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Using data from a 1987 nationwide survey of U.S. cities of 25,000 population and above, this research analyzes the formal authority and the informal powers associated with the office of mayor. We divide cities by mayor-council or council-manager form. The findings confirm that elected chief executives in mayoral cities possess considerably more formal authority than their counterparts in manager communities, yet informal mayoral powers are quite comparable among these two forms of government. Using ANOVA (GLS), we also predict variations in mayoral power using five demographic and political variables. Among mayor-council cities, location in a central city and large size are the best explanatory variables. For manager cities, regional location and the presence of partisan ballots and ward elections are the best predictors of mayoral power.

Beginning in the late 1970s and accelerating during the 1980s, U.S. cities lost substantial federal assistance. This research identifies those cities that were especially dependent on federal transfer payments both before and after most of the cuts had been made. The authors also analyze changes in municipal fiscal behavior between 1975 and 1987. In 1975, the most aid-dependent places were central cities suffering both socioeconomic and fiscal stress. Only central city status and socioeconomic hardship were primary predictors of aid dependency 12 years later. The second stage of the analysis shows, unexpectedly, that the loss of federal funds was not a significant influence on the fiscal decisions made in this large group of cities.

Compares state and federal redistribution of assistance to local US school districts.

A model of intergovernmental service contracting is tested for U.S. cities of 25,000 and over population. In this model, the decision process is assumed to be shaped by many of the same forces that affect contracting to the private sector, namely, cost considerations, fiscal pressures, and political influences. Considerable support is found for the model, although fiscal stress is not a major impetus for contracting with other jurisdictions. The presence of a city manager facilitates greater intergovernmental contracting, although restrictive state laws limit such arrangements. Above all, when local officials fear loss of service control, less intergovernmental contracting occurs.