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Why do some autocratic governments do better than others in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI)? The received wisdom holds that democracies enjoy advantages over autocracies when it comes to attracting FDI. But there exist autocratic countries that attract substantial amounts of FDI. For example, during the last two decades, about half of the top 20 non-OECD host countries are nondemocratic. Focusing on the role of commitment institutions by which host countries can commit their protection of foreign assets, I argue that autocrats with long time horizons can provide stronger institutions to protect property rights. This allows them to attract more FDI. Using an error correction model (EDM) covering autocratic countries from 1970 to 2008, I find evidence that strongly supports my argument. These findings suggest that what matters to foreign investors is not regime type per se but specific institutional features of the host country. Insofar as host countries provide sound institutions to protect foreign assets, they would be able to attract more foreign investment.

Why do some autocratic governments do better than others in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI)? The received wisdom holds that democracies enjoy advantages over autocracies when it comes to attracting FDI. But there exist autocratic countries that attract substantial amounts of FDI. For example, during the last two decades, about half of the top 20 non-OECD host countries are nondemocratic. Focusing on the role of commitment institutions by which host countries can commit their protection of foreign assets, I argue that autocrats with long time horizons can provide stronger institutions to protect property rights. This allows them to attract more FDI. Using an error correction model (EDM) covering autocratic countries from 1970 to 2008, I find evidence that strongly supports my argument. These findings suggest that what matters to foreign investors is not regime type per se but specific institutional features of the host country. Insofar as host countries provide sound institutions to protect foreign assets, they would be able to attract more foreign investment.

AbstractObjectiveThis study investigates the impact of remittances on the shadow economy and how domestic institutions, particularly property rights, moderate this relationship.MethodsWe employed a quantitative research method using panel data from developing countries from 1990 to 2018. We adopted both fixed‐effects and instrumental variable approaches to address possible endogeneity concerns between remittances and the shadow economy.ResultsThe results demonstrate that remittances are positively associated with the shadow economy's size. However, this positive effect is weaker in countries with strong property rights institutions. These findings remain robust across alternative measures of key variables and estimation techniques.ConclusionThe results suggest that foreign income in the form of remittances is an important determinant of the shadow economy in recipient countries. We believe that exploring the relationship between foreign sources of income and the decisions of economic actors to enter specific sectors warrants further investigation.

AbstractRecent scholarly efforts to reveal the political effects of transnational terrorism are encouraging. They contribute to our understanding of how terrorism affects the targeted societies. We attempt to extend this line of research by examining the political impact of domestic terrorism. Domestic incidents overwhelmingly outnumber transnational incidents. In addition, the differences between domestic and transnational incidents may produce political outcomes. We examine the impact of domestic terrorism on the political survival of national leaders in the targeted societies. Our cross-national time-series analysis on a worldwide sample of 172 countries over the 1970–2014 period shows that domestic terrorism has a significant positive impact on leadership change. This impact is robust to various estimation techniques. This result suggests that heightened incidents of domestic terrorism hasten the removal of incumbent leaders in the targeted societies.

States play a critical role in designing institutions to facilitate international business. We study the effect of autocratic states' time horizons on their attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) through designing domestic and international institutions. We argue that autocrats with a long time horizon tend to build credible domestic commitment-institutions that attract foreign investors; however, they are also likely to affect the design of commitment carve-outs in international institutions, in particular bilateral investment treaties, thus weakening their institutional effect on foreign investment. We test these dual effects of regime time horizon on FDI inflow using data from 80 autocratic states over a 33-year period and find substantial support for our arguments.

AbstractThe positive influence of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries' economic growth has been widely debated. Given the mixed empirical evidence, scholars have sought to find the economic preconditions under which FDI spillovers are likely to occur and facilitate economic growth in the host countries. Those preconditions are not exogenously dictated but largely shaped by governments' policy preferences. Particularly in autocracies, an autocrat's policy preferences are the driving force that determines whether a host country is likely to be equipped with growth-friendly institutions and policies. We argue that such economic institutions and policies are dependent on the time horizons of autocrats in power. Our empirical analysis covering 64 autocratic countries from 1970 to 2005 supports our main argument that FDI has a positive effect on growth when autocratic time horizons are sufficiently long, and positive FDI spillovers mainly occur through the protection of property right institutions.