arguments for ever greater levels of deterrence over any meaningful attempts at reassurance on virtually any issue, from trade to Taiwan.
Adding to the problem, the mutually reinforcing, negative dynamic still operating on both sides will no doubt continue to generate considerable fatalism among some scholars, political figures, and defense analysts who posit that greatly increased levels of military deterrence are needed to avert an otherwise unavoidable conflict, or that such conflict will ultimately prove inevitable regardless of how much deterrence is employed. From this perspective, the notion that Washington or Beijing can be reassured in meaningful ways on vital issues becomes largely moot.
The most significant source of such pessimism is the specific dynamic regarding Taiwan, along with the poor state of crisis communication between Washington and Beijing. On the former issues, leaders in both countries publicly espouse, in rote terms, their commitment to the original bilateral understanding regarding the island that has kept the peace for decades — involving Chinese support for peaceful unification as a top priority and U.S. support for its One China policy. However, both sides have nonetheless steadily eroded the credibility of that understanding through both words and actions, to the point where such mutual assurances now carry little weight in either capital. As both sides fail to credibly reassure each other, the likelihood of an eventual conflict would increase.
Nothing that Biden and Xi said at their meeting offers the prospect of altering this dynamic going forward, despite Biden's endorsement of the One China policy and his reported reaffirmation of commitments he made last year in Bali. Rather than clearly reaffirming and explaining the basic limits that will exist on U.S. relations with and support for Taiwan (central to the One China policy) and the absence of any deadline for Chinese efforts to unify with Taiwan (central to Beijing's policy of peaceful unification), the two presidents merely repeated past statements, while advising one another to stop provoking the situation.
On defense issues and crisis communication, the two presidents' statement of their commitment to resuming or strengthening a few defense dialogues and channels of communication is certainly a good thing. However, no mention was made of several more important interactions, including the Defense Consultative Talks (renamed the Defense Strategic Dialogue in 2020), the Asia Pacific Security Dialogue (renamed the Defense Policy Exchange, also in 2020), and the Crisis Communication Working Group (CCWG), which fell into disuse after 2021. These dialogues are all highly essential to any effort to provide an enduring and productive foundation for the relationship
In the absence of such stability, the failure of the two presidents to clearly reaffirm the CCWG is particularly disappointing. In fact, resuming CCWG meetings should be the first step in creating a broader crisis dialogue that extends well beyond the mil-mil level. This dialogue should involve both civilian and military officials from several agencies with the experience, knowledge, and authority to discuss the full range of attitudes, policies, and possible mechanisms that relate to managing and preventing crises.
Such an ambitious but necessary effort will likely require the creation of a two-tier or two-channel crisis dialogue, one focusing on national-level issues relating to the strategy and policy aspects of crisis prevention and management, and the second channel relating primarily to defense establishment prerogatives and responsibilities, but with some civilian input. The latter would focus mainly on crisis management mechanisms, and the former on risk reduction/prevention and policy solutions.
Creating such a structure will, in turn, require a willingness on both sides to recognize that they each contribute to the negative dynamic driving toward a crisis over Taiwan or some other bilateral political-military dispute and that both crisis prevention and crisis management must be essential topics for discussion in any efforts to avoid confrontation and conflict. None of this was suggested at the Biden-Xi summit.
Because of this failure, Beijing will likely continue to resist creating genuine crisis management dialogues and mechanisms, viewing them as a way for Washington to escalate its provocative, crisis-inducing behavior while avoiding an actual conflict. And Washington will continue to resist Beijing's desire to discuss crisis prevention, viewing it as a way for China to pressure the United States to reduce its support for Taiwan, or its military presence in Asia.
Overcoming this impasse will not be easy but could occur with the assistance of unofficial crisis dialogues held at the Track Two or Track 1.5 level. Such conversations between former officials, scholars, and military officers, some in existence for years, can raise topics and present ideas and solutions that would prove virtually impossible at the official Track One level. But no hint of this was evident at the summit, or in subsequent remarks by lower-level officials.
The Biden-Xi meeting was arguably a lost opportunity to open the door toward a more genuinely stable and productive long-term Sino-American relationship. At best, it has temporarily slowed the pace toward more contention and possibly conflict, especially over Taiwan. Lacking the will and political courage to take the hard, risky steps that could put relations on a sound footing over the longer term, the two presidents opted for "small beer," in the form of a few soothing words and limited agreements. As a result, the relationship will likely continue to slide downward and remain prone to severe disruptions. Perhaps it is asking too much of the two presidents to take any risks in attempting to reach a more solid foundation, but the stakes involved suggest that they would be well worth taking.

