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Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES -- PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter One. Overview -- Chapter Two. Utility Theory -- Chapter Three. Specifying a Game -- Chapter Four. Classical Game Theory -- Chapter Five. Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection -- Chapter Six. Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria -- Chapter Seven. More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibria -- Chapter Eight. Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefs -- Chapter Nine. Repeated Games -- Chapter Ten. Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? -- Appendix One: Basic Mathematical Knowledge -- Appendix Two: Answers to Selected Problems -- NOTES -- GLOSSARY OF TERMS IN GAME THEORY -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

Order within Anarchy focuses on how the laws of war create strategic expectations about how states and their soldiers will act during war, which can help produce restraint. The success of the laws of war depends on three related factors: compliance between warring states and between soldiers on the battlefield, and control of soldiers by their militaries. A statistical study of compliance of the laws of war during the twentieth century shows that joint ratification strengthens both compliance and reciprocity, compliance varies across issues with the scope for individual violations, and violations occur early in war. Close study of the treatment of prisoners of war during World Wars I and II demonstrates the difficulties posed by states' varied willingness to limit violence, a lack of clarity about what restraint means, and the practical problems of restraint on the battlefield

"The Interaction of Theory and Data" published on by Oxford University Press.

A Presidential Address provides one with the opportunity to look backwards and forward. Backwards to understand how we got to where we are now; forwards to suggest paths to further progress. I will focus on the range of research methods that the members of the Society use, how they have evolved during my engagement with the Society, and some suggestions of how we can develop them further.

The laws of war seek to regulate conduct during wartime. The record of compliance with these treaties is mixed. I explain compliance as the result of publicly accepted and so legally binding agreements that create incentives for the parties to enforce those agreements through reciprocity. Ratification by a democracy is a signal that it intends to abide by the treaty standard; those that ratify are more likely to comply. Ratification does not effect the behavior of nondemocracies, however. Ratification of the relevant treaty by both warring parties strengthens reciprocity. There is a hierarchy of average compliance across issues which matches the scope for violations by individuals on each issue, with greater scope for such violations corresponding to lower levels of compliance.

A comment on Andrew Bennett, Ahron Barth, & Kenneth R. Rutherford's & Peregrine Schwartz-Shea's articles on methodological trends in political science instruction & scholarship (both, 2003) argues that specialization in graduate training & methodological focus in journals are required for methodological diversity in the discipline. Training for pluralistic ends would result in either a lack of true understanding of any methods or be too demanding on students' time. Further, requiring journals to represent all methods might interfere with communication in the field. Why the American Political Science Review underrepresents methodologies is considered in closing. 1 Photograph, 5 References. J. Zendejas