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Selv om det kan hevdes at de ulike elementene som utgjør cyberoperasjoner – undergraving, sabotasje, manipulering, tyveri og desinformasjon – ikke er noe nytt, sprer de seg i dag med en hastighet og i et omfang som er uten historisk sidestykke. Cybersikkerhet er tett sammenvevd med det 21. århundres politiske og militære konflikter. Som NATOs generalsekretær Jens Stoltenberg påpeker, har de fleste konflikter og kriser i våre dager en cyberdimensjon, og det er vanskelig å forestille seg en militær konflikt i dag uten (Stoltenberg, 2016). Av denne grunn har såkalt cyberavskrekking blitt tema for en omfattende militær, politisk og akademisk debatt som kretser rundt et sett av viktige operasjonelle konsepter og overveielser. Et sentralt tema er hvorvidt det kan avskrekkes i cyberspace, gitt attribusjons utfordringene som preger etterdønningene av et cyberangrep. Denne artikkelen stiller spørsmål ved om «cyberavskrekking» er mulig og hensiktsmessig, og drøfter nye mulige måter å tenke rundt avskrekking i cyberspace på.
Abstract in English
Cybersecurity is deeply intertwined with every aspect of today's political and military conflict. In conjunction with the growing acceptance of cyberspace as a military domain, so called "cyber deterrence" has become the subject of extensive military, political and academic debates. Revolving around a set of important strategic and operational concepts the debates are questioning whether deterrence can be achieved in cyberspace. In line with current debates, this article examines if "cyber deterrence" is possible, appropriate, and desirable, yet extends the debate by including new possible ways to think about deterrence and defense in cyberspace. By drawing attention to cyberspace's idiosyncrasies while questioning the orthodoxy of deterrence as a concept, a reconceptualization of "cyber deterrence" that focuses on cyberspace itself is argued for, one which incorporates new outlooks and ideas, some of which may challenge the established boundaries of deterrence theory.

Cybersecurity has attracted significant political, social, and technological attention as contemporary societies have become increasingly reliant on computation. Today, at least within the Global North, there is an ever-pressing and omnipresent threat of the next "cyber-attack" or the emergence of a new vulnerability in highly interconnected supply chains. However, such discursive positioning of threat and its resolution has typically reinforced, and perpetuated, dominant power structures and forms of violence as well as universalist protocols of protection. In this collective discussion, in contrast, six scholars from different disciplines discuss what it means to "do" "critical" research into what many of us uncomfortably refer to as "cybersecurity." In a series of provocations and reflections, we argue that, as much as cybersecurity may be a dominant discursive mode with associated funding and institutional "benefits," it is crucial to look outward, in conversation with other moves to consider our technological moment. That is, we question who and what cybersecurity is for, how to engage as academics, and what it could mean to undo cybersecurity in ways that can reassess and challenge power structures in the twenty-first century.