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Résumé Le mythe de l'Eurafrique s'est adapté aux exigences des conjonctures nationales ou européennes pendant la période coloniale. Tantôt il s'agissait de développer le continent africain, tantôt il fallait créer une zone tampon sécuritaire. Pour la CEE, l'Eurafrique constitue un simple accord sur la distribution de fonds d'aide. Cependant, en France le mythe de l'Eurafrique s'est scindé en plusieurs blocs géopolitiques.

Le mythe de l'Eurafrique s'est adapté aux exigences des conjonctures nationales ou européennes pendant la période coloniale. Tantôt il s'agissait de développer le continent africain, tantôt il fallait créer une zone tampon sécuritaire. Pour la CEE, l'Eurafrique constitue un simple accord sur la distribution de fonds d'aide. Cependant, en France le mythe de l'Eurafrique s'est scindé en plusieurs blocs géopolitiques.

This paper explores the question of how Gibraltar's contemporary identity is evolving as its inhabitants manipulate their status as citizens of a contested territory of the European Union. The people of Gibraltar exploit the connotations of 'being European' as part of their ongoing battle to resist Spanish & British efforts to negotiate a bilateral solution to the question of Gibraltar's future political status. Gibraltarians refer to the example of other member state dependencies as they attempt to 'decolonize' their territory & 'modernize' its relations with the UK. The article considers local, British, & Spanish variants of 'decolonization.' While Gibraltar's self-definition as the exemplary European has achieved some recognition, its partial exclusion from the EU causes friction while allowing it to navigate rather uncertainly between possible further autonomy & integration with the UK. Only the former is acceptable to Madrid, & that only within the Spanish state. The European Union has so far been unable to provide a framework within which the dispute may find a solution. 74 References. Adapted from the source document.

Introduction: European enlargement generally refers to the inclusion of new states into the European Union's Treaty area. This article considers instead the enlargement of Economic and Monetary Union into Africa. We know that no part of Africa is in the EU, though Morocco has sought to join, and the island of Mayotte belongs to an EU member state (France) and uses the euro. But the EU's single currency area is not identical with its monetary area. This article is about EMU beyond the EU itself, and in particular about the monetary shadow European colonial history has cast over western and central Africa. Here as well as in the Comoros islands three local currencies were long in the monetary area of France, and are now but local expressions of the euro. That was why in the late 1990s the impending introduction of the single European currency aroused considerable interest and some anxiety in those African countries that faced possible inclusion in the EU's monetary union. The question was whether the EC institutions should take over responsibly for monetary policy in the former French African overseas territories, although they are not in the EU now, and were never part of the EEC before independence. Alternatively, experts in Europe and in Africa considered whether France should maintain its monetary guarantee, and if so, whether the CFA franc should be decoupled from the future European currency. Finally, the CFA franc zones could simply disappear. Today currencies in the fourteen Francophone states plus those of two of Portugal's former African overseas countries are simply local variants of the euro. This paper briefly puts this strange situation in its historical context, considering what has changed and what has not with the changeover from the franc CFA pegged to the French franc, to a franc CFA pegged to the euro. I shall then ask, together with mainly African economists, political analysts and politicians, whether Africa's proxy euro zone should expand to take in perhaps the entire sub Saharan continent, which has a privileged trade and aid relationship with the EU. Alternatively, do Africans and Europeans see a European monetary zone in Africa as an opportunity or as an anachronistic burden? Do Africans within the zone want to remain tied to the EU to a degree that exists in no other sovereign states outside Europe? Two of the three CFA franc cum euro monetary zones have expanded both in nature and in geographical extent, having become economic unions and taken in two ex Portuguese dependencies. Do these now wish to form even larger units and turn themselves into regional common markets, with a common currency that in reality is not a currency at all, but only one or several local variants of the euro? How do other African states regard such ambitions? The answers to these questions require first a brief historical comment.

After World War II when the governments of several European states attempted to form supranational groupings, colonial obligations posed problems that persist to this day. The article traces immediate postwar history, outlining the present relationship between the EC institutions and what remain of member‐state Empires, before proceeding to two case studies. The first concerns the ramifications of 'Euroland' in present or past dependencies after European Monetary Union. The second considers the role of European dependencies in military alliances and analyses how one of the founding Treaties was used in the mid‐1990s after the discovery that it applied extra‐territorially. The conclusion is that the external border of multi‐speed Europe is even more variable than it might otherwise be because of the attachments some member states retain to colonial remnants.