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How do authoritative international bodies decide that states have complied with their orders? Compliance research has mostly focused on how states react to rulings and how interest groups mobilize for and against compliance. Less has been said about how international bodies certify compliance with their orders in contexts of conflicting interests and incomplete information. Because in theory the seal of compliance could be given to different types and volumes of state actions, we argue that when nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) monitor implementation closely, international adjudicators will be more demanding in compliance certification, resulting in more protracted compliance monitoring processes. We test our expectations in the case of the Inter- American Commission of Human Rights and find that recommendations take longer to reach status of full compliance when more NGOs act as petitioners and when they have more experience with monitoring compliance. If NGOs help that more effective implementation receives an international organization's seal of approval, large numbers of orders without full compliance might not necessarily be bad news about human rights on the ground.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is controversial, acutely so in Africa. The first thirty-nine people it indicted were all African. It did not open any formal investigations outside Africa until the 2016 decision to investigate conduct related to the 2008 Georgia-Russia war. The first three notifications of withdrawal from the ICC Statute, each made in 2016, were by Burundi, South Africa, and Gambia. While South Africa and Zambia reversed their initial intentions, Burundi in fact became the first state party to withdraw from the ICC in October 2017. These maneuvers are closely connected to country-specific political and legal considerations, but they overlap with concerns expressed by governments in other countries including Kenya and Namibia. Among these concerns is that "the ICC has become the greatest threat to Africa's sovereignty, peace and stability," and that "the ICC is a colonial institution under the guise of international justice."

Abstract
This article addresses the underrepresentation of Global South scholars in Global North journals. In order to explore this issue, we conducted a study on the submission decisions of Global South scholars, with a focus on International Relations (IR). We collected novel data on IR scholars based in Latin America and conducted a conjoint experiment on a sample of 446 scholars. Our study provides the first experimental evidence of journal submission choice in Political Science in the Global South. Our findings indicate that both journal attributes and individual characteristics impact the choice of journal, including factors such as language, editorial location, and acceptance rates. This research has important implications for the discipline and for journal editors in the Global North, as it provides valuable insights on how to promote diversity in academic publishing as well as the limits of such strategies.

ABSTRACTClaims about international relations and political science more broadly becoming more globalized coexist with enduring critiques of the discipline being dominated by scholars from wealthier Western countries. This article leverages data on publication patterns between 2008 and 2020 in the Argentine IR community, which we believe is a relevant and potentially representative sample from the Global South, to show that the discipline is becoming more globalized yet also more segmented. We argue that this segmentation is a product of unequal participation in social and professional networks. The norms and information that circulate through these networks shape the inclination as well as the ability of Global South scholars to join a globalizing discipline.

When negotiating investment treaties, states balance two goals: providing strong protections for investors (investor protection), which is thought to attract foreign direct investment, and maintaining the ability to regulate their economies (regulatory autonomy). In this article we argue that treaty content can tell us about the latent preferences that states have over the level of investor protection enshrined in BITs. We use an item response theory (IRT) model and a dataset of 1,144 treaties to estimate latent preferences on this scale for signatory countries. Our measure is of use to scholars interested in studying bilateral investment treaties, international law, and foreign direct investment, and our model is of use to anyone aiming to estimate latent preferences from jointly produced manifestations.