Yesterday, the New York Times published a guest essay by Craig Singleton, a fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, entitled "China's Military is Going Global." Singleton argues that Beijing is well on its way to building a globe-spanning network of "strategic strong points along China's major trade, energy, and resource routes" that pose a dire military threat to the United States. Allegedly using the structure of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative of commercial infrastructure projects, Beijing's supposedly new "under the radar" strategy is seen as directly challenging Washington's ability to carry out critical overseas military missions, including the defense of Taiwan.In response to this expanding threat, Singleton calls for Washington to devise a strategy designed to "pre-emptively" neutralize China's moves, including "incentives or punishments" directed at host governments.It is surprising that the New York Times saw fit to publish such an essay, since it is replete with distortions, exaggerations, and speculations. There is no question that China's overseas military-related activities merits close examination, especially when they take place in sensitive areas. But such an examination requires a careful parsing of actual facts, with clear distinctions made between proposed plans, actual undertakings, commercial versus military (and non-military security) purposes, and the likely military benefits for China that might ensue from a particular location or operation. Instead of observing such requirements, Singleton plays fast and loose with the evidence, subtly caveating his statements with weasel words like "might," "may," "could," "suggests," "suspected," etc. Nonetheless, almost every conceivable possible, current, or emerging overseas Chinese commercial, scientific, or security "presence" is labeled as part of a deliberate, coordinated, military-centered strategy to "reshape the global military landscape" in Beijing's favor and hence to threaten the U.S. In reality, China has thus far established only one actual, operating overseas military base, on the horn of Africa, in Djibouti, and is probably establishing a naval facility in Cambodia. But there are real limits to how far China can go in duplicating such places. As Isaac Kardon of the Carnegie Endowment has pointed out, China has no formal military alliances (beyond the dubious case of North Korea) and is unlikely to acquire any in the foreseeable future, a fact that imposes major constraints on its ability to establish serious military bases. Few if any countries wish to commit to housing full-fledged, sizeable military facilities that could project Chinese military power across their region and, in the process, invite an American response. Moreover, many of the actual security-related facilities that Singleton employs as evidence for his argument serve functions other than militarily threatening the United States, such as anti-piracy missions, UN peace-keeping rotations, non-combatant evacuation operations in an emergency, or the protection of nearby investments. And their ability to evolve beyond such functions is likely to remain highly limited. Most recipient states want Chinese commerce and investment above all else. Indeed, many of the supposed new Chinese bases or proto bases identified by Singleton consist primarily of a commercial or civilian scientific presence, some with only a vague potential for military use. A few existing commercial facilities (such as in the UAE) might acquire limited military functions, but in many cases this remains unclear. One can argue that such commercial locations do serve a kind of strategic purpose, but as part of Beijing's efforts to become a major commercial and scientific/technological power, not to directly threaten U.S. global military dominance. In addition, even if a clearer military function were to emerge in many of China's overseas facilities, it is far from clear that it would in most cases provide Beijing with the kind of daunting strategic benefit that Singleton alleges. For example, some analysts of the facility in Cambodia have argued that it will provide few new operational advantages for the PLA. In truth, Singleton's argument is an updated and expanded version of the so-called "string of pearls" idea that appeared many years ago. Originating with an American corporation, the concept sought to link together some of China's overseas activities in Southeast Asia and along the Indian Ocean to the Middle East to form a grand Chinese strategic move to dominate the region militarily and politically. As with the present version, the reality fell far short, usually for similar reasons.Finally, it is troubling that Singleton recommends that Washington should adopt both incentives and coercive means to preemptively neutralize China's allegedly nefarious overseas activities. If applied to most of the existing examples he provides of these activities, such an effort could easily backfire, as target countries interpret Washington's behavior as an attempt to undermine what they regard as legitimate commercial and scientific transactions with China.China's expanding overseas commercial, scientific, and security presence requires close, careful examination, no question. Unfortunately, this essay does not offer such analysis. Indeed, by publishing it, the New York Times has more likely provoked an even greater level of threat inflation than already exists in Washington and elsewhere.

The emergence of the People's Republic of China on the world scene constitutes the most significant event in world politics since the end of World War II. As the world's predominant political, economic, and military power, the United States faces a particularly significant challenge in responding to China's rising power and influence, especially in Asia. Offering a fresh perspective on current and future U.S. policy toward China, Michael Swaine examines the basic interests and beliefs behind U.S.-China relations, recent U.S. and Chinese policy practices in seven key areas, and future

"Sensitivities and suspicions between Washington and Beijing have heightened as China's global power and influence have grown. Chinese and American officials and participants in past confrontations, and scholars from both countries explore the changing features of crisis behavior and their implications for defusing future encounters"--Provided by publisher

PREFACE -- FIGURES -- SUMMARY -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- ACRONYMS -- INTRODUCTION -- NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY -- SENIOR ORGANIZATIONS AND LEADERS -- Offices of the President and Vice President -- Office of the Premier of the Executive Yuan -- National Security Council -- Ministry of Foreign Affairs -- Ministry of National Defense -- General Staff Headquarters -- National Security Bureau -- The Kuomintang Standing Committee and Advisory Committees -- The Foreign and Overseas Affairs and National Defense Committees of the Legislative Yuan -- THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS -- Ad Hoc, Private Meetings -- Limited Bureaucratic Policy Mechanisms -- DEFENSE POLICY, FORCE STRUCTURE, AND BUDGET/ PROCUREMENT DECISIONS -- SENIOR ORGANIZATIONS AND LEADERS -- Office of the President -- Ministry of National Defense -- General Staff Headquarters -- Armed Services General Headquarters -- Legislative Yuan -- Impending Organizational Changes -- Defense Strategy and Force Structure Priorities -- THE WEAPONS PROCUREMENT DECISIONMAKING PROCESS -- Defense Plan and Budget Determination -- General Procurement Proposal Formulation -- CGS/MND Evaluation -- President/Premier Evaluation -- LY Intervention -- U.S./ROC Discussions -- Implementation -- Overall Assessment -- CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY.