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Although there is plentiful research on the impact of marriage, employment and the military on desistance from criminal behaviour in the lives of men, far less is known about the factors most important to women's desistance. Imprisoned women are far more likely than their male counterparts to be the primary caretakers of children before their incarceration, and are far more likely to intend to reunify with their children upon their release from incarceration. This book focuses on the role of mothering in women's desistance from criminal behaviour. Drawing on original research, this book explores the nature of mothering during incarceration, how mothers maintain a relationship with their children from behind bars and the ways in which mothering makes desistance more or less likely after incarceration. It outlines the ways in which race, gender, class, nationality, sexuality, gender identity, and other characteristics affect mothering and desistance, and explores the tensions between individual and system-level factors in the consideration of desistance. This book suggests that any discussion of desistance, particularly for women, must move beyond the traditional focus on individual characteristics and decision-making. Such a focus overlooks the role played by context and systems which undermine both women's attempts to be mothers and their attempts to desist. By contrast, in the tradition of Beth Richie's Compelled to Crime, this book explores both the trees and the forests, and the quantum in-between, in a way that aims for lasting societal and individual changes.

The global prison industrial complex was built on Black and brown women's bodies. This economy will not voluntarily loosen its hold on the bodies that feed it. White carceral feminists traditionally encourage State punishment, while anti-carceral, intersectional feminism recognizes that it empowers an ineffective and racist system. In fact, it is built on the criminalization of women's survival strategies, creating a "victimization to prison pipeline." But prisons are not the root of the problem; rather, they are a manifestation of the over-policing of Black women's bodies, poverty, and motherhood. Such State surveillance will continue unless we disrupt these powerful systems both inside and outside prisons.

The papers of this thesis are not available in Munin: 1. Clark, D. J., and Michalsen, A.: 'Managerial Incentives for Technology Transfer', Economics of Innovation and New Technology (2010), vol.19, no.7:649-668. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10438590903128974 2. Michalsen, A.: 'R&D Policy in a Vertically Related Industry' (forthcomming paper in Economics of Innovation and New Technology). 3. Michalsen, A.: 'R&D Cooperation and Market Structure' (manuscript) ; Abstract My thesis focuses on technology transfer and innovation policy in a knowledge-based society. In particular, I analyse the firms' incentives to invest in research and development (R&D), the transfer of technological knowledge to a rival and government stimulation of R&D investment. Further, I analyse the incentives to engage in R&D cooperation in different market structures. By coordinating R&D decisions the firms can internalize the externalities of their research effort, and thereby strengthen the incentives to perform R&D. The dissertation consists of three essays where I develop theoretical models within the subject of strategic R&D investment. As a consequence of externalities that arise when conducting R&D, the economic value to society often exceeds the economic benefits enjoyed by the innovating firms. Since the output of R&D investments is non-rival and only partially excludable, some of the knowledge also benefits their competitors and thereby reduces the incentive to engage in R&D activities. By coordinating these R&D activities the firms can internalize this externality. Knowledge created by one firm is typically not contained within that firm, and R&D spillovers occur when technological knowledge produced by one firm is transferred to other firms, both voluntarily and involuntarily. In my first paper I study how separation of ownership and management affects firms' incentives to transfer technological knowledge voluntarily and without payment from a rival in a Cournot duopoly. The main finding is that strategic management does not necessarily increase the incentives to transfer technology, but it can change the adoption of technologies. In my next paper I study the effectiveness of public funding aimed at stimulating business performed R&D in a vertically related market. In particular, the focus of the analysis is how to set the policy instruments upstream and downstream in order to achieve an optimal level of innovation in the whole industry. I show that it is always optimal to subsidize the R&D activity of the upstream firm. Whether a tax or a subsidy is used in the downstream market depends upon its level of concentration. If there are few firms downstream, then it is always optimal to employ an R&D subsidy in this part of the market. However, if competition is sufficiently strong, then R&D activity downstream should be taxed. The optimal R&D policy implies a differentiation of the subsidy rates between the upstream and the downstream market. Moreover, subsidizing the upstream supplier has a greater effect on welfare than the stimulation of each of the downstream buyers. In my third paper I study strategic R&D alliances among asymmetric firms. I consider a market where some of the firms are active in research, while other firms do not conduct R&D. With non-innovative firms as technologically leading firms, the innovating firms invest in R&D to narrow the technological gap. On the other hand, with the technologically leading firms investing in R&D they expand their technological advantage. In the analysis I determine whether R&D cooperation leads to higher levels of R&D than R&D competition under different market structures. Cost asymmetries among firms seems to enlarge the interval of spillover rates where cooperative R&D secures greater R&D effort than competitive behaviour, and this depends on the number of firms that do not perform R&D or the number of firms that do not receive R&D spillover.