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Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Abbreviations -- Preface and Acknowledgements -- Contributing Authors -- Introduction and Overview -- Chapter 1: Recognition of States and Its (Non-) Implication on State Succession: The Case of Successor States to the Former Yugoslavia -- Chapter 2: Disagreements over the Definition of State Property in the Process of State Succession to the Former Yugoslavia -- Chapter 3: Equity and Equitable Principles in the Law of State Succession -- Chapter 4: Matters of State Succession in the World Bank's Practice -- Chapter 5: Questions of State Identity and State Succession in Eastern and Central Europe -- Chapter 6: The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Succession in Respect of Treaties -- Chapter 7: Austria and Slovenia: Succession to Bilateral Treaties and the State Treaty of 1955 -- Chapter 8: Succession of States in Respect of Citizenship: The Case of the Former SFRY -- Chapter 9: Succession to the Former Yugoslavia's External Debt: The Case of Slovenia -- Chapter 10: Succession to the Archives of the Former SFR Yugoslavia -- Chapter 11: Fundamental Controversies in Succession to the Former SFR Yugoslavia -- Name Index -- Subject Index.

Experiences show that countries use one of the following three forms for "institutionalisation" of their private-public partnership (PPP) activities: (i) centralised, (ii) decentralised, and (iii) mixed. The article argues that the form of mixed PPP "institutionalisation" would be the most appropriate for Slovenia. The institutional structure would be composed of three institutions: (i) central PPP unit responsible, first, for horizontal coordination of all PPP policies in the country, and second, for implementation of PPP projects in all those areas where sectoral PPP units would not be created, (ii) very limited number of sectoral PPP units (probably 1 to 2) that would be responsible for implementation of PPP projects in their respective sectors, and (iii) advisory board that would advise the central PPP unit in designing the most complex segments of the PPP policies in the country and would provide a platform for professional discussion and for communication with the public at large on a wide variety of PPP issues. In substance terms, the central PPP unit would be responsible directly to the government while in organisational terms, it would be incorporated into the institutional structure of the ministry of finance with the head of the unit being directly responsible to the minister of finance.

The article discusses main differences in the EU enlargement strategy/process between the one applied for the big-bang Eastern enlargement in 2004/2007 and the one being used for the EU accession of the Western Balkan countries. Within this framework, the article focuses on the key drivers that have contributed to the slowing down of the EU accession process for these countries over the last decade. Among others, these drivers include some traditional ones, such as lessons from the EU-10 enlargement and general "enlargement fatigue" in quite a number of EU member states, as well as a number of more recent ones, such as the consequences of the economic crisis, the migrant/refugee crisis and the Brexit. The reduced appetite of the EU member states for Western Balkan enlargement has been reflected in the reshaped EU enlargement strategy that is now based on the so-called "fundamentals first" approach with the rule of law, early resolution of bilateral issues and strengthened economic governance as its key pillars. Besides, the enlargement process is run today much more on the intergovernmental basis than this was the case during the large Eastern enlargement.

The article discusses main differences in the EU enlargement strategy/process between the one applied for the big-bang Eastern enlargement in 2004/2007 and the one being used for the EU accession of the Western Balkan countries. Within this framework, the article focuses on the key drivers that have contributed to the slowing down of the EU accession process for these countries over the last decade. Among others, these drivers include some traditional ones, such as lessons from the EU-10 enlargement and general "enlargement fatigue" in quite a number of EU member states, as well as a number of more recent ones, such as the consequences of the economic crisis, the migrant/refugee crisis and the Brexit. The reduced appetite of the EU member states for Western Balkan enlargement has been reflected in the reshaped EU enlargement strategy that is now based on the so-called "fundamentals first" approach with the rule of law, early resolution of bilateral issues and strengthened economic governance as its key pillars. Besides, the enlargement process is run today much more on the intergovernmental basis than this was the case during the large Eastern enlargement.

AbstractThis article confirms the validity of the hypothesis that national interests were the driving force behind the process and outcome of negotiations for the EU's next financial perspective for 2007–13. The hypothesis is tested by comparing hypothetical coalitions based on quantified national interests (partial net budgetary balances) and the actual (documented) coalitions. Based on these results, the article also discusses implications of the 'net balances problem' for the 2008/09 EU budget review.