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Introduction: cross-border banking in a globalized era -- A primer on international financial standards on illicit financing -- A theory of unofficial market enforcement -- The FATF's fight against illicit financing -- How the noncomplier list drives FATF compliance -- Unofficial market enforcement against listed countries -- Fighting illicit financing in Southeast Asia -- Conclusion: the power and peril of markets as enforcers.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Contents -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Cross-Border Banking in a Globalized -- 1. A Primer on International Financial Standards on Illicit Financing -- 2. A Theory of Unofficial Market Enforcement -- 3. The FATF's Fight against Illicit Financing -- 4. How the Noncomplier List Drives FATF Compliance -- 5. Unofficial Market Enforcement against Listed Countries -- 6. Fighting Illicit Financing in Southeast Asia -- Conclusion: The Power and Peril of Markets as Enforcers -- Appendix -- Notes -- References -- Index

AbstractThis paper highlights how international organizations can use global performance indicators (GPIs) to drive policy change through transnational market pressure. When international organizations are credible assessors of state policy, and when monitored countries compete for market resources, GPIs transmit information about country risk and stabilize market expectations. Under these conditions banks and investors may restrict access to capital in noncompliant states and incentivize increased compliance. I demonstrate this market-enforcement mechanism by analyzing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body that issues nonbinding recommendations to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The FATF's public listing of noncompliant jurisdictions has prompted international banks to move resources away from listed states and raised the costs of continued noncompliance, significantly increasing the number of states with laws criminalizing terrorist financing. This finding suggests a powerful pathway through which institutions influence domestic policy and highlights the power of GPIs in an age where information is a global currency.

AbstractCountry participation in one-state, one-vote forums like the United Nations General Assembly often reflects underlying power asymmetries and endogenous political processes. Voting alignment is undoubtedly an important preference indicator. However, this paper contends that it is incomplete; silence is politically significant as well. Weak states use absence as a form of institutional power that shields them from geopolitical pressure and competing-principals problems. While abstention is a public signal of neutrality that undercuts voting unanimity, the ambiguous intent of absence makes it a distinct form of political expression. We examine the politics of absences at the General Assembly, highlighting how states may be strategically absent from select votes for political reasons. Building on the Bailey et al. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2), 430–456, 2017 roll-call voting data, we distinguish strategic absences from other types of absence and provide evidence that such behavior is linked to US interests and competing-principals problems. Taking these non-random reasons for missingness into account provides a fuller picture of how weak states engage with international institutions and highlights how silence can be a consequence of larger political processes.