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The Digital Business Ecosystem (DBE) model far surpasses other models and structures in its scope, scale, and complexity. DBEs feature unique economic, technological, business, and growth characteristics that increase their opacity to consumers, competition enforcers, and lawmakers. These include a range of market failures, the role of cloud computing in realizing the DBE value proposition, and growth through acquisition.The United States is making slow progress in addressing competition concerns in the digital sector. Legislative initiatives remain focused on the largest players, and there is little political appetite for a dedicated sector regulator to develop a system of non-discrimination "access" regulation. This article discusses the implications of the widening gap between the complexity and growth of DBEs, and policy responses to the market power problems they raise. The analysis recommends a more coherent approach centered on identifying policy tools—including antitrust, regulation, and privacy law—that are best suited to addressing the unique features of DBEs and that work in a complementary way.

The Antitrust Revolution remains the only comprehensive framework for understanding major developments in antitrust through the economic case study device. In putting the debate over the role of economics in modern antitrust at center stage, The Antitrust Revolution identifies the broader themes that have emerged in antitrust enforcement over the last four decades. This article explores The Antitrust Revolution as a "microcosm" of antitrust, and valuable pedagogical tool, by unpacking the coeditors' approach to case selection across seven editions. The analysis highlights how The Antitrust Revolution has, in retrospect, identified with remarkable accuracy the major developments and conflicts in antitrust law and economics over a critical period of time in U.S. history.

During the past eighteen years, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) has grown into the flagship competition advocacy organization in the United States. In handing off the leadership to his successor, AAI's founder and first president, Bert Foer, leaves a legacy rich in the ideology of progressive antitrust. His successor, Diana Moss, discusses the challenges of making AAI into a durable institution moving forward, and she recaps the unique contributions to this special tribute issue by Harry First and Eleanor Fox, Robert Skitol, David Lawsky, and Bill Kovacic.

The transgenic seed industry provides an ideal case study of major competition policy and antitrust enforcement questions associated with systems. These systems consist, at a minimum, of upstream markets for genetic traits (e.g., herbicide-tolerance and insect-resistance) and downstream markets for traited seeds. Corn, soybeans, and cotton are particularly important crops on which transgenic innovations have had an impact. The article begins by discussing the remarkable nature of the transgenic seed revolution, the role of innovation, and the importance of patent protection. It moves on to examine how rapid consolidation has created systems with significant vertical and horizontal integration. These sections help establish the framework for examining two major types of systems—open and closed. Such systems are defined primarily by whether the combinations or "stacks" of genetic traits contained in traited seed involve the technology of a single firm or multiple firms. They give rise to two major modalities of competition—intrasystem and intersystem rivalry. In transgenic seed, the presence of a dominant firm has arguably had a major influence on the evolution of these modalities, particularly through licensing policies for patented technology. The article highlights the difficult questions associated with the nexus between intellectual property law and antitrust law. Some progress is evident, however, as illustrated by landmark antitrust enforcement actions that address system issues.