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Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession

With tools borrowed from the economic analysis of insurance, principal-agency theory has allowed political scientists new insights into the role of information asymmetry & incentives in political relationships. It has given us a way to think formally about power as the modification of incentives to induce actions in the interests of the principal. Principal-agency theory has evolved significantly as political scientists have sought to make it more applicable to peculiarly political institutions. In congressional oversight of the bureaucracy, increasing emphasis has been placed on negotiation of administrative procedures, rather than the imposition of outcome-based incentives, as originally conceived. Awareness of the problem of credible commitment has impelled more dramatic reformulations, in which agents perform their function only when their interests conflict with those of the principal, & they are guaranteed some degree of autonomy. 37 References. Adapted from the source document.

Formal analytical techniques developed by economists for the investigation of private goods markets are increasingly being applied to the study of politics. Some of the recent applications of such techniques to the phenomenon of bureaucratic budgeting are reviewed. While various previous models have investigated the budgeting decision of the bureau chief, or of the bureau's sponsor, both decisions must be modeled in strategic interaction. Game theory is used here for that purpose, by giving the bureau's sponsor a budget allocating strategy dimension, & the bureau chief a budget utilization or compliance strategy dimension. With certain plausible assumptions, equilibria in the game may not be unique or efficient (Pareto optimal). The possible usefulness of the game theoretic technique is demonstrated for a generalized hierarchical interaction between a supervisor & subordinate, suggesting that Pareto suboptimality may be a typical, built-in characteristic of strategic interaction in a hierarchical context. 4 Figures. AA.

"Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession"--

Most rational choice theories of committee decision making predict a process of competitive coalition formation leading to a minimum winning coalition. Committee experiments reported to date tend to support these theories. However, both theories and committee experiments are contradicted by the evidence of real-world legislatures making distributive decisions; these decisions are characterized by coalitions of the whole providing virtually all members with a share of distributive benefits. The results in this article help to resolve this contradiction by showing that if the committee experimental design includes a universalistic alternative which provides a high level of expected benefits for committee members, it will be selected. Competitive coalition formation occurs in experimental settings which do not include such an alternative. The results call into question the generality of ordinalist theories of competitive coalition formation.

MOST RATIONAL CHOICE THEORIES OF COMMITTEE DECISION MAKING PREDICT A PROCESS OF COMPETITIVE COALITION FORMATION LEADING TO A MINIMUM WINNING COALITION. COMMITTEE EXPERIMENTS REPORTED TO DATE TEND TO SUPPORT THESE THEORIES. HOWEVER, BOTH THEORIES AND COMMITTEE EXPERIMENTS ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE OF REAL-WORLD LEGISLATURES MAKING DISTRIBUTIVE DECISIONS; THESE DECISIONS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY COALITIONS OF THE WHOLE PROVIDING VIRTUALLY ALL MEMBERS WITH A SHARE OF DISTRIBUTIVE BENEFITS. THERESULTS IN THIS ARTICLE HELP TO RESOLVE THIS CONTRADICTION BY SHOWING THAT IF THE COMMITTEE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN INCLUDES A UNIVERSALISTIC ALTERNATIVE WHICH PROVIDES A HIGH LEVEL OF EXPECTED BENEFITS FOR COMMITTEE MEMBERS, IT WILL BE SELECTED. COMPETITIVE COALITION FORMATION OCCURS IN EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS WHICH DO NOT INCLUDE SUCH AN ALTERNATIVE. THE RESULTS CALL INTO QUESTION THE GENERALLY OF ORDINALIST THEORIES OF COMPETITIVE COALITION FORMATION.