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It has long been assumed that Parliament has unlimited power to enact legislation cancelling valid contracts and denying compensation to any persons affected. This paper challenges that conventional wisdom. The author argues that the principle of the rule of law requires that governments be accountable in the ordinary courts for wrongful actions of government officials. This principle is undermined if government is absolved from any liability for breach of a fairly bargained and valid contract. Thus, legislation purporting to abrogate contracts and deny compensation is invalid, since it violates the implied limits on legislative authority associated with the rule of law. The author also explains how protecting contractual expectations in the manner suggested does not unduly limit Parliamentary sovereignty, and will not result in a wholesale constitutional entrenchment of property rights.

This paper considers the various legal issues that would arise in the context of Quebec's secession from Canada, and attempts to situate these issues politically. The author argues that, under the current constitutional amending formula, Quebec secession would require the support of the federal Parliament as well as the unanimous consent of the provinces; he also suggests that it is extremely unlikely that this level of support would be attained. The paper goes on to explore the possibility of Quebec seceding from Canada through a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), suggesting that the success or failure of a UDI would depend upon the ability of Quebec to exercise effective and exclusive control over its own territory and population. The author also argues that a Quebec UDI would almost certainly be contested by Canada, thus precipitating a costly contest for legal supremacy between the Canadian and Quebec governments. The legal, economic, and political uncertainty associated with two rival regimes would impose enormous costs on everyone involved, leading to author to conclude that a Quebec uDi is a legal possibility, but quite impractical and unacceptable in pragmatic political terms. The final section of the paper considers the implications of the recent proposals for joint political institutions between a sovereign Quebec and Canada, claiming that joint political institutions are unlikely to be created following sovereignty